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Introduction
Over the last decades, the world economy has become considerably more connected across
borders. International trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) have increased dramati-
cally. The value of world merchandise exports rose from $3,676 billion in 1993 to $17,816
billion in 2011 (see WTO, 2012a). Worldwide FDI stock increased in the last two decades
by a factor of 10 from about $2 trillion in 1990 to about $20 trillion in 2011 (see UNCTAD,
2012). As a direct consequence, internationally active firms, i.e., exporters, importers, and
multinational enterprises (MNEs) gain in importance. The number of MNEs worldwide
has more than doubled from about 35,000 in 1990 to about 82,000 in 2008 (see UNCTAD,
1992, 2010). This is important from a microeconomic perspective, since internationally
active firms differ from purely domestic firms. With the availability of firm level data,
researchers have started to analyze these differences. The results have shown that in-
ternationally active firms are on average larger and more productive (Bernard, Jensen,
Redding, and Schott, 2007; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004). These firms are an im-
portant driver of countries’ economic growth. Therefore, it is of high relevance to conduct
in-depth studies of the behavior of internationally active firms.
Taking into account their importance and different character compared to domestic firms,
this dissertation analyzes internationally active firms’ financing, wage setting, and invest-
ment decisions. In the first and second chapter, we analyze theoretically and empirically
why internationally active firms rely heavily on trade credits despite their high costs. The
first chapter focusses on the role of trade credits to alleviate financial constraints, while
the second chapter explores in how far trade credits foster exporting. In the third chap-
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ter, we model theoretically the role of labor unions to explain exporters’ and MNEs’ wage
setting behavior. The last chapter provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of
firms’ decisions where to locate production in foreign countries and how this relates to
the sector of the affiliate that is to be set up abroad. In the remainder of this introduc-
tion, we will summarize the main contribution of each chapter. All four chapters of this
dissertation are self-contained such that they can be read independently.
The first two chapters of this dissertation analyze why internationally active firms use
trade credits intensively. Trade credits are credits extended between two firms, either
from a supplier to its customer, i.e., supplier credit, or from a customer to its supplier,
i.e., cash-in-advance (CIA). When a firm extends a supplier credit, it allows the buyer to
pay the good after delivery, usually with a delay of 30 to 90 days. In contrast, paying
in advance means that the buyer pays before the delivery of the good and thus provides
the producer with working capital. According to the IMF (2009), about 40% of interna-
tional transactions are financed via supplier credits and about 20% via CIA. At the same
time, trade credits are generally considered to be more expensive than bank credits (see
Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Therefore, it is puzzling that they are used intensively by
internationally active firms.
In order to solve this puzzle, we start from the observation that, despite the fact that
internationally active firms are found to be more productive than domestic firms (Melitz,
2003; Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007), they are more prone to financial
constraints (Berman and Héricourt, 2010). This may be due to two reasons: First, firms
active in international trade have higher financing needs than purely domestic firms. They
have higher outlays and there is a longer time span between the production of the goods
and the payment. Second, cross-border transactions are considered to be more risky (e.g.,
due to exchange rate risk, different legal systems, and less knowledge about the foreign
market and the foreign trading partner). Thus, internationally active firms and banks
financing these firms face a high degree of uncertainty. Banks have difficulties to judge
the profitability of an international transaction. This information asymmetry may impede
2
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internationally active firms’ access to bank credits.
In the first chapter, we focus on the case of supplier credits and develop a theoretical model
of a potential exporter who needs external finance for the production of export goods.1 In
a world without asymmetric information, bank credits are cheaper than supplier credits
because banks, being specialized financial intermediaries, are more efficient in providing
credits. With asymmetric information on the quality of the supplier, however, bank
credits are more expensive. A supplier credit can provide a signal about the quality of
the supplier (e.g., the quality of the supplier’s product), which may lead to a reduction
in the uncertainty the bank faces. Via the supplier credit, the exporter has time to check
the quality of the input delivered before paying the supplier. Therefore, only suppliers
of high quality intermediate products have an incentive to give a supplier credit. Hence,
the uncertainty about the quality of the supplier is reduced and the bank charges a
lower interest rate for any complementary bank credit. This may enable firms to obtain
additional bank credit financing that could not afford it before. Consequently, supplier
credits are most beneficial for financially constrained exporters.
In order to test the signaling hypothesis, we analyze whether supplier credits and bank
credits are complements or substitutes. For this purpose, we use the Business Expecta-
tions Panel of the ifo Institute for Economic Research. This is a panel data set for the
years 1994 to 2009 which has merged balance sheet data and data of the ifo Business
Tendency survey for 3,974 German companies. Our results indicate that bank credit
and supplier credit are substitutes for financially unconstrained firms. For financially
constrained firms, however, we find evidence that the two forms of credit tend to be com-
plements. As our theory suggests, we find this effect to be even stronger for financially
constrained exporters. Thus, our results support our theoretical predictions of the quality
signal conveyed by supplier credits, which explains the intensive use of supplier credits by
internationally active firms.
1This chapter is based on the article “Trade Credits and Bank Credits in International Trade: Sub-
stitutes or Complements?” which is joint work with Katharina Eck and Monika Schnitzer.
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The second chapter looks into whether trade credits, by reducing information asymme-
tries, also foster trade.2 The reduction of information asymmetries may imply that firms
get bank credit financing that did not receive bank credit before, whereby alleviating fi-
nancial constraints. Therefore, trade credits may enable more firms to become exporters.
In this chapter, we focus on the case of an exporter who receives CIA by the importer.
For this purpose, we develop a theoretical model of firms that need external finance to be
able to export. Financial constraints arise from asymmetric information problems, both
adverse selection and moral hazard, that deter less productive firms from exporting if only
bank financing is available. Access to CIA reduces the asymmetric information problem
as it is a signal on the importers quality and reduces the importers’ incentive to divert
the good. Thus, CIA increases the profitability of exporting and hence promotes the
export participation of firms, in particular for financially constrained firms. We test our
prediction with data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys
(BEEPS) for German firms in 2004. Using an instrumentation strategy, we are able to
identify a causal effect of CIA on exporting. We find that firms that receive CIA from
their trading partners have on average a 27% higher probability to export than firms that
do not receive CIA financing. In line with our theoretical prediction, we find that the
export fostering effect of CIA is particularly strong for financially constrained firms.
Chapter one and two contribute to the literature by providing an explanation for the
intensive use of supplier credits by internationally active firms. Furthermore, in the first
chapter we provide empirical evidence that supports our hypothesis of trade credits being
used as a signaling device. The second chapter contributes to the literature by proposing
the first model on the effects of CIA financing on international trade. In addition, we
provide empirical evidence on the beneficial effects of CIA financing on exporting derived
in our model.
2This chapter is based on the article “How Trade Credits Foster Exporting” which is joint work with
Katharina Eck and Monika Schnitzer.
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The third chapter deals with the question whether MNEs pay higher or lower wages than
exporters.3 Empirical studies have produced inconclusive findings as to whether MNEs
pay their employees more than domestically owned firms, which are potential exporters.
Heyman, Sjöholm, and Tingvall (2007) estimate that the individual worker’s wage level
is 2 to 6% higher in MNEs compared to domestically owned firms (see Huttunen, 2007;
Chen, Ge, and Lai, 2011, for similar findings). Other studies, however, do not find
an MNE wage premium (see Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright, 2002; Almeida,
2007; Andrews, Bellmann, Schank, and Upward, 2009). A potential explanation for the
inconclusive empirical evidence is the existence of labor unions. On the one hand, MNEs
have a bargaining advantage when negotiating with unions. As they have a production
plant in a foreign country, they can threaten the union to relocate production in case the
MNE and the union cannot agree on a wage. Therefore, MNEs may pay lower wages than
exporters. On the other hand, if unions have preferences that exhibit rent sharing, i.e.,
they want to partake in firms’ profits, wages depend on the firms’ profits. Thus, MNEs
may pay higher wages than exporters, as they are found to be more productive and to
yield higher profits (Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004).
In order to analyze these opposing forces, we develop a theoretical model of firm-union
wage bargaining of exporters and MNEs introducing the fair wage approach of Egger and
Kreickemeier (2012a) into the heterogeneous firms wage bargaining model of Eckel and
Egger (2009). We find that whether MNEs pay higher or lower wages than exporters
depends on the strength of the union, the competitive environment, trade costs, and the
degree of rent sharing, i.e., how closely aligned unions’ wage claims are to firms’ profits.
MNEs pay higher wages when unions’ bargaining power is relatively low or relatively
high as in these cases MNEs benefit less from their bargaining advantage. For weak
unions, wage claims are low anyway and for strong unions the firms’ contribution and,
hence, the disagreement profit matters less. For intermediate bargaining power, MNEs
pay lower wages than exporters as they can profit most from their bargaining advantage.
3This chapter is based on the article “Multinational Enterprises, Exporters, and Unions: Bargaining
Advantage vs. Rent Sharing”.
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Furthermore, MNEs’ wage payments relative to exporters’ increase with trade costs and
with the competitive situation in an economy.
The contribution of this chapter is to offer a theoretical explanation for the inconclusive
empirical evidence. The model can serve as guidance for future empirical studies on what
should be included in the estimation of the wage equation. Moreover, we can show that
MNEs have positive effects on the labor market, despite their rather bad reputation in
public debate. They may either pay higher wages than exporters or, if they pay lower
wages, we show that a higher share of MNEs in an economy decreases the unemployment
rate.
Finally, the fourth chapter turns to the question which country characteristics determine
firms’ decisions where to locate production in foreign countries and how this is connected
to the stage of the production process that shall be placed abroad.4 Most of today’s
production processes involve several stages which can be performed simultaneously or
sequentially. Firms may split these stages across several countries.
We adopt the idea of Kremer (1993) and Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012) to the case
of FDI. These papers implement a sequential production process involving several stages
which are subject to mistakes. For the product to have full value, all stages have to
be completed successfully. Hence, most value can be lost at stages at the end of the
value chain. Kremer (1993) and Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012) find that countries
with higher productivities specialize in later stages of production, which Kremer (1993)
has called the O-ring theory of economic development. In line with these results, our
hypothesis is that firms locate affiliates that produce goods that are positioned at later
stages in the production process in countries with lower propensities to making mistakes,
i.e., more productive countries.
In order to test this hypothesis, we use firm level panel data for the years 1999 to 2006 on
the universe of German multinationals and their activities abroad, which is provided by
4This chapter is based on the article “Testing the O-Ring Theory for FDI” which is joint work with
Henrike Lindemann.
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the Deutsche Bundesbank (2012). To capture the affiliate sector’s position in a value chain
we employ the measure of upstreamness by Antràs, Chor, Fally, and Hillberry (2012). It
considers the number of stages at which a sector enters production processes before the
final use of a product. Furthermore, we add countries’ productivity as key explanatory
variable. We find that a destination country’s productivity becomes more important for
a firm’s investment decision if the affiliate sector is positioned more toward the end of the
value chain. Hence, we can confirm the implications of the O-ring theory for FDI.
This chapter provides the first empirical test of the sorting pattern predicted by Kremer
(1993) and Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012) using data on FDI. Our results can ex-
plain the role of FDI for rising income inequalitites between countries as later stages of
the production process are also the ones yielding the highest value added (Fally, 2012).
Additionally, our analysis may serve as clear guidance for poor and less productive coun-
tries’ policy makers to recognize this sorting pattern of FDI and to increase productivity
enhancing investments in order to attract more downstream affiliates.
Summarizing the four chapters, this dissertation provides new insights on internationally
active firms’ behavior, focussing on financing, wage setting, and investment decisions.
These are three of the main fields that need to be analyzed in order to improve our
understanding of internationally active firms which most likely gain even more importance
in the future.
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Chapter 1
Trade Credits and Bank Credits in
International Trade: Substitutes or
Complements?∗
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Katharina Eck and Monika Schnitzer.
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1.1 Introduction
The financing of international transactions is a very important determinant of interna-
tional trade, as the recent financial crisis has forcefully shown. According to WTO Trade
Statistics, world merchandise exports declined by 12% in 2009, whereas world GDP de-
clined by only 2.5% (WTO, 2010). A lack of finance during 2009 has been blamed as one
of the reasons for this pronounced decrease in global trade (Amiti and Weinstein, 2011).
Apart from internal finance, firms have two options for financing their international trans-
actions. They can ask for a bank credit or they can make use of supplier credits, also
called trade credits.1 In the latter case, they delay paying their supplier, usually between
30 to 60 days. Supplier credits are typically more expensive than bank credits, with a real
interest rate of 40% (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Prima facie this suggests that supplier
credits are expensive substitutes, only attractive for those firms that cannot obtain bank
credit. Interestingly, supplier credits are used intensively by internationally active firms.
About 40% of international transactions are financed via supplier credits (IMF, 2009).
Internationally active firms are also larger and more productive than domestic ones, as
firm level studies confirm (see e.g., Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007, for a sur-
vey). This raises the question why internationally active firms rely to such a large extent
on supplier credits and how this relates to their use of bank credits. In this chapter, we
address this question both theoretically and empirically.
We start from the observation that firms active in international trade have higher fi-
nancing needs than purely domestic firms. They generally have higher outlays (e.g., the
establishment of a distribution network abroad) and there is a longer delay between the
production of the goods and the payment. Moreover, cross-border transactions are con-
sidered to be more risky (e.g., due to exchange rate risk, different legal systems, and
less knowledge about the foreign market and the foreign trading partner). Thus, inter-
nationally active firms and banks financing these firms face a high uncertainty. Banks
1In the prevailing literature, the term trade credit is often used interchangeably for a supplier credit
and does not exclusively refer to the financing of an international trading transaction.
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encounter difficulties to judge the profitability of international transactions. These infor-
mation asymmetries may hinder internationally active firms from obtaining bank credits.
Most models of international trade consider a world without financial frictions so that
these facts are insufficiently taken into account. We show that supplier credits can allevi-
ate financial constraints as they can reduce information asymmetries via a quality signal.
Therefore, supplier credits and bank credits are complements for financially constrained
firms.
For this purpose, we develop a model of a potential exporter who needs external finance
for the production of export goods. In a world without asymmetric information, bank
credits are cheaper than supplier credits, because banks are more efficient in providing
credits. With asymmetric information on the quality of the supplier, however, bank
credits become more expensive, even prohibitively so. If this is the case, a supplier credit
can provide a signal about the quality of the supplier which may lead to an additional
provision of bank credit. The uncertainty the bank faces is reduced, so the bank charges
a lower interest rate for any complementary bank credit. Thus, the use of supplier credits
can facilitate the provision of additional bank credits due to a reduction in uncertainty.
To test our signaling hypothesis, we analyze whether supplier credits and bank credits are
complements or substitutes. We use the Business Expectations Panel of the ifo Institute
for Economic Research. This is a panel data set for the years 1994 to 2009 which has
merged balance sheet data and data of the ifo Business Tendency survey for 3,974 German
companies. The data includes information on trade accounts payable and receivable and
on bank debt from the balance sheet data. Additionally, it contains variables indicating
a firm’s export status and whether a firm is financially constrained or not. Thus, we have
a direct measure of financial constraints and can avoid the problems arising from indirect
measures such as balance sheet information.2
We estimate the relationship between supplier credits and bank credits with the two-step
2See Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) for an extensive discus-
sion.
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GMM estimator for panel data proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). As bank credit
influences supplier credit and vice versa, we face a reverse causality problem. Therefore,
we assume sequential exogeneity and instrument supplier credit with its second lag. This
is admissible because the second lag of supplier credit influences bank credit today, but
bank credit today does not influence supplier credit two periods ago. The results indicate
that bank credit and supplier credit are substitutes for financially unconstrained firms.
For financially constrained firms, however, we find evidence that the two forms of credit
tend to be complements. As our theory suggests, we find this effect to be even stronger
for financially constrained exporters. Thus, our results confirm our theoretical predictions
of the quality signal conveyed by supplier credit.
This chapter is related to three strands of the literature. First, it is related to the theoret-
ical and empirical literature on trade credits. There are several theoretical articles which
explain the existence and use of trade credits (see Fisman and Love, 2003, for a review).
Closest to our approach is the warranty for product quality theory by Lee and Stowe
(1993). The authors argue that certain industries require trade credits as a guarantee for
product quality, because the choice of trade credit terms offered by the supplier can serve
as a signal of product quality. Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) find empirical evidence
on the warranty for product quality hypothesis. This chapter contributes to the liter-
ature by explaining the intensive use of supplier credits by internationally active firms.
In international trade, quality uncertainty is even higher. Therefore, we incorporate the
warranty for product quality as a motivation for the extension of trade credit into our
model of international trade. We show that supplier credits are an important financing
tool for financially constrained exporters.
Second, we build on the literature on the relation between bank credit and trade credit. Up
to now, papers which have dealt with the relation between bank credits and trade credits
have focused only on national transactions. Biais and Gollier (1997) develop a model
where the firm that extends the trade credit signals its belief in the credit worthiness of
the firm it provides with trade credit. This in turn helps the firm receiving the trade
11
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credit obtain additional bank credits.3 Their argument requires that the trade partner
has an information advantage relative to the bank. This seems to be at odds with the
empirical evidence by Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) who find that suppliers
have no persistent informational advantage. In contrast to Biais and Gollier (1997), in our
model we assume that the firm extending trade credit signals its own quality, which seems
to be the more natural and realistic assumption.4 A closely related paper is the one by
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) who develop a model in which trade credits and bank credits
are substitutes for firms with unconstrained access to external finance, whereas firms
that do not receive sufficient bank funding, use bank and trade credits complementarily.
Their reasoning for the complementary relationship is that lending goods is less prone
to diversion than lending cash, which has been termed the diversion theory of trade
credit financing. Banks are more willing to extend additional bank credit to trade credit
receiving firms since these are less likely to commit moral hazard. We develop a different
model, in which trade credits help to solve an adverse selection problem. In addition, we
provide empirical evidence of our results.
Empirically, Matias Gama and Mateus (2010) find that in general, bank credits and
supplier credits are substitutes. For smaller and younger firms, the substitution and
complementary hypothesis are not mutually exclusive, however. Their interpretation
of this result is that supplier credits signal the creditworthiness of a small firm to the
bank, which can increase its bank credit supply. Yang (2011) finds that supplier credits
and bank credits are complements for financially constrained firms, where financial con-
straints are measured by a firm’s bond rating status and its size. Hence, Yang (2011)
3Aktas, de Bodt, Lobez, and Statnik (2012) show that supplier credits are a signal not only to lenders
but also to investors. Fabbri and Menichini (2010) study the use of trade credits for rationed and non-
rationed firms, arguing that suppliers not only have an information advantage over other creditors, but
are also better in liquidating the assets in case of default.
4Huang, Shi, and Zhang (2011) set up a mechanism-design model in which they can show that when
firms’ production efficiency crosses a low threshold supplier credits and bank credits are substitutes. This
is, according to the authors, almost always the case. In contrast, we find that supplier credits and bank
credits can be complements and that this complementary effect is of special importance for financially
constrained exporters.
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also strengthens the complementary effect for smaller firms.5 Additionally, Giannetti,
Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) find that trade credits help firms secure financing from
relatively uninformed banks or get better deals from their banks. Thus, they also confirm
the complementary relationship of supplier credits and bank credits. We go beyond their
analysis by focusing on exporters for whom we expect the information problem for banks
to be even larger. In contrast to previous findings, we show that the complementary
relationship between supplier credits and bank credits also holds for large firms. Most
noteworthy, our results show that it is not a firm’s size that determines the relationship
between supplier credits and bank credits, but whether a firm is financially constrained
and whether it is internationally active.
The third strand of literature we build on deals with financial constraints in international
trade. Manova (2012) shows that firms that are productive enough to export in the
absence of financial constraints may not be able to do so if they are financially constrained.
Bellone, Musso, Nesta, and Schiavo (2010) and Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2011) provide
empirical evidence for the importance of financial constraints in international trade. While
these studies have focused only on bank credit as a source of external finance, other recent
papers also add supplier credits to the analysis (Ahn, 2011; Antràs and Foley, 2011;
Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2012). These studies focus on the optimal choice of financing modes
in international trade considering supplier credits. This chapter extends this literature
by showing that supplier credits and bank credits are not necessarily substitutes among
which exporters have to choose but can also be complements.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: In section 1.2, we present the basic
model and compare different forms of financing. Furthermore, we derive empirical hy-
potheses from the model. Section 1.3 presents the data and gives summary statistics.
5While the findings in Yang (2011) suggest that trade credit can alleviate financial constraints that
are due to asymmetric information between banks and firms, the paper cannot explain the intensive use
of supplier credits in international trade. As exporters are generally larger than non-exporters, they
would be classified as unconstrained by Yang (2011). Our data allow us to look at financially constrained
exporters using the self-reported measure of financial constraints. As predicted by our model, we find that
financially constrained exporters are more likely to benefit from the positive signaling effect of supplier
credits.
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In section 1.4, we explain the estimation strategy and provide empirical results. Finally,
section 1.5 draws a conclusion.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
1.2.1 Basic Setup
Consider a firm that decides whether or not to export depending on its productivity level.6
The productivity level may differ across firms. The firm needs to buy inputs to produce
its final good that it can sell on the foreign market at an exogenously given market price
p.7
The firm has the following Cobb-Douglas production function
f(q1, q¯2) = x = [(1 + β)q1]
1
2 q¯
1
2
2 , (1.1)
where x is the quantity produced and q1 and q¯2 are the input factors. q¯2 is a fixed input
requirement. It can be interpreted as machines the quantity of which cannot be adjusted
in the short run. (1 + β) denotes the productivity level, where β > 0. Thus, an increase
in the productivity level leads to a larger output given a fixed quantity of inputs.
The firm has to buy the inputs q1 from a supplier at price p1. Minimizing costs for a given
x leads to variable costs of production k(x) = p1 x
2
(1+β)q¯2 . The variable costs are marginally
increasing in the quantity produced and are decreasing in the firm’s productivity level
and the fixed input requirement. Furthermore, the firm faces fixed costs. The fixed costs
consist of fixed input costs (F = p2q¯2) on the one hand and fixed costs of exporting
(FEX) on the other hand. The fixed costs of exporting can stem from the establishment
of a distribution network or the acquirement of knowledge about the foreign market, for
example.
6Note that we do not take into account the firm’s domestic activities.
7We assume that the effect of the firm’s production decision on the market price is negligible.
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The input good is subject to a quality risk.8 With probability σ the supplier produces a
product which is of good quality at marginal production costs c¯. With probability (1−σ)
she produces low quality, at marginal costs c, where c¯ > c. The final good of the exporter
can be sold only if the input used in the production process is of good quality, which is
in line with the O-ring theory (Kremer, 1993). The supplier knows her own quality, but
the exporter does not.
The price to be paid for the input good, p1, is determined in a bargaining procedure
between the exporter and the input supplier. In the following, we assume that the exporter
has all the bargaining power, which means that he can choose the input price p1 and the
supplier only can choose whether or not to supply the input.
Production takes place in period t = 0. This is when the potential exporter has to
incur the variable and the fixed costs. The revenues of the international transaction are
generated in period t = 1. We assume that the potential exporter has no internal funds,
thus, external finance is needed to bridge the time lag. Our assumption on the distribution
of bargaining power implies that the financing need of the exporter is minimized. It is
straightforward to extend our analysis to cases when this assumption is relaxed. In the
following, we analyze different financing scenarios and derive the minimum productivity
level necessary for successful exporting under these different financing scenarios.
1.2.2 Pure Bank Credit Financing
Consider first the case in which the firm asks the bank for a credit to cover the production
costs. Like the exporter, the bank cannot judge the quality of the supplier. The banking
sector is perfectly competitive. Thus, if the quality of the input good is unknown, it is
necessary that
σD(1 + rB) = (1 + r¯B)D, (1.2)
8For simplicity, we do not consider quality uncertainty with respect to the exporter.
15
Trade Credits and Bank Credits in International Trade
for the bank to break even. σ represents the probability that the input is of good quality
such that the exporter generates positive revenues and repays his credit. D stands for
the amount of credit demanded, (1 + rB) is the gross interest rate charged by the bank
and r¯B are the refinancing costs incurred by the bank. Therefore the gross interest rate
charged by the bank amounts to
(1 + rB) =
(1 + r¯B)
σ
. (1.3)
It is increasing in the refinancing costs and the quality risk (decrease of σ).
The exporter’s profit function then is
piBCEX = σpx− σ
(1 + r¯B)
σ
[
p1
x2
(1 + β)q¯2
+ F + FEX
]
. (1.4)
The exporter has expected revenues of σpx. The total costs are financed via bank credit
which is repaid with probability σ.
The exporter chooses the input price p1 such that his profits are maximized. This implies
choosing the smallest possible price p1 that satisfies the incentive constraint of the high
quality input supplier so that the input good is delivered:
p1q1 − c¯q1 ≥ 0. (1.5)
Thus, the exporter pays p1 = c¯ to the supplier.
Maximizing the exporter’s profits with respect to the quantity and plugging in p1 yields
xBC = σp(1 + β)q¯22c¯(1 + r¯B)
. (1.6)
Plugging this into the profit function and setting it equal to zero gives the minimum
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productivity level necessary for successful exporting with bank credit financing
(1 + β)BC ≡ 4(1 + r¯B)
2(F + FEX)c¯
(σp)2q¯2
. (1.7)
Firms with a productivity level 1 + β ≥ (1 + β)BC are able to export as they make at
least zero profits. Firms with a productivity level smaller than the threshold level are not
able to start exporting.
Doing simple comparative statics, it is easy to see that the higher the costs, the higher the
productivity a firm has to have in order to break even. In contrast, the higher the market
price, the higher the revenues, so that the productivity threshold is lower. Moreover, the
higher the quality uncertainty the firm faces, the lower the expected revenues are and
the higher the productivity level has to be in order to export successfully. In case of no
information asymmetries, σ = 1, firms need to be less productive to enter the foreign
market.
1.2.3 Full Supplier Credit and Bank Credit Financing
Firms with a productivity level below the minimum threshold necessary to afford bank
credit financing may turn to supplier credit financing instead. The supplier delivers the
input, but the potential exporter can pay for it later. Usually, the payment can be
made up to 30 to 60 days after delivery. By definition, the maximum amount of supplier
credit extended are the costs of the input good (p1q1). The rest has to be financed via
bank credit. To capture the idea that banks are inherently more efficient in supplying
credits, we assume that the refinancing costs of suppliers, (1 + r¯SC), are higher, i.e.,
(1 + r¯SC) > (1 + r¯B). Note that the refinancing costs (1 + r¯SC) can also be interpreted as
a measure of the financial constraint of the supplier.
Consider first the case where the supplier credit covers the total input good costs, p1q1.
In this case, the exporter conditions the payment of the input on the success of resale.
Only if the final goods can be sold on the foreign market successfully, the exporter pays
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the supplier. Note that our assumption that the exporter has no internal funds to finance
production precludes paying the supplier if there are no revenues from selling the good
on the export market. Consequently, only good suppliers have an incentive to participate
in the transaction. For the good supplier to be willing to do so, it is necessary that
p1q1 − c¯q1(1 + r¯SC) ≥ 0. (1.8)
Thus, the exporter pays the supplier p1 = c¯(1 + r¯SC) if the export goods are successfully
sold.
As only the good supplier participates in the transaction, the quality uncertainty is elim-
inated. The bank, therefore, sets σ = 1 and is willing to finance the fixed costs at the
interest rate (1 + r¯B).
The exporter’s profit function then looks as follows
piSCEX = px− c¯(1 + r¯SC)
x2
(1 + β)q¯2
− (1 + r¯B)(F + FEX). (1.9)
Applying the same procedure as before, we can derive the minimum productivity level
necessary for successful exporting with supplier credit financing for the variable costs and
bank credit financing for the fixed costs
(1 + β)SC ≡ 4(1 + r¯B)(F + FEX)c¯(1 + r¯SC)
p2q¯2
. (1.10)
Comparing (1.10) with (1.7) yields that firms who cannot afford bank credit financing are
able to obtain supplier credit financing for the full variable costs and bank credit only for
the fixed costs if and only if
(1 + β)SC ≤ (1 + β) < (1 + β)BC .
Note that there exist parameter cases for which the supplier credit threshold is below the
18
Trade Credits and Bank Credits in International Trade
bank credit threshold if and only if
(1 + r¯SC) <
(1 + r¯B)
σ2
. (1.11)
This is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 The higher the quality uncertainty (lower σ), the more attractive is sup-
plier credit financing relative to pure bank credit financing. Furthermore, the higher the
refinancing costs of the supplier, the more expensive supplier credit financing is.
1.2.4 Partial Supplier Credit
Consider now the case where the exporter uses a supplier credit only for a fraction of
the input costs, to save on the high interest rates of supplier credit. In the following, we
determine the minimum amount of supplier credit necessary to solve the adverse selection
problem. The rest of the production costs has to be covered by a bank credit.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature determines the supplier’s type, (T = {G,B}). The supplier is of the good
type (T = G) with probability σ and of the bad type (T = B) with probability
(1− σ). The supplier learns her type.
2. The exporter chooses the amount of supplier credit as a fraction α(T ) of the costs
of the input good
(
p1
x2
(1+β)q¯2
)
and chooses the price he pays for the input (p1).
3. The bank observes the amount of supplier credit extended to the exporter by the
supplier (but not the supplier’s quality) and makes an offer to the exporter about
an additional bank credit, choosing either a high
(
1+r¯B
σ
)
, a low (1 + r¯B) interest
rate, or no credit offer at all.
4. Depending on the decisions by the bank and the supplier, the firm decides whether
to export or not in period t = 0.
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5. In period t = 1, payoffs are realized.
Note that we assume that a fraction of the input costs can be paid later. Generally, the
supplier credit equals the whole amount of an invoice, but the terms of payment vary, i.e.,
whether the invoice amount can be paid 30 or 60 days after delivery. It is straightforward
to reinterpret the fraction α as a temporal instead of a quantitative fraction.
The profit function of the supplier is
piSU(T ) =

αp1q1 − (c¯q1 − (1− α)p1q1)(1 + r¯SC) if T = G,
[(1− α)p1q1 − cq1](1 + r¯SC) if T = B.
The good supplier gets paid the fraction α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) of the input costs in period
t = 1. This reflects the repayment of the supplier credit. The rest of the input costs is
paid at delivery in t = 0. The difference between the production costs of the input and
the amount paid at delivery, (c¯q1 − (1 − α)p1q1), has to be financed at the interest rate
(1 + r¯SC).
The profit function of the bad supplier differs in that she never receives the rest of the
purchasing price, which is supposed to be paid later, because the exporter generates no
revenues. If the bad supplier extends a supplier credit, she delivers the good and receives
only the amount which has to be paid immediately at delivery in t = 0.
We consider two types of equilibria, separating and pooling equilibria. In a separating
equilibrium, the exporter chooses the amount of supplier credit and the input price such
that he effectively screens the suppliers and only the good type participates in the trans-
action. In a pooling equilibrium, the amount of supplier credit and the input price are
chosen such that both types participate in the transaction and so the type of the supplier
is not revealed.
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Separating Equilibrium
When does the supplier credit provide a credible signal that the input is of good quality?
The signal is credible if the amount of supplier credit extended is large enough so that
the supplier yields positive profits if she is of the good type and her profits equal zero if
she is of the bad type. This guarantees that the bad type has no incentive to mimic the
good type by granting a supplier credit. The amount of supplier credit necessary for a
credible signal is given by
(1− α)p1 ≤ c ⇒ αsep ≥ 1− c
p1
. (1.12)
Furthermore, the participation constraint of the good supplier has to be fulfilled:
αp1q1 − (c¯q1 − (1− α)p1q1)(1 + r¯SC) ≥ 0. (1.13)
From this we can derive
p1 = c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC), (1.14)
αsep = (c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC)
c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC) . (1.15)
Consider the following belief structure of the bank. The bank believes that a supplier
which extends a level of supplier credit of α ≥ αsep is of the good type, Pr(G|α ≥ αsep) =
1, and a supplier which extends a level of supplier credit of 0 ≤ α < αsep is of the bad
type, Pr(G|0 ≤ α < αsep) = 0. If the bank believes that the supplier is good, it sets
σ = 1. If instead the bank believes that the supplier is of the bad type, it does not extend
any bank credit at all. Using this belief structure of the bank we can check whether there
exists a separating equilibrium in which the good supplier extends a fraction α(G) = αsep
of supplier credit and the bad supplier chooses not to extend a supplier credit at all,
α(B) = 0.
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The profit function of an exporter who finances the costs via a supplier credit (α(G) =
αsep) and a bank credit has the following form
pi
SC/BC
EX = px− [(1− αsep)p1(1 + r¯B) + αsepp1]
x2
(1 + β)q¯2
− (1 + r¯B)(F + FEX). (1.16)
The exporter has higher expected revenues compared to a situation with pure bank fi-
nancing because he knows that the supplier is of good quality. Additionally, the bank
charges a lower interest rate as it believes that the supplier is of good quality and sets
σ = 1.
Again, the exporter maximizes profits with respect to the quantity. Plugging the optimal
quantity into the exporter’s profits and setting it equal to zero, we obtain the minimum
productivity level necessary to export successfully with a combination of supplier credit
and bank credit financing:
(1 + β)SC/BC ≡ 4(1 + r¯B)(F + FEX) [c(r¯B − r¯SC) + c¯(1 + r¯SC)]
p2q¯2
. (1.17)
Proposition 2 For firms with (1 + β) ≥ (1 + β)SC/BC there exists a separating perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in which only the good suppliers extend supplier credits and the bank
charges the low interest rate as it believes in the quality signal. The strategies and beliefs
of this separating equilibrium are given by
[(α(G) = αsep, α(B) = 0) , (gives bank credit at interest rate (1+r¯B), gives no bank credit),
Pr(G|α ≥ αsep) = 1 and Pr(G|0 ≤ α < αsep) = 0].
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
For firms with a productivity level (1 + β) < (1 + β)BC , i.e., who cannot afford a bank
credit, supplier credit helps them overcome their financial constraints and realize the
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international transaction if and only if
(1 + β)SC/BC ≤ (1 + β) < (1 + β)BC .
Inserting the corresponding expressions (1.7) and (1.17), it is straightforward to see that
there exist parameter cases for which the supplier credit threshold is below the bank credit
threshold if condition (1.18) holds
c(r¯B − r¯SC) + c¯(1 + r¯SC) < (1 + r¯B)c¯
σ2
. (1.18)
This is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Consider firms with (1 + β) < (1 + β)BC. It is the more likely that the
combination of supplier credit and bank credit yields a positive payoff for exporters who
would not be able to receive pure bank financing
(1) the lower the refinancing costs of the supplier (r¯SC),
(2) the higher the refinancing costs of the bank (r¯B),
(3a) if (1+r¯SC)σ2 > (1+r¯B): the lower the difference in production costs of the suppliers,
(3b) if (1+r¯SC)σ2 < (1+r¯B): the higher the difference in production costs of the suppliers,
(4) the higher the quality uncertainty (lower σ) and hence importance of the signal. For
σ = 1, pure bank credit financing is cheaper than supplier credit financing.
In Appendix A.1, we provide a graphical illustration of different parameter combinations
for which (1 + β)SC/BC < (1 + β)BC . We have shown that a supplier credit can ease
financial constraints due to two mechanisms. First, there is the direct channel. Supplier
credits provide the firm with liquidity. Consequently, the amount of credit which has to
be financed by the bank is reduced. Additionally, there is the indirect channel of supplier
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credit. The supplier can signal her quality via the extension of supplier credit. The
supplier delivers the good, but the firm needs only pay for it later. This means that in
fact the exporter can condition the payment of the input good on the quality delivered.
Accordingly, the risk of the transaction is reduced. Hence, the higher the risk of the
transaction, the more attractive supplier credits become. As we have argued before, in
our model suppliers can be national or international. However, supplier credits will be
of higher importance for international suppliers as the uncertainty faced by the exporter
and the bank will be higher than with a national supplier.
Pooling Equilibrium
Consider next the possibility of a pooling equilibrium where both suppliers give the same
amount of supplier credit, α(G) = α(B), with 0 ≤ α(T ) < αsep. In such a pooling
equilibrium, the bank does not learn anything about the supplier’s type. Hence, the same
credit rate applies as in the case without supplier credit.
The exporter’s profit function in a pooling equilibrium equals
pipoolEX = σpx− [(1− α)p1(1 + r¯B) + σαp1]
x2
(1 + β)q¯2
− (1 + r¯B)(F + FEX), (1.19)
where the fraction of the input costs extended in form of supplier credit is 0 ≤ α < αsep.
From the participation constraint of the good supplier we can derive that for a given α,
the exporter sets the price p1 in a pooling situation such that
αp1q1 ≥ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC). (1.20)
Furthermore, for both suppliers to extend the same amount of supplier credit it has to
hold that
(1− α)p1 ≥ c.
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We can again derive the minimum productivity level necessary for successful exporting:
(1 + β)Pool ≡ 4(1 + r¯B)(F + FEX) [σ(c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC) + c(1 + r¯B)](σp)2q¯2 . (1.21)
Proposition 4 For firms with (1 + β) ≥ (1 + β)Pool there exists a pooling equilibrium
with the following strategies
[(α(G) = α(B) , where 0 ≤ α(T ) < αsep), (gives bank credit at interest rate (1 + r¯B)/σ,
gives bank credit at interest rate (1+r¯B)/σ), Pr(G|α ≥ αsep) = 1, Pr(G|0 ≤ α < αsep) = 0
and Pr(G|α(G) = α(B)) = σ].
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
For firms with a productivity level (1 + β) < (1 + β)BC , i.e., who cannot afford a bank
credit, supplier credit in a pooling equilibrium helps them to realize the international
transaction if and only if
(1 + β)Pool ≤ (1 + β) < (1 + β)BC .
Using (1.7) and (1.21) we can show that there exist parameter cases for which the supplier
credit threshold is below the bank credit threshold if and only if
σ(1 + r¯SC) < (1 + r¯B). (1.22)
If this condition holds, firms are enabled to export using supplier credit even though it
provides an uninformative signal. The uninformative signal does not reduce the uncer-
tainty, however. Comparing the separating cutoff with the pooling cutoff yields that the
parameter range for which there exists a separating equilibrium is larger than the param-
eter range for the pooling equilibrium. Comparing the expected profits of the exporter,
supplier, and bank, we can derive that firms prefer playing the separating rather than the
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pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 5 The separating equilibrium Pareto-dominates the pooling equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Thus, in our empirical predictions we restrict attention to the separating equilibrium.
1.2.5 Empirical Hypotheses
To sum up, our findings deliver the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: In general, bank credit and supplier credit are substitutes.
Hypothesis 2: For financially constrained firms, supplier credit and bank credit are
complements.
Hypothesis 3: The complementary effect is stronger for internationally active firms.
Our theoretical model illustrates the ambivalent nature of supplier credits. Proposition
1 implies that bank credit financing can be substituted for by supplier credits for the
variable costs. Firms with a high enough productivity level can afford a bank credit to
finance their international transaction. Therefore, they are not financially constrained. To
them, supplier credits and bank credits are substitutes, as they have the option to finance
the variable costs via a supplier credit or a bank credit (Hypothesis 1). Proposition 2
and 3 state that due to the reduction in risk, supplier credits can enable the extension of
a bank credit for firms that are financially constrained, which otherwise could not afford
pure bank credit financing. For these firms, supplier credits and bank credits can be
complements (Hypothesis 2). Although we cannot test directly whether supplier credits
provide a quality signal to the bank, we can test whether supplier credits lead to more bank
credits for financially constrained firms. Since exporters have higher financing needs and
generally face a higher uncertainty, the complementary effect of supplier credit financing
should be particularly strong for exporters (Hypothesis 3).
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1.3 Data
We use the Business Expectations Panel of the ifo Institute for Economic Research
provided by the Economic and Business Data Center (EBDC). It contains balance sheet
data and data of the ifo Business Tendency Survey for 3,974 German companies from
the manufacturing sector for the years 1994 to 2009. The balance sheet data is taken
from Amadeus and Hoppenstedt on a yearly basis. The ifo Business Tendency Survey
is conducted on a monthly basis and contains mainly questions on the firms’ business
situation, expectations, and demand situation.9 The panel is unbalanced. On average,
firms are four years in the dataset. The balance sheet data includes information on
trade accounts payable and receivable and on bank debt. Additionally, the ifo Business
Tendency Survey contains variables indicating whether a firm exports or not and whether
a firm is financially constrained or not.
Supplier Credit
Consistent with Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Fisman and Love (2003), we measure
supplier credit taken by a firm by trade accounts payable scaled by total assets from
the balance sheet data. Our measure of supplier credit can, thus, be interpreted as
the ratio of total assets financed via interfirm loans.10 We take the logarithm as trade
accounts payable divided by total assets is highly skewed. The disadvantage of trade
accounts payable is that they include not only voluntarily granted supplier credits but
also delayed payments not agreed to by the supplier ex ante. One could argue that
involuntarily extended supplier credits do not provide a quality signal. However, trade
accounts payable are frequently used as a proxy for supplier credits and it is the best
9For an overview of the collected variables, see Becker andWohlrabe (2008) and for the methodological
background of the survey, see Goldrian (2007).
10Scaling is necessary since the supplier credit volume of a firm is directly linked to the size and the
sales volume of a firm. Furthermore, it allows us to abstain from price effect adjustments in each year.
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measure available to us.11
Bank Credit
The amount of bank credit a firm has is measured by the variable bank debt, which
includes short-term and long-term debt. We also scale bank credit by total assets from
the balance sheet data and take the logarithm.
Export Status
In the ifo Business Tendency Survey, firms are asked about their export status. From this
we construct a dummy variable. As the firms are asked each month and we conduct our
analysis on a firm-year basis, we collapse the data. We classify a firm as internationally
active if it exports its product in at least two months per year.12
Financial constraints
The ifo Business Tendency Survey also contains two questions concerning the financial sit-
uation of a firm. In one question the firms are asked whether they are constrained in their
production due to financial constraints (yes/no). The second question asks how the firms
judge the willingness of banks to give credits to firms (cooperative/normal/restrictive).
The latter question is general in nature. However, we argue that firms will answer this
question based on their own experience and thus, the answer reflects their financial
situation.13 We combine both measures and classify a firm as financially constrained if it
answers at least once a year that it is hindered in production due to financial constraints
11Alternatively, we could take supplier credit use as a dummy variable. The idea is that the extension
of supplier credit provides the signal and there is no linear effect from more supplier credit used to more
bank credit received. But the volume of trade accounts payable consists of several supplier credits from
different suppliers, which all signal their quality. Consequently, there may indeed be a linear effect.
Furthermore, we do not observe any zeros in our data since all firms have trade accounts payable in their
balance sheet.
12Note that we cannot use export intensities as this information is not included in our data.
13These questions are not asked on a monthly basis. The question on whether the firm was constrained
in production due to financial constraints is asked in January, April, July and October. The question on
the willingness of banks to extend credits is asked in March and August.
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or that it judges the willingness of banks to extend credits as restrictive or both. This
variable, thus, provides us with a direct measure of financial constraints. Hence, we
can overcome the problems raised by the discussion between Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) concerning the use of indirect measures
of financial constraints such as investment-cash flow sensitivities.
Other control variables
We control for the productivity of a company which we measure as the logarithm of
sales over the number of employees (Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004). Due to strong
collinearity we do not simultaneously include the number of employees or sales. In a
robustness check, however, we use the logarithm of sales instead of the productivity mea-
sure. Additionally, we include the logarithm of the firm’s tangible assets scaled by total
assets (Matias Gama and Mateus, 2010). Furthermore, we control for the sales growth of
the firm to capture firm-specific growth prospects.
Panel A of Table 1.1 provides summary statistics for the variables we use in our analy-
sis.14 The average number of employees per firm is 2,489. The fraction of firms that are
exporting is 93%. The high export participation can be explained by the fact that pri-
marily large firms are included in the dataset. The ifo Business Tendency Survey mainly
addresses large firms. For large German firms, a fraction of exporters of about 80%–90%
is reasonable (see Burg, Dittrich, Vogel, and Wagner, 2009). 15% of the firms report
that they are financially constrained. The share of trade accounts payable relative to
total assets is 8%. In comparison, the share of bank credit relative to total assets is 17%.
Thus, we see that firms use a larger share of bank credits to finance their costs. However,
the share of trade accounts payable is also quite high compared to the bank credit share.
Hence, supplier credit is a significant source of financing.15
Comparing exporters to non-exporters in Panel B of Table 1.1, we find that exporters
14These summary statistics are pooled over all the years of the regression sample.
15Fisman and Love (2003) find a similar result for the share of trade accounts payable used for the
US.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristics
Mean SD
Number of employees 2,489 10,999
Trade accounts payable (1000 Euros) 26,800 122,000
Bank credit (1000 Euros) 53,300 400,000
Tangible assets (1000 Euros) 74,100 185,000
Trade accounts payable/total assets (%) 8 6
Bank credit/total assets (%) 17 15
Tangible assets/total assets (%) 27 18
Salesgrowth (%) 28 630
Sales/number of employees 267,792 475,664
Share of exporters (%) 93 -
Share of financially constrained firms (%) 15 -
Panel B: Exporters vs. Non-Exporters
Exporters Non-Exporters Difference
Number of employees 2,583 1,293 1,290***
Trade accounts payable/total assets (%) 8 8 0
Bank credit/total assets (%) 17 15 2
Tangible assets/total assets (%) 26 42 -16***
Salesgrowth (%) 30 4 26
Share of financially constrained firms (%) 15 20 -5
Panel C: Constrained vs. Unconstrained Exporters
Constrained Unconstrained Difference
Exporters Exporters
Number of employees 1,928 2,697 -769*
Trade accounts payable/total assets (%) 9 7 2***
Bank credit/total assets (%) 23 16 7***
Tangible assets/total assets (%) 25 26 -1
Salesgrowth (%) 8 34 -26
Panel A provides average firm characteristics pooled over all years for the regression sample. The
number of observations is 1,720. Panels B and C provide mean comparison tests for various firm
characteristics between exporters and non-exporters and financially-constrained exporters and
non financially-constrained exporters, respectively, using Welch’s formula to allow for unequal
variances in both groups (Welch, 1947). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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are significantly larger than non-exporters. This is the usual result stated in various
studies (see Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2007, for a survey) and is the basis for
the selection into exporting theory modeled by Melitz (2003). We also see that slightly
fewer exporters are financially constrained than non-exporters. 15% of the exporters
report being financially constrained compared to 20% of the non-exporters. However,
there is no difference in the use of trade accounts payable relative to total assets between
exporters and non-exporters. But when we compare financially constrained exporters to
non-financially constrained exporters in Panel C of Table 1.1, we find that financially
constrained exporters use a significantly higher share of trade accounts payable than non-
financially constrained exporters at the 1% significance level. This finding supports the
theoretical results of our model. Those firms which do not receive bank credit in the
first place and are thus financially constrained use supplier credit. Furthermore, supplier
credit financing is even more important for internationally active firms. This explains
the difference in the use of supplier credit between financially constrained exporters and
non-financially constrained exporters.
Note that we have a missing data problem both in the survey data as well as in the
balance sheet data. As mostly large firms answer the ifo Business Tendency Survey and
have balance sheet data available our empirical analysis focuses on large firms. Therefore,
we do not claim to have a representative sample of German manufacturing firms overall,
but of large German manufacturing firms.
1.4 Estimation Strategy and Results
1.4.1 The Effect of Supplier Credit on Bank Credit for Finan-
cially Constrained and Unconstrained Firms
To test the hypotheses derived above, we analyze the effect of supplier credit on bank
credit. The first hypothesis considers the general relation between bank credit and supplier
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credit and the second hypothesis focuses on the effect of supplier credit on bank credit for
financially constrained firms. To analyze the relationship for both financially constrained
and unconstrained firms the corresponding estimation equation is
BCit = β0 + β1SCit + β2constrainit + β3SCit ∗ constrainit + β4xit + ηi + λt + it. (1.23)
Our dependent variable is the share of bank credit in total assets of firm i in period
t (BCit). Supplier credit is the explanatory variable of interest (SCit). constrainit is
a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is financially constrained or not. We also
include an interaction term of supplier credit received and the financial constraints dummy.
The variable xit includes a vector of control variables. As control variables, we use firm
productivity, salesgrowth, a dummy whether the firm is exporting, and tangible assets.
Furthermore, we control for firm fixed effects (ηi) and time fixed effects (λt).
As bank credit influences supplier credit and vice versa, we face a reverse causality prob-
lem. Given its total financing needs, the firm decides simultaneously on how much to
finance via bank credit and how much to finance via supplier credit. If the firm does not
get enough or any bank credit at all, it will approach its supplier and ask for a supplier
credit instead. Vice versa, if the firm gets supplier credit, this might enable it to get an
additional bank credit. We estimate this equation with the two-step generalized method
of moments (GMM) estimator for panel data proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). We
use the finite sample correction of the asymptotic variance estimates derived by Wind-
meijer (2005). Generally, the two-step GMM estimator uses heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors, but in small samples the estimated standard errors tend to be too small.
This is due to the presence of estimated parameters in the weight matrix.
We assume sequential exogeneity and instrument supplier credit with its second lag, that
is supplier credit received two years ago which is the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estima-
tor. In addition, we also apply its second- and third-lag (supplier credit received two and
three years ago) which is the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator and allows to exploit
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more of the available moment conditions. This is admissible because supplier credit re-
ceived two years ago (SCit−2) influences bank credit in period today (BCit), but bank
credit received today does not influence supplier credit received two years ago. Like this,
instrumenting SCit with SCit−2 and SCit−3 solves our simultaneity problem. SCit−2 is
strongly correlated with SCit (correlation coefficient of 0.82), thus it is relevant. Fur-
thermore, SCit−2 has an influence on BCit only via SCit. Additionally, we use all the
right-hand-side variables as instruments, except for the financial constraints dummy. As
we would argue that the amount of bank credit the firm receives depends on whether
the firm feels financially constrained but the reverse is also plausible, we instrument the
financial constraints dummy also by its second and third lag, as well as the interaction
term of supplier credit and the financial constraints dummy.
The Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimators use first-
differences. Thus, we account for the fact that the relation between bank credit and
supplier credit might be a spurious relationship attributed to unobservable specific het-
erogeneity among firms. The two-step GMM estimator is only consistent if there is no
second-order serial correlation of the errors. We provide a direct test of the second-order
residual serial correlation coefficient proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Furthermore,
we also use the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions to test the validity of our in-
struments. The Hansen test can be weakened by instrument proliferation. Therefore,
instead of using one instrument for each time period, variable and lag distance, we use
one instrument for each variable and lag distance. The idea is that the moment conditions
are summed over the years for each lag distance. Another study which uses this technique
is, among others, Beck and Levine (2004).
The fact that we have an unbalanced panel does not prevent the use of the two-step GMM
estimator. Arellano and Bond (1991) argue that no fundamental changes occur provided
that a minimal number of continuous time periods is available for each firm. This is the
case in our dataset. The average number of years in which the firms in our sample report
is four. The maximal number of years is 13. However, in order to avoid losing obser-
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vations we use the orthogonal deviations transformation instead of first-differencing as
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). Instead of subtracting the previous observation,
the orthogonal deviations transformation subtracts the average of all available future ob-
servations. Like differencing, this removes fixed effects, but preserves the sample size in
panels with gaps.
In equation (1.23), we expect supplier credit as such to have a negative effect on bank
credit and the interaction term of supplier credit and the financial constraints dummy
to have a positive effect. In this estimation, we cannot separately identify the different
motives for the use of supplier credit and their effects on the use of bank credit. Certainly,
there is the positive effect on bank credit included in the volume of supplier credit due
to the signal, but this effect probably does not compensate for the general substitution
effect.
In column 1 of Table 1.2, the results of the two-step GMM estimator are provided using
Windmeijer finite sample corrected standard errors where we use the second- and the
third-lag as instruments for the endogenous variables. As explained above, we collapse the
instruments and use orthogonal deviations. This gives us a sample of 1,720 observations
for 410 companies and we use 23 instruments. We find that for financially unconstrained
firms the fraction of supplier credits used indeed has a negative influence on the fraction
of bank credits used which is significant at the 10% level. As both measures are in logs
the coefficient indicates that 1% more supplier credit leads to 4% less bank credit. This
finding confirms our first hypothesis. Furthermore, we find weak support for our second
hypothesis. The coefficient of the interaction term of the share of supplier credit used and
the financial constraints dummy is positive. It is marginally significant with a p-value of
0.126. This indicates that although bank credit and supplier credit are substitutes for
unconstrained firms, supplier credit has a positive impact on bank credit for financially
constrained firms.
The coefficient of the variable tangible assets is positive as one would expect, though
insignificant. Tangible assets can serve as collateral and hence should enable firms to
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get more bank credit. Salesgrowth is negative but its effect is close to zero. The dummy
indicating whether a firm feels financially constrained has a large positive coefficient, which
is significant at the 10% level. This is surprising as one would expect that firms that feel
financially constrained should get less bank credit. However, this reasoning only considers
the supply of bank credit and not the demand for bank credit. It may be that financially
constrained firms are those firms that have a lot of investment possibilities and therefore
a higher demand for bank credit. The export dummy has a negative coefficient which is
insignificant. Being an exporter reduces the amount of bank credit you have. This may
reflect the higher risk due to international transactions which reduces the willingness of
banks to extend credit. Additionally, although internationally active firms usually need
to finance more investments and transactions, they also generally have higher profits and
may use them to build up internal funds. The coefficient of productivity is positive, which
implies that more productive firms can get more bank credit as they are supposed to be
more reliable creditors.
In Table column 2 of 1.2, we conduct the same estimation with only the second lag as
instrument for the endogenous variables. The coefficients change slightly in size but the
signs remain the same. Now, the coefficient of supplier credit is significantly negative at
the 5% level. The coefficient of tangible assets also becomes significant at the 10% level.
The financial constraints dummy remains significantly positive at the 10% level. The coef-
ficient of supplier credit for financially constrained firms remains positive and marginally
significant with a p-value of 0.133. Furthermore, the coefficient of labor productivity
becomes significant at the 10% level.
The test for serial correlation in both specifications shows that we have first-order serial
correlation of the errors but no second-order or third-order serial correlation. Hence, the
Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator is consistent. This supports our sequential exogeneity
assumption. The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions for the specification in column
1 is fulfilled. The Null that the instruments as a group are exogenous cannot be rejected.
We also test whether subsets of instruments are exogenous by using difference-in-Hansen
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Table 1.2: The Relation Between Supplier Credits and Bank Credits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. BC BC BC BC
SC -3.981* -4.626** -3.849** -4.101*
(2.311) (2.331) (1.682) (2.215)
tangibles 1.215 1.457* 1.216** 1.291
(0.788) (0.856) (0.603) (0.797)
salesgrowth -0.020 -.0215 -0.0181 -0.0191
(0.0199) (0.0193) (0.0141) (0.0151)
constrain 7.689* 7.359* 6.684* 6.252
(4.321) (3.964) (3.507) (3.822)
constrain*SC 2.118 1.9763
(1.385) (1.315)
constrain*SC*EXP 1.854** 1.720*
(0.9371) (1.044)
EXP -0.454 -0.479 -0.3056 -0.3137
(0.737) (0.7258) (0.6639) (0.6877)
labprod 1.183 1.409* 1.116* 1.223
(0.804) (0.832) (0.569) (0.767)
year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 1720 1720 1720 1720
No. of companies 410 410 410 410
No. of instruments 23 20 25 21
Lags used 2+3 2 2+3 2
AR(1) 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.005
AR(2) 0.290 0.288 0.199 0.248
AR(3) 0.989 0.774 0.824 0.909
Hansen (p-value) 0.851 . 0.953 .
In columns 1 and 3, we use the two-step GMM estimator with Windmeijer finite sample corrected
standard errors using the second and the third lag as instruments for the endogenous variables.
In columns 2 and 4, we only use the second lag as instrument.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
statistics. We find that all subsets of instruments are exogenous. In column 2, we do
not report the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions as the system is just identified.
Thus, we can conclude that we have an indication for the signaling effect of supplier credit
in our data. Although supplier credits and bank credits are substitutes for unconstrained
firms, they are complements for financially constrained firms.
36
Trade Credits and Bank Credits in International Trade
1.4.2 The Importance of Supplier Credit for Internationally Ac-
tive Firms
Bellone, Musso, Nesta, and Schiavo (2010) and Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2011) show that
financial constraints play an important role in international trade. This is the case because
the costs and the risks faced by firms are higher in international transactions. Therefore,
supplier credits, as an additional source of finance, are especially vital in international
trade. We now test whether the complementarity between supplier credit and bank credit
for financially constrained firms is particularly important for internationally active firms
(Hypothesis 3). We use the following estimation equation
BCit =γ0 + γ1SCit + γ2constrainit + γ3EXPit + γ4SCit ∗ constrainit ∗ EXPit
+ γ5xit + ηi + λt + it. (1.24)
This equation only differs from equation (1.23) in the triple interaction term we add
instead of the interaction term of supplier credit with the financial constraints dummy. We
interact supplier credit used with the dummy for whether a firm is financially constrained
and a dummy indicating export status. Thus, γ4 displays the effect of supplier credit
on bank credit for financially constrained exporters. γ1 is the effect of supplier credit
on bank credit for non-financially constrained firms, both exporters and non-exporters
and financially constrained non-exporters. We could also include the interaction term of
supplier credit and the financial constraints dummy. This would then explicitly capture
the group of financially constrained non-exporters. However, due to the high share of
exporters and the small fraction of financially constrained firms in our data this group is so
small such that it does not make sense to include it separately. Similarly, we do not add the
interaction term of financial constraints and export status, as we see in our data that the
within-variation is very small and thus is mainly captured by taking the first differences.
Furthermore, we are interested in comparing the group of financially constrained exporters
to all other firms. Following our model, we also do not add an interaction term for supplier
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credits for unconstrained exporters as unconstrained exporters are able to obtain bank
credit in the first place without relying on the signal extended by supplier credit. Again,
we also use the interaction terms lagged two or three times as instruments.
In column 3 of Table 1.2, the share of supplier credit used again has a significantly negative
effect on the share of bank credit used (5% significance level). The coefficient of supplier
credit for financially constrained exporters is significantly positive at the 5% level. Thus,
the signaling effect of supplier credit seems to be significant for financially constrained
exporters which confirms our third hypothesis. The underlying theoretical argument is
that for exporters the uncertainty is higher and thus the signaling effect is more important.
For those exporters with a very high productivity level that nevertheless get bank credit
financing, the signal provided by supplier credits is of no great importance. For those
exporters with a lower productivity level whose bank credit financing is constrained,
however, the signaling effect of supplier credit plays a significant role. The coefficient of
tangible assets has a significantly positive effect on bank credit at the 5% significance
level. The financial constraints dummy remains significantly positive at the 10% level as
well as labor productivity.
The results using only the second lag as instruments shown in column 4 are similar. The
coefficient of supplier credit is significantly negative at the 10% level. Furthermore, the
effect of supplier credit for financially constrained exporters remains significantly positive
at the 10% level. The tests for serial correlation and the Hansen test for overidentification
again yield that the estimator is consistent and the instruments are valid.
1.4.3 Robustness Checks
Using sales over employees is the best productivity measure we can use. Alternatively,
we rerun the estimations using the logarithm of sales of a firm as a proxy for its size
(Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006). In Table A.2 the results are shown. The signs remain
the same for all coefficients. Only the size of the coefficients differs slightly. In columns
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1 and 2, one sees that the effect of supplier credit as such remains significantly negative.
The effect of supplier credit for financially constrained firms is positive, but insignificant.
However, the estimation results in column 3 also support our results obtained using our
productivity measure. Again, supplier credit for financially constrained exporters has a
positively significant effect at the 5% level. In column 4, this effect is also positive but
insignificant, with a p-value of 0.159. The tests for serial correlation and the Hansen test
for overidentification are again fulfilled.
In a second robustness check, we scale trade accounts payable and bank debt by total
liabilities instead of total assets. Hence, we consider the effect of the importance of
supplier credits considering the whole amount of external finance on the importance of
bank credits in the financing portfolio. As bank credits and supplier credits are not the
only forms of external finance this effect can again be positive or negative. In columns 1
and 2 of Table A.3, the substitutive relation between supplier credits and bank credit is
confirmed. The coefficient of supplier credit for financially constrained firms is positive
but insignificant. In columns 3 and 4, we find again supportive evidence for the positive
effect of supplier credits for financially constrained exporters.
Summing up all results, we have seen that the share of supplier credit used has a negative
effect on the share of bank credit used for financially unconstrained firms (Hypothesis
1). However, if we only look at financially constrained firms the share of supplier credit
used tends to affect the share of bank credit used positively, although the overall effect is
still negative but less so (Hypothesis 2). This positive effect seems to play a more signifi-
cant role, though, for financially constrained exporters. The coefficient of the interaction
term is positively significant (Hypothesis 3). The empirical results, therefore, provide
supporting evidence for our theoretical model.
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1.5 Conclusion
Supplier credits are an important financing tool, especially for internationally active firms.
This is surprising given that supplier credits are generally considered to be more expensive
than bank credits, with an annual real interest rate of 40% or higher.
We show that even though supplier credits can involve high implicit interest rates, they
are attractive to financially constrained exporters. Supplier credits not only provide ad-
ditional liquidity to a firm, but they serve as a signal of the quality of purchased interme-
diates. Access to supplier credit financing is particularly relevant for firms that cannot
afford to export if only pure bank financing is available. They use supplier credits com-
plementary to bank credits. In contrast, firms that can export with pure bank financing
do not necessarily rely on supplier credit financing. To them, bank credits and supplier
credits are substitutes. We confirm our predictions for a sample of German manufacturing
firms.
40
Chapter 2
How Trade Credits Foster Exporting∗
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Katharina Eck and Monika Schnitzer.
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2.1 Introduction
Aggravated trade finance conditions have been suggested as one of the reasons why trade
flows collapsed in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis as well as in past crises (Amiti
and Weinstein, 2011). Indeed, a great part of all trade transactions are supported by
some form of trade finance (Auboin, 2009). Surprisingly, though, the main part of trade
finance takes the form of trade credits, which are considered a particularly expensive
form of financing: implicit annual trade credit interest rates can amount to up to 40%
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Trade credits are extended bilaterally between firms and
exist in the form of supplier credits and cash-in-advance (CIA). CIA refers to payments
made in advance by the buyer of a good to the seller. In contrast, a supplier credit is
granted from the seller of a good to the buyer such that the payment of the purchasing
price can be delayed for a certain period of time.2 Why trade credits are so prevalent in
international trade, despite their high cost, has been little studied so far.
This chapter aims at closing this gap. We argue that international transactions are
inherently subject to more uncertainty than domestic transactions and that trade credits
serve as a quality signal that helps reduce this high uncertainty. In our analysis, we focus
on CIA financing and provide a rationale for the use of expensive trade credits to finance
international trade. For this purpose, we develop a model of financially constrained
firms that need outside finance to be able to export. Financial constraints arise from
asymmetric information problems that deter less productive firms from exporting if only
bank financing is available. Access to CIA reduces the asymmetric information problem
and thus promotes the export participation of firms that are constrained in their access
to traditional bank financing.
We test our prediction with data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Perfor-
mance Surveys (BEEPS) for German firms in 2004. This dataset is ideal for our purposes
2In the literature, the term trade credit is sometimes used for credits extended by a bank to support
a trade transaction. When using the term trade credit, we exclusively refer to inter-firm credits that are
extended between firms without any financial intermediation.
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since it contains data on the use of CIA and the export activity of firms. We find that
firms that receive CIA from their trading partners have on average a 27% higher proba-
bility to export than firms that do not receive CIA financing. Likewise, a 1% increase in
CIA financing increases the export probability of firms on average by 13%. We find that
the export fostering effect of CIA is particularly strong for financially constrained firms.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, we are the first to explicitly analyze the
effects of CIA financing on international trade in a theoretical framework. In our model,
we show that the productivity threshold to profitably export is lower if a firm is provided
with CIA by its foreign trading partner. Second, using survey data, we can provide direct
evidence of the beneficial effects of CIA financing on exporting. In the survey, firms report
how much of their sales are paid in advance by customers. Thus, we need not rely on
proxies for CIA availability such as trade payables from balance sheet data. Since the
use of CIA by firms is very likely related to unobserved firm characteristics we apply an
instrumental variable approach to establish a causal effect of CIA financing on exporting.
Accounting for endogeneity, we find that CIA availability strongly fosters the export
participation of firms. In addition, we analyze the differential impact of CIA financing
on exporting for firms that are constrained in their access to finance. We find that firms
that have higher financing needs and firms that experience difficulties in accessing bank
finance more strongly benefit from CIA financing in terms of their export participation.
Our analysis is related to two strands of literature. First, it builds on the literature on
trade credits such as Lee and Stowe (1993). In Lee and Stowe (1993), firms extend trade
credits to signal product quality to their (domestic) customers which is the so called
warranty by quality hypothesis.3 This signaling motive should hold a fortiori for inter-
national transactions that suffer from an even higher degree of uncertainty. As we show
in our model, even though trade credits are intrinsically more costly than bank credits,
this disadvantage is more than compensated for by the reduction of uncertainty, so fi-
3Another paper on the warranty by quality hypothesis was simultaneously developed by Long, Malitz,
and Ravid (1993). In a more recent paper, Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) provide empirical evidence
of the quality signaling motive for a small sample of US and European firms.
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nancially constrained firms benefit from access to trade credits. Biais and Gollier (1997)
develop a model where the firm that extends the trade credit signals its belief in the cred-
itworthiness of the firm it provides with trade credit. Their argument requires that the
trade partner has an information advantage relative to the bank. Giannetti, Burkart, and
Ellingsen (2011), however, find that the trading partners have no persistent informational
advantage. In contrast to Biais and Gollier (1997), in our model we assume that the firm
extending CIA signals its own quality, which seems to be a more natural and realistic
assumption. Furthermore, this literature focuses on supplier credits. Instead, we analyze
CIA. This is especially interesting since Mateut (2012), e.g., shows that prepayment fi-
nancing is intensively used by firms across all industries. Thus, CIA, similar to supplier
credit financing, provides an alternative to bank-intermediated trade finance.
Only recently has the literature on trade credits taken international transactions into
its focus, investigating the optimal choice of trade credit. In Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2012)’s
model, financial market characteristics and contractual environments of both the foreign
and domestic market influence the choice of trade credit by firms. Similarly, Antràs and
Foley (2011) study how a firm’s choice of using CIA versus supplier credit depends on the
extent of contractual frictions in the foreign trading partner’s country. The authors find
empirical support using data from a large US exporting firm. Ahn (2011) investigates
which side of the transaction should provide a trade credit and finds that it should be the
trade partner that possesses the larger amount of collateral. Furthermore, he provides an
explanation for how a lack of trade finance could have contributed to the drop in global
trade during the financial crisis. Olsen (2011) focuses on the role of banks in international
trade. He shows that by issuing letters of credit, banks can help to overcome enforcement
problems between exporters and importers. Glady and Potin (2011) provide empirical
evidence on the importance of letters of credit when country default risk is high. While
the focus of these papers is primarily on the choice of the trade credit form as a function of
the level of uncertainty, we focus instead on the rationale for using CIA as an alternative
or as a complement to cheaper bank financing. We show how CIA solves both a moral
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hazard and an adverse selection problem for an exporter. Hence, we find that CIA fosters
international trade.
The second strand of literature explores the influence of financial constraints on exporting
behavior. Chaney (2005) and Manova (2012) show that financial constraints can prevent
less productive firms from exporting in a Melitz (2003)-type model. Feenstra, Li, and
Yu (2011) argue that exporters are more severely affected by financial constraints than
domestic firms, due to the higher risks and longer financing periods in international trade.
Firm-level studies confirm the adverse effect of financial constraints on exporting (see e.g.,
Minetti and Zhu, 2011; Muûls, 2008; Buch, Kesternich, Lipponer, and Schnitzer, 2010).
We add CIA to the choice of financing instruments for an internationally active firm.
Whereas some firms cannot profitably export if only bank financing is available, we show
that with the help of CIA, financially constrained firms can also export.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In section 2.2, we develop a model for
an exporter receiving CIA. Section 2.3 introduces the dataset and provides summary
statistics. In section 2.4, we set out the empirical strategy to test our model predictions
and present our results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Consider a two-period economy, t = 0, 1, in which a firm considers whether to produce
for the foreign market.4 When producing the quantity x in t = 0, a firm faces the convex
cost function k = x22(1+β) . (1 + β) denotes the productivity level of the firm so that more
productive firms produce at lower variable costs, β > 0. Following the current literature,
we characterize a firm by its productivity level which determines its decision to become
internationally active (see Melitz, 2003). Additionally, the firm has to incur a fixed cost
FEx associated with foreign market entry, e.g., costs related to the establishment of a
4Since we are interested only in whether a firm can export at all, we exclude domestic transactions
from our analysis.
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distribution network or market research in the foreign market. At the end of t = 0,
the firm sells its good at price p in the foreign market to an importing firm. In t = 1,
the importing firm can resell the good to final customers in the foreign market at the
exogenous market price pˆ and generate revenues.
We assume that the exporting firm does not possess any internal funds and has to finance
all costs of production externally in t = 0, before any revenues are generated. The
importing firm does not possess any cash, either, to pay for the exporter’s good. There
are two possibilities of how payment by the importer to the exporter can occur: either
after delivery in t = 1, as soon as the importer has generated own revenues, or upfront
before the exporter starts to produce. In the former scenario, the exporter has to finance
all production costs via a bank credit. In the latter scenario, the importer has to access
external finance to be able to pay in advance. We do not consider payment at delivery
(at the end of t = 0) because this implies that both trading partners have to use costly
external finance instead of only one of the partners. Therefore, payment at delivery is
strictly dominated.
When payment occurs after delivery, the exporter faces two sources of uncertainty. The
first one is an adverse selection problem with regard to the importer’s type. With prob-
ability µ, 0 < µ < 1, the importer is of high quality (H) and so is able to successfully
market the exporter’s good in the foreign market. With probability (1− µ) the importer
is of low quality (L) which means that positive revenues cannot be generated and hence
the exporter is not paid.
Second, a moral hazard problem can occur, due to the long distances in international
trade and difficulties of tracing the importer’s behavior. Instead of selling the good in
the foreign market, the importer can divert the good and derive a private payoff of φx,
blaming adverse market conditions for not generating positive revenues. To fix ideas, we
assume that the market demand for the exporter’s good in the foreign market is uncertain:
demand in the foreign market is positive with probability λ, 0 < λ < 1 and it is zero
with probability (1 − λ). No revenues are generated in the latter case and the importer
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cannot repay the exporter, even if he is of high quality. We assume that diverting the
good is inefficient, 0 < φ < λpˆ. Whether or not the high-quality importer diverts the
good depends on the price he is supposed to pay to the exporter in case of successfully
marketing the good. The low-quality importer always diverts the good since he cannot
successfully market it.5 Hence, positive export revenues are generated only if the importer
is of high quality, market demand is positive, and the high-quality importer does not divert
the good.6
2.2.1 Pure Bank Credit Financing
In the following, we consider the case in which payment occurs after delivery and the
exporter has to apply for a bank credit to finance all costs of production. The bank credit
can be repaid only if the importer pays for the goods as agreed on. This depends on
the type of the importer, the demand in the foreign market, and the decision whether to
divert or resell the good. To prevent problems related to moral hazard, for each unit of x
sold to the high-quality importer, the exporting firm demands a price p such that
λ(pˆx− px) ≥ φx.
The high-quality importer’s expected revenues from selling the good and repaying the
exporter in case of positive market demand must be at least as high as the gain from
diversion. We assume that the exporter has full market power in setting the price for the
good, so p is given by
p = pˆ− φ
λ
. (2.1)
Assuming instead that the importer has some, but less than full, market power changes
our results only quantitatively but not qualitatively.
5Including moral hazard is necessary to have type uncertainty in our model. Without any possibility
to divert the good, a low-quality importer would not take part in trade.
6Araujo and Ornelas (2007) also model type uncertainty of exporters and importers in international
trade. They focus on improvements in institutional quality to overcome asymmetric information.
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Banks operate under perfect competition and make zero profits. The bank faces the same
uncertainty as the exporter concerning the quality type of the importer and the market
risk, so credit repayment by the exporter is uncertain. For simplicity, we assume that
there is no asymmetric information with regard to the exporter’s quality. For the bank
to break even, the following condition has to hold
λµD(1 + rB) = (1 + r¯B)D,
where D stands for the amount lent by the bank which is repaid with probability λµ, i.e.,
if the importer is of high quality and market demand is positive. The bank’s expected
revenues have to be equal to the refinancing costs of the bank. (1 + rB) denotes the gross
interest rate the bank charges and (1 + r¯B) refers to the gross refinancing interest rate of
the bank. The collateral in case of non-repayment is normalized to 0. Solving for (1 + rB)
yields the gross interest rate the bank requires to break even:
(1 + rB) =
(1 + r¯B)
λµ
. (2.2)
The higher the certainty about the foreign market demand and the importer quality, the
lower the interest rate the bank demands. In the case of complete certainty, λ = µ = 1,
the bank demands exactly its gross refinancing rate. With pure bank credit financing the
exporter faces the following profit function:
piBCEx = λµpx− (1 + r¯B)
(
x2
2(1 + β) + FEx
)
. (2.3)
The exporter receives expected revenues of λµpx and finances the total costs of production
via a bank credit. The exporter repays the amount borrowed only in case of positive
revenues (λµ) and is charged an interest rate that takes into account the risk of the
international transaction. Maximizing the exporter’s profit function with regard to x, we
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can derive the optimal quantity exported with pure bank credit financing:
xBCEx =
(1 + β)
1+r¯B
λµ
(
pˆ− φ
λ
)
. (2.4)
Plugging (2.4) into the exporter’s profit function (2.3) and setting the profit equal to zero
yields the minimum productivity level required to make at least zero profit:
(1 + β)BCEx ≡
(
1 + r¯B
λµ
)2 2FEx(
pˆ− φ
λ
)2 . (2.5)
Firms with a productivity level (1+β) < (1 + β)BCEx are not able to export since at this level
of uncertainty, they are unable to break even.7 We refer to these firms as financially
constrained implying that they are not productive enough to export with pure bank
financing. A similar concept is used in Manova (2012) where imperfect financial contract
enforcement abroad precludes less productive firms from exporting. Better contractual
enforcement, which can be seen as a reduction in uncertainty, leads to a lower export
threshold.
In our model, the productivity threshold is lower the lower the uncertainty with regard
to the type of the foreign customer (higher µ) and positive market demand (higher λ).
It decreases with lower refinancing costs incurred by the bank and increases with higher
fixed costs of exporting. Firms that can charge a higher price p, e.g., if the moral hazard
problem is less severe (lower φ), can be relatively less productive to start exporting since
their expected revenues are higher.
2.2.2 Pure Cash-in-Advance Financing
Next, we consider payment before delivery. If the exporter can enforce advance payment
of the total invoice before production takes place in t = 0, moral hazard and adverse
7The idea of varying thresholds for different financing options can also be found in Mateut, Bougheas,
and Mizen (2006) and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) who focus on trade credit extension without reference
to international transactions.
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selection can be eliminated completely. Low-quality importers reveal their type by not
agreeing to pay in advance and problems related to moral hazard are irrelevant from the
exporter’s point of view. Moreover, an additional bank credit is not needed as the total
costs of production can be paid out of the revenues received up front.
When paying the invoiced amount in advance, the importer faces refinancing costs of
(1 + r¯Im). We assume that r¯Im > r¯B since banks are specialized financial intermediaries
and are more efficient in providing credits. We can interpret r¯Im as a measure of the
financial constraint of the importer, i.e., the higher is r¯Im, the less able is the importer to
provide CIA. Recall our assumption that the exporter has full bargaining power. Hence,
with pure CIA financing, the exporter demands a price p˜ such that the importer just
breaks even:
λpˆx− p˜x(1 + r¯Im) = 0.
Consequently,
p˜ = λpˆ1 + r¯Im
. (2.6)
The exporter’s profit function with pure CIA financing is
piCIAEx = p˜x−
(
x2
2(1 + β) + FEx
)
. (2.7)
This leads to
(1 + β)CIAEx ≡
(1 + r¯Im
λ
)2 2FEx
pˆ2
. (2.8)
Comparing the minimum productivity level required for pure CIA financing to the one for
pure bank credit financing, we find that pure CIA financing requires a higher minimum
productivity level if
(1 + r¯Im)(λpˆ− φ) > λpˆ(1 + r¯B)
µ
. (2.9)
The above condition is fulfilled if the refinancing costs of the importer are high relative
to the refinancing costs of the bank. If r¯Im is high, firms that cannot export in the case
of pure bank credit financing still cannot with pure CIA financing, either. This is due to
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the fact that the higher the refinancing costs the lower the price p˜ exporters can demand
for their goods. In contrast, if the adverse selection problem is acute (low µ), pure CIA
financing is attractive for financially constrained firms because the elimination of the
adverse selection problem is very valuable. To simplify our presentation, in the following
we restrict attention to parameter cases where pure CIA is more expensive than pure
bank credit financing, i.e., condition (9) is fulfilled. This seems to be the most relevant
case since full prepayments are very rare in practice.
2.2.3 Partial Cash-in-Advance and Bank Credit Financing
Consider now a combination of bank credit and CIA where only a fraction α of the invoice
payment is made in advance. This enables the importing firm to save some of the high
refinancing costs while it still allows the exporter to solve the adverse selection and the
moral hazard problem. The payment made in advance is used to pay a part of the total
production costs, the rest is financed via bank credit.
The fraction paid in advance can now serve as a signal of the importer’s quality type to
the bank and the exporter. Three cases can occur after observing a certain α: first, if the
bank believes that the importing firm is of high quality (Prob(H) = 1), it will provide
an additional bank credit at a lower interest rate to the exporting firm. Second, if the
bank believes that the importer is of low quality (Prob(H) = 0), it will not provide any
bank credit at all because the exporter is not able to repay the bank when trading with
a low-quality importer. Third, if the bank cannot infer the quality type from the amount
paid in advance (Prob(H) = µ), it will demand the same interest rate as in the case of
pure bank credit financing.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature determines the importer’s quality where Prob(H) = µ and Prob(L) = 1−µ.
The importer learns its type.
51
How Trade Credits Foster Exporting
2. In t = 0, the exporting firm specifies a price pˇ for the good to be exported and
demands CIA payment of a fraction α of the total amount from the importer. The
importer decides whether to extend the fraction α in advance or not, depending on
the importer’s type.
3. The bank observes the CIA payment by the importer in t = 0 and decides on
additional bank credit.
4. After observing the decisions made by the importer and the bank, the firm decides
whether to produce and export or not.
5. In t = 1, pay-offs are realized.
We consider two types of equilibria in this game, separating and pooling equilibria. In a
separating equilibrium, an informative signal is given, in a pooling equilibrium the signal
sent by the importer is not informative. Proposition 1 describes the separating perfect
Bayesian equilibrium that maximizes the exporter’s pay-off. The first bracket contains
the importers’ strategies, the second bracket contains the strategies of the bank. The
equilibrium and off-equilibrium beliefs are stated in the last two brackets.
Proposition 1 There exists a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
[(
αH = αSep, αL = 0
)
,
(1 + r¯B
λ
,NoBC
)
, P rob
(
H|α ≥ αSep
)
= 1,
P rob
(
H|0 ≤ α < αSep
)
= 0
]
where αSep = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ(1+r¯Im)−
φ
λ
and the price demanded for the exported good is pˇ = pˆ −
φ
λ
+ φ(1+r¯Im) . In this separating equilibrium, the high-quality importer extends the share
αH = αSep in advance and the low-quality importer chooses not to extend CIA at all.
When observing α = αSep, the bank updates its belief according to Bayes’ Rule such that
Prob
(
H|α = αSep
)
= 1 and extends additional bank credit at a lower interest rate, 1+r¯B
λ
.
When observing α = 0, the bank’s belief is Prob (H|α = 0) = 0 and it denies additional
bank credit.
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Proof. See Appendix B.1.
In the separating equilibrium, the exported quantity xSep and the minimum productivity
threshold for exporting (1 + β)SepEx equal:
xSepEx =
(1 + β)
1 + r¯B
[
λpˆ− φ+ φ(1 + r¯B)(1 + r¯Im)
]
, (2.10)
(1 + β)SepEx ≡
2(1 + r¯B)2FEx[
λpˆ− φ+ φ(1+r¯B)(1+r¯Im)
]2 . (2.11)
Firms with a productivity level lower than (1 + β)SepEx cannot export since they have
negative expected profits. As before, the productivity threshold increases with higher
fixed costs and higher bank refinancing costs. It also increases with higher importer
refinancing costs and a higher marginal benefit from diversion.
In addition, we consider the following pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 2 There exists a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
[
αPool,
(
1 + r¯B
λµ
)
, P rob
(
H|α = αPool
)
= µ, Prob
(
H|α < αPool
)
= 0,
P rob
(
H|α > αPool
)
∈ [0, 1]
]
where αPool = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ(1+r¯Im)−
φ
λ
and the price demanded by the exporter is pˇ = pˆ− φ
λ
+ φ(1+r¯Im) .
In this pooling equilibrium, both high- and low-quality importers extend the same share of
CIA. The bank is unable to infer the type of the importer from this signal and sticks to its
ex-ante belief, Prob (H) = µ. It extends additional bank credit at the interest rate 1+r¯B
λµ
.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
For the pooling equilibrium in which αPool = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ(1+r¯Im)−
φ
λ
, we can derive the following
production quantity and productivity threshold:
xPoolEx =
(1 + β)
1 + r¯B
[
µ(λpˆ− φ) + φ(1 + r¯B)(1 + r¯Im)
]
, (2.12)
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(1 + β)PoolEx ≡
2(1 + r¯B)2FEx[
µ(λpˆ− φ) + φ(1+r¯B)(1+r¯Im)
]2 . (2.13)
Comparing the minimum productivity thresholds in the different financing scenarios, we
derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The productivity thresholds can be uniquely ranked:
(1 + β)SepEx < (1 + β)
Pool
Ex < (1 + β)
BC
Ex
Thus, we can identify four groups of firms. (1) Firms with (1 + β) ≥ (1 + β)BCEx can
export in every financing scenario. (2) Firms with (1 + β)PoolEx ≤ (1 + β) < (1 + β)BCEx can
export if CIA is given, either in the separating or the pooling equilibrium. (3) Firms with
(1 + β)SepEx ≤ (1 + β) < (1 + β)PoolEx can export only in the separating equilibrium if the
signal via CIA is informative. (4) Firms with (1 + β) < (1 + β)SepEx cannot export at all.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Figure 2.1 gives a graphical representation of the ranking of the productivity thresholds
for the three different financing options. Proposition 3 implies that if CIA financing is
available, financially constrained firms in the second and third group can export that
would not have been able to do so with pure bank financing only. These firms benefit
from the availability of CIA. Firms in the fourth group cannot export even if CIA is
Exβ+1
Ex
BC)1( β+ExSep)1( β+ ExPool)1( β+
(1)(2)(3)(4)
Figure 2.1: Ranking of Productivity Thresholds Required for Exporting
available. Firms in the third group depend on an informative signal that eliminates the
adverse selection problem. Therefore, these firms play the separating perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. In contrast, firms in the second group have a high enough productivity
level to export even if the adverse selection problem is not eliminated and can export
under both equilibria. However, they cannot export with pure bank financing only. This
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is due to the fact that incentives for opportunistic behavior are stronger without CIA
so that an exporter has to set a lower price for his good to prevent moral hazard by
the importer. Firms in the first group do not depend on CIA availability since they
are productive enough to export with pure bank financing only. Interestingly, even these
firms which have access to bank financing prefer to use CIA. This is shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 Even if firms are able to export using pure bank financing, i.e., if
(1 + β) ≥ (1 + β)BCEx , they prefer partial CIA financing to pure bank financing.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Even very productive firms generate strictly lower expected profits with pure bank financ-
ing than with partial CIA financing. This is due to the fact that any small amount of CIA
provided reduces the importer’s incentive to divert the good. Consequently, the exporter
can set a higher price and generate higher expected profits from partial CIA financing.
Proposition 5 Firms with (1 + β) ≥ (1 + β)PoolEx can export under both the separating
and the pooling equilibrium. They prefer to play the separating (pooling) equilibrium if
quality uncertainty is low (high) and the importer’s refinancing costs are high (low). The
higher the productivity of the firm, the greater the parameter space in which the pooling
equilibrium is preferred by the exporters.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
If the importer’s refinancing costs are high, the exporter’s expected profits are higher
in the separating equilibrium since the informative signal compensates for the relatively
lower price firms receive from the importer. In contrast, expected profits are higher
in the pooling (separating) equilibrium if uncertainty is high (low). This result seems
counterintuitive at first. However, it is due to the fact that trade with an informative
signal takes place with probability µ only. With probability (1 − µ) the importer is of
low quality and hence not willing to send the informative signal which means that the
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transaction does not take place. An uninformative signal in a pooling equilibrium is sent
by both types of importers, instead. Therefore, firms prefer receiving at least a small
(uninformative) share of CIA upfront than receiving nothing if it is very likely that they
trade with a low-quality importer (µ is low). This effect is reinforced for more productive
firms since more productive firms have lower production costs and can better absorb losses
when trading with a low-quality importer. To summarize, what emerges from our model
is the following.
Prediction
The availability of CIA increases the profitability of exporting and hence increases the
probability of exporting, in particular for financially constrained firms.
CIA is beneficial to firms since it reduces uncertainty with regard to foreign trading
partners and it makes moral hazard less attractive to the firm paying in advance. Both
effects increase the profits from exporting which implies that all firms prefer to use a
combination of CIA and bank credit. However, considering a firm’s ability to export,
the provision of CIA is particularly beneficial to financially constrained firms since these
firms cannot export in the absence of CIA. Therefore, we expect the positive effect of
CIA on the export probability of firms to work mainly through the effect of financially
constrained firms.
2.3 Data and Summary Statistics
To test our prediction, we use data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Perfor-
mance Survey (BEEPS) on 1,196 German firms in 2004. BEEPS was developed jointly by
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank Group to
analyze the business environment of firms and to link it with firm performance. In 2004,
cross-sectional data on German firms was collected. By using stratified random sampling,
a high representativeness of the sample is achieved. Specifically, the sample is designed
56
How Trade Credits Foster Exporting
so that the population composition with regard to sectors, firm size, ownership, foreign
activity, and location is captured.8 In Table B.1 in Appendix B.2 the decomposition of
firms according to sectors for our sample can be found. Panel A of Table 2.1 provides
average sample characteristics. The median number of 12 employees per firm and the
median of expected sales of 1,200,000 Euro in the sample correspond quite well to the
German population averages: according to data from the Statistical Yearbook for the
Federal Republic of Germany, the average number of employees is 13 and average sales
amount to 1,230,000 Euro in 2004 (Federal Statistical Office, 2007).
The main advantage of this dataset is that it provides us with a precise measure of the
use of CIA by firms. More specifically, firms are asked what percentage of their sales’ in
value terms were paid before delivery from their customers over the last 12 months. Thus,
we do not have to rely on a proxy such as trade payables which is often used in the trade
credit literature when only balance sheet data is available. However, we cannot single out
CIA related to exporting activities compared to domestic activities since transaction level
data is not available in the survey. Thus, we restrict our analysis to linking the overall use
of CIA by firms to their export participation decision. Data on the exporting activities by
firms is given in terms of export shares of total sales which range from 0% to 90% in our
dataset. We classify a firm as an exporter if it sells a positive amount of its sales abroad.
A detailed description of all variables included in our analysis can be found in Table B.2
in Appendix B.2.
About 16% of all firms generate a positive share of their sales abroad (Panel A of Table
2.1), a share that is slightly higher than the population average for 2004 which is 12%
(Haunschild, Hauser, Günterberg, Müller, and Sölter, 2007). A look at the average use
of CIA in the sample reveals that more than one third of all firms receive prepayments
from their customers. In contrast, the mean share of prepayments received is rather low:
8Sectors included in the sample are mining and quarrying, construction, manufacturing, transporta-
tion, storage and communications, wholesale, retail and repairs, real estate, renting, and business service,
hotels and restaurants, and other community, social and personal activities. Sectors that are subject to
government price regulation and prudential supervision like banking, electric power, rail transport, and
water and waste water are excluded.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Summary Statistics on Firm Characteristics
Mean Median SD Obs.
Sales (1,000 Euros) 15,862 1,200 88,486 1,135
Age 19.4 14 16.7 1,196
Number of employees 85.8 12 443.3 1,195
LogLabprod 4.76 4.61 0.77 1,135
CompNum 3.51 4 1.03 1,196
ForPressure (%) 28.0 - - 1,196
Univeduc (%) 12.36 5 20.58 1,195
Foreign (%) 9.0 - - 1,196
Share of Exporters (%) 16 - - 188
Share of firms receiving CIA (%) 35 - - 418
Share of CIA received (%) 7 0 16 1,196
PublicInfo (%) 27.4 - - 1,184
Specificity 2.2 2 0.95 1,196
Panel B: Exporters vs. Non-Exporters
Exp Obs. Non-Exp Obs.
Mean
diff.
Share of firms receiving CIA (%) 43.5 188 33.7 1,008 9.8***
Av. Share of CIA received (%) 7.4 188 7.2 1,008 0.2
Sales (1,000 Euros) 66,971 177 6,419 958 60,552***
LogSize 4.06 188 2.42 1,008 1.64***
LogAge 3.0 188 2.61 1,008 0.39***
LogLabprod 5.0 177 4.7 958 0.3***
Foreign (%) 37.0 188 4.0 1,008 33.0***
Lowest Size Quartile
Share of firms receiving CIA (%) 33.3 24 27.9 305 5.4
Second-Lowest Size Quartile
Share of firms receiving CIA (%) 52.4 21 28.5 291 23.9**
Second-Highest Size Quartile
Share of firms receiving CIA (%) 48.3 29 34.8 230 13.5
Highest Size Quartile
Share of firms receiving CIA (%) 43.0 114 48.4 182 -5.4
Panel A provides average firm characteristics. Panel B displays results from mean difference
tests of firm characteristics for exporters vs. non-exporters using Welch’s formula to allow for
unequal variances in both groups (Welch, 1947). Firms are defined as exporters if they sell a
positive share of their sales abroad. The share of firms that receives CIA is defined as all firms
that receive a share greater than zero over all firms. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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on average, only 7% of total sales in value terms is paid by customers before delivery.
This implies that the remaining part, about 93% of total sales, is either paid on time or
after delivery by customers. The low average share of use of CIA may reflect the high
refinancing costs for the extending firms.
Panel B of Table 2.1 displays differences in CIA use by exporters versus non-exporters.
Strikingly, exporters distinctly use CIA more extensively than non-exporters. About 44%
of all exporters receive a positive share of their sales in advance, whereas only 34% of all
non-exporters obtain advance payment. The average share of CIA received is very similar
for both groups and only marginally higher for exporters. Since our data does not allow
us to determine whether CIA is used to finance a domestic or an export transaction, we
are concerned that the higher use of CIA by exporters is simply driven by the signifi-
cantly larger size of exporters in terms of number of employees and scope of operations.
Therefore, we split firms into size quartiles according to their number of employees and
check whether exporters still use CIA more extensively than non-exporters within the
same size quartiles. We find that within the same size quartile, relatively more exporters
than non-exporters receive CIA payments except within the highest size quartile. Note
that the low number of exporters in each size quartile makes it difficult to observe sig-
nificant positive differences although the differences are quite large. Other well-known
characteristics of exporters are reflected in the data as well: exporters are older, have
higher sales per worker (labor productivity), and rather tend to be foreign owned.
These descriptive statistics suggest that CIA financing plays a very important role for
internationally active firms. Our theoretical model provides an explanation for these
findings which we put to an empirical test in the following section.
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2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy
Our main prediction from our theoretical model states that access to CIA financing facili-
tates entry into exporting since asymmetric information problems are reduced. This effect
should be driven through the higher export performance of financially constrained firms
since unconstrained firms can export even in the absence of CIA. As stated in our model,
a firm is able to participate in exporting if it generates positive profits from exporting,
piEx > 0. The firm’s profits from exporting depend on the financing options available to
the firm, partial CIA versus pure bank financing, its own productivity level as well as
other firm characteristics. Thus, we rewrite piEx as
pi∗i = α + β1CIAreci + β2LogLabprodi + γCi + i, (2.14)
where CIAreci measures firm i’s use of CIA financing. We employ two measures of CIA
financing. The first is a binary indicator, DCIArec, equal to 1 if the firm receives a
positive amount of CIA and equal to 0 otherwise. In this case, the firm receives its sales
either on time or after delivery which implies that the firm has to rely on other sources of
financing such as bank credit financing. The second is the log percentage share of total
sales received in advance, LogCIArec. A lower value of LogCIArec implies that the
firm has to rely on other financing sources to a greater extent. Log labor productivity,
LogLabprod, is defined as the log of sales over employees and proxies for the firm’s own
level of efficiency. Additional firm level controls that influence the export decision of a
firm are included in the vector Ci. i denotes the error term. We do not observe the true
profits from exporting pi∗i of a firm, but its export status Expi. It is defined as a binary
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indicator equal to 1 if firm i generates positive profits from exporting and 0 otherwise:
Expi =

1, if pi∗i > 0,
0, if pi∗i ≤ 0.
(2.15)
Assuming a standard normal distribution of i we can write the probability to export of
firm i as:
Prob(Expi = 1) = Prob(α + β1CIAreci + β2LogLabprodi + γCi + i > 0)
= Φ(α + β1CIAreci + β2LogLabprodi + γCi), (2.16)
where Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function of the error term.
According to our model, the availability of CIA increases the profits from exporting pi∗i
and thus, we expect the effect of CIA on the export probability to be positive, β1 > 0.
The same holds true for the productivity level of the firm, β2 > 0.
A simple test of our hypothesis can be conducted via regressing Exp on CIArec and
further controls. The estimated coefficient β1 is unbiased if we can assume that whether
a firm receives CIA (or how much CIA it receives) is assigned randomly across firms.
However, this assumption is very likely not to hold true due to unobserved factors that
affect both the export decision of a firm and the decision whether to use CIA financing.
Consider for example uncertainty with regard to the importer’s type, captured by the
parameter µ in our model. Higher uncertainty with regard to the trading partner’s ability
to repay hinders entry into exporting since exporting becomes less profitable. Likewise,
higher uncertainty makes the use of CIA more attractive in order to alleviate asymmetric
information. Consequently, not controlling for the level of uncertainty may lead to a
downward bias of our results. A second example is manager motivation. More motivated
managers may be more successful in leading their enterprises into exporting and they may
also be more able to enforce CIA payment from their customers. Thus, omitted manager
motivation can lead to an upward bias of our results. We address endogeneity in our key
61
How Trade Credits Foster Exporting
variable by employing two instruments that are unrelated to the export decision of a firm
but influence CIA financing.
To find suitable instruments that strongly influence whether a firm receives CIA pay-
ment from its customers but that are unrelated to the export decision, we make use of
information on the relationship between firms and their customers. The first instrument
comes from a question on the sources that firms use to acquire new customers. In the
survey, firms are asked whether trade fairs and other public sources of information are not,
slightly, fairly, very, or extremely important sources of information about new customers
to the firm. We construct the dummy PublicInfo, which is equal to 1 if the firm indicates
that trade fairs and other public sources of information are extremely important sources
of information about new customers. This is true for about 27% of firms in our dataset.
PublicInfo proxies for the closeness between firms and their customers. Firms that deem
information collected and made available by official authorities as extremely valuable very
likely experience difficulties in acquiring new customers. These firms should be more likely
to ask for CIA (or for a higher share of sales paid in advance) to be compensated for the
difficulties in finding the customers. PublicInfo can also be seen as a proxy for the range
of applications that the product can be used for. Firms that produce goods that can be
used for a smaller range of applications usually tend to face a smaller circle of potential
customers than firms that produce widely applicable goods. Consequently, they have to
exert more effort to find new customers which makes using CIA more attractive. We do
not expect the closeness between firms and customers to directly impact on the export de-
cision of firms. If the degree of closeness to customers influences a firm’s export decision,
the observed influence would be very likely negative since less knowledge on customers
should rather impede exporting than facilitate it. IV estimation in that case would then
lead to a lower and thus more conservative estimate for the effect of CIA on exporting.
The second question addresses the specificity of the main product or service sold by
the firm. Firms are asked how their customers react if the firm raises the price of its
main product or service line by 10%. Possible responses are: (i) customers buy from
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competitors, (ii) customers continue to buy at much lower quantities, (iii) customers
continue to buy at slightly lower quantities, or (iv) customers continue to buy from the
firm in the same quantities as before. Out of these answers, we construct the ordinal
variable Specificity that measures the price elasticity of demand that the firm faces or,
in other words, the bargaining power that the firm has vis-à-vis its customers. Specificity
takes the value 1 if (i) is chosen by the firm, 2 if (ii) is chosen, and so forth. A higher value
of the variable indicates a higher bargaining power or a lower elasticity of demand. We
expect a positive relationship between Specificity and the use of CIA. A low elasticity of
demand reflects a high specificity of the good or service sold such that customers depend
on the input. Consequently, these customers have a higher incentive to comply with CIA
requirements by the firm. Mateut (2012) provides empirical evidence on the relationship
between goods’ characteristics and customer prepayments for French firms. She finds
that downstream firms that sell a differentiated good receive larger prepayments from
their customers than firms that sell standardized goods.
Since a high market bargaining power may also reflect the competitiveness of the firm, we
are worried that our instrument does not only capture the specificity of the relationship
between firms and customers but that it might also pick up the degree of competition
the firm faces. Low competition can allow firms to raise prices without losing customers
and enable firms to enter the export market more easily since they obtain higher profits.
Therefore, we directly control for the level of competition that the firm experiences in
the national and the international market. This ensures that Specificity only captures
customer dependence with regard to product characteristics and, thus, is exogenous to
the export decision of a firm. Firms that produce very specific goods should be more able
to enforce CIA payment but producers of more specific goods should not be more likely
to export than producers of less specific goods, once the competition level is controlled
for.
Since our first measure DCIArec for CIArec is binary, we apply the recursive bivariate
probit model to estimate the effect of CIA on export participation in our first specification.
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Given valid instruments, the recursive bivariate probit model allows to determine the
causal effect of a potentially endogenous binary regressor on a binary dependent variable.
Specifically, it simultaneously estimates two probit models via maximum likelihood. The
first equation models the effect of the binary endogenous regressor and potential controls
on the outcome. The second equation models the endogenous regressor as a function of
the instruments and other controls. The error terms of both equations are assumed to be
correlated due to unobserved factors, e.g., manager motivation. The causal effect of the
binary endogenous regressor can be estimated if instruments are available that strongly
influence the endogenous regressor but are exogenous to the outcome equation.9 In our
case, we jointly estimate the export probability and the probability of a firm to receive
CIA by its customers. The first equation is given in (2.16). The second equation describes
the probability to receive CIA as follows:
Prob(DCIAreci = 1) = Prob(a+ b1Zi + b2LogLabprodi + cCi + ui > 0)
= Φ(a+ b1Zi + b2LogLabprodi + cCi), (2.17)
where ui is assumed to be standard normally distributed. i and ui are jointly normally
distributed with mean zero, a variance of 1, and a correlation coefficient of ρ. Alterna-
tively, we can estimate the causal effect of CIA on exporting via a two-stage least squares
linear regression model (2SLS). This approach loosens the restrictive assumptions on the
joint distribution of the error terms but it does not take into account the binary nature
of both the dependent variable and the endogenous regressor.
Z denotes our set of instrumental variables, PublicInfo and Specificity. By jointly
estimating equation (2.16) and (2.17) via maximum likelihood, we can identify a causal
effect of the use of CIA on the export participation of a firm. We employ our instruments
consecutively and also jointly in one specification.
In addition, we apply the continuous measure of CIA received, LogCIArec to measure
9The recursive bivariate probit model has also been used by Minetti and Zhu (2011) to address
potential endogeneity in a trade context.
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the intensity of CIA financing. In doing so, we replace equation (2.17) with the following
reduced form specification:
LogCIAreci = a+ b1Zi + b2LogLabprodi + c2Ci + vi. (2.18)
Equation (2.16) and (2.18) are jointly estimated via maximum likelihood under the as-
sumption that i, vi ∼ N (0,∑) and σ11 = 1.
Ci contains several control variables that influence the export decision of firms and are
commonly used in the literature. We follow Minetti and Zhu (2011) and control for rep-
utation and size effects by including the log of firms’ age, LogAge, and the log number
of employees, LogSize. Moreover, the percentage of the workforce with a university ed-
ucation or higher, Univeduc, is added to control for human capital effects. Older and
larger firms are usually expected to have a higher export probability, as well as firms that
possess a more highly educated workforce. We take the competitive environment of the
firm into account by controlling for the degree of national and international competition
that the firm faces. CompNum gives the number of national competitors of the firm
which can take values from 0 to 4 where 4 is coded as 4 or more competitors in the
national market. ForPressure captures the extent of foreign competition. It is defined
as a binary indicator equal to 1 if the firm states to be fairly or very much influenced by
competition from foreign competitors when making key decisions with regard to develop-
ing new products, services or entering new markets. It is equal to 0 if foreign pressure is
not at all or only slightly important to the decision process of the firm. The influence of
competition on the export decision is ambivalent. On the one hand, stronger competition
may deter firms from entering the export market. On the other hand, it might hint at the
existence of a larger market and growth opportunities to the firm by going international.
The inclusion of both controls ensures that our instrumental variable Specificity only
reflects the specificity of the firm-customer relationship and no competition effects. Last
but not least, we control for foreign ownership since foreign owned firms are more likely
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to export (Greenaway, Guariglia, and Kneller, 2007). Foreign is a dummy equal to 1 if
at least 10% of the firm are owned by a foreign entity. Sector specific effects are included
in all specifications, as well.
2.4.2 Effect of Cash-in-Advance Financing on Export Participa-
tion
Table 2.2 provides the results from estimating the effect of CIA financing, measured as
a binary indicator, on the export participation decision of firms. In the first column,
we consider CIA received as randomly granted to firms by their customers and estimate
equation (2.16) via a simple probit model. The effect of DCIArec on the probability
to export is positive and highly significant. To grasp the economic impact of positive
CIA received, we calculate the average marginal effect for DCIArec on the export prob-
ability: on average, firms that receive a positive amount of their sales in advance from
their customers have a 6% higher probability to export than firms that either receive the
payment on time or after delivery of their goods or services. With regard to the other
estimates, we confirm prior findings of the literature. Larger and more productive firms
have a higher export probability, as well as foreign owned firms and firms equipped with a
more highly educated workforce. In contrast, older firms do not participate significantly
more often in exporting. The effect of the number of domestic competitors is positive but
not significant, either. Instead, we find a strong positive influence of pressure from foreign
competitors on the export participation decision of firms. Firms indicating that pressure
from foreign competitors is fairly or very important when making key decisions about
developing new products or entering new markets have a higher probability to export.
This may reflect growth opportunities available in the foreign market and firms making
use of scale effects.
In columns (2) and (3), we jointly estimate equations (2.16) and (2.17), taking into ac-
count potential endogeneity of our key regressor. To instrument the use of CIA by firms,
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Table 2.2: Effect of DCIArec on Export Participation -
Simple and Bivariate Probit Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep.Var. Exp DCIArec Exp DCIArec Exp DCIArec Exp
Probit Bivariate probit Bivariate probit Bivariate probit
DCIArec 0.402*** 1.301*** 1.404*** 1.504***
(0.124) (0.413) (0.301) (0.258)
LogAge 0.025 -0.127** 0.046 -0.135** 0.065 -0.126** 0.052
(0.087) (0.058) (0.082) (0.058) (0.080) (0.058) (0.079)
LogSize 0.205*** 0.131*** 0.146*** 0.137*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.125***
(0.041) (0.029) (0.053) (0.029) (0.047) (0.029) (0.045)
LogLabprod 0.326*** 0.085 0.267*** 0.110** 0.252*** 0.0890* 0.246***
(0.080) (0.053) (0.080) (0.053) (0.076) (0.053) (0.074)
Univeduc 0.008* 0.008*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.004 0.008*** 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
CompNum 0.015 -0.015 0.014 0.002 0.020 0.009 0.013
(0.058) (0.039) (0.054) (0.039) (0.053) (0.040) (0.052)
ForPressure 0.747*** -0.043 0.695*** 0.011 0.667*** -0.023 0.660***
(0.121) (0.093) (0.131) (0.093) (0.126) (0.094) (0.123)
Foreign 1.358*** -0.099 1.273*** -0.134 1.248*** -0.099 1.213***
(0.171) (0.144) (0.195) (0.142) (0.182) (0.144) (0.181)
PublicInfo 0.283*** 0.278***
(0.087) (0.084)
Specificity 0.130*** 0.130***
(0.044) (0.043)
AME/ATE 0.057 0.220 0.248 0.275
(SE) / SD (0.018) 0.153 0.161 0.169
Observations 1,070 1,124 1,135 1,124
ρˆ -0.550* -0.620*** -0.681***
Log-Likelihood -274.0 -966.4 -975.5 -961.7
Sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are in parentheses.
In column 1, we provide the average marginal effect of DCIArec on exporting. In column, 3, 5, and 7 we
calculate the average treatment effect of DCIArec on exporting. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
we employ PublicInfo in column (2), which indicates whether the firm regards informa-
tion on new customers acquired from trade fairs and other public sources as extremely
important. The instrument highly significantly enters the equation for use of CIA. As
conjectured, firms with a high demand for officially collected information on new cus-
tomers are more likely to require CIA payment. Younger firms are more likely to use CIA
reflecting that these firms probably do not have built up a reputation with banks and
are more constrained in their access to traditional forms of finance. The size of a firm
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increases its likelihood to receive CIA. Both findings are in line with results for CIA use
by French firms (see Mateut, 2012). In addition, we find that firms with a more highly
educated workforce also tend to use prepayment financing more often. In column (3), the
estimates for equation (2.16) are displayed. We observe a strong and positive influence
of CIA received on the export participation decision of firms. Calculating the average
treatment effect of CIA received on the export probability of firms, we find that CIA
financing increases the likelihood of firms to export by 22%.10 The effect has more than
tripled compared to the simple probit model estimate which is 6%. The Wald test of
zero correlation between i and ui yields a significant negative correlation ρˆ at the 10%
level suggesting that we cannot consider the use of CIA by firms as exogenous. Thus, not
accounting for omitted variables greatly underestimates the true effect of CIA financing
on exporting. A potential reason is omitted variable bias due to unobserved customer
uncertainty which negatively impacts on exporting but makes CIA financing more neces-
sary. The main findings for our other covariates basically hold true except that we fail to
find a significant positive influence of a more highly skilled workforce.
In column (4), we use Specificity as instrument which gauges the firm’s bargaining power
with regard to enforcing CIA payment from its customers. We expect firms with increasing
bargaining power (decreasing price elasticity) to be more likely to enforce CIA payments
from their customers. Looking at the results in column (4), we find that this is indeed
the case. Specificity has a strong and positive impact on firms’ probability to receive
CIA suggesting that the higher the bargaining power of the firm, the more likely it is to
receive CIA. Exogeneity of the use of CIA can be rejected at the 1% level. The effect of
advance payments on the exporting decision of firms increases when instrumented with
pricing power information. On average, receiving CIA raises the export participation of
firms by about 25%.
In the last specification, we use both instruments jointly to increase the precision of
10The average treatment effect of CIA received on exporting is given by the following formula in
Wooldridge (2010), p. 594: Φ(α+ β + γCi)− Φ(α+ γCi).
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our estimates. Both instruments are again highly significant and exogeneity of our key
regressor is strongly rejected. Making use of a larger part of the exogenous variation in
DCIArec leads to a decrease in the estimated standard errors in column (7) and to an
even higher effect on exporting: receiving prepayments increases the probability to export
by 27%.
Next, we provide the results when measuring use of CIA as continuous variable in log
percentage shares of total sales in Table 2.3. Instead of the bivariate probit model, we
estimate equation (2.16) and (2.18) jointly via an instrumental variable probit model. We
employ the same set of instruments in turn. When neglecting endogeneity in LogCIArec,
we observe a small positive and significant effect on the export probability of firms. A
1% increase in the share of CIA received leads to a 2% increase in the export probability.
Considering only the exogenous variation in our key regressor instead leads to more precise
and larger coefficients that are highly significant: a 1% increase in the share of CIA
received on total sales raises firms’ export participation probability between 10% and
15%, depending on the set of instruments. However, Publicinfo seems to be a rather
weak instrument for LogCIArec. Applying it as single instrument in column 2, we cannot
reject exogeneity of our key regressor which points to a weak instrument. Therefore, our
preferred specification is the last specification in which we use both instruments jointly.
To ensure that the considerable increase in the estimated effect of CIA financing on
exporting does not stem from non-linearities underlying the recursive bivariate probit or
the instrumental probit model, we additionally provide the results from 2SLS estimations
in Tables B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B.2. The effect of DCIArec on exporting is even larger
when estimated via 2SLS in Table B.3. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect widely
varies from an insignificant point estimate of 24% to an increase by 77%. These findings
clearly illustrate that 2SLS is less suited for estimating the effect of a binary endogenous
regressor on a binary outcome since it neglects the binary nature of both endogenous
variables. One consequence is that predicted probabilities of export participation can
lie outside the unit interval. Minetti and Zhu (2011) note that this shortcoming also
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Table 2.3: Effect of LogCIArec on Export Participation -
Simple Probit and IV Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. Var. Exp LogCIA-rec Exp
LogCIA-
rec Exp
LogCIA-
rec Exp
Probit IV probit IV probit IV probit
LogCIArec 0.107** 0.552*** 0.691*** 0.635***
(0.043) (0.204) (0.074) (0.098)
LogAge 0.013 -0.127** 0.059 -0.133** 0.094 -0.122** 0.072
(0.086) (0.060) (0.078) (0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.070)
LogSize 0.210*** 0.111*** 0.114 0.115*** 0.036 0.107*** 0.075
(0.040) (0.029) (0.084) (0.029) (0.059) (0.029) (0.059)
LogLabprod 0.331*** 0.081 0.215* 0.102* 0.113 0.085 0.164*
(0.080) (0.056) (0.118) (0.056) (0.083) (0.056) (0.086)
Univeduc 0.008* 0.008*** 0.0002 0.008*** -0.001 0.008*** -0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
CompNum 0.016 -0.032 0.023 -0.014 0.034 -0.001 0.022
(0.058) (0.042) (0.051) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.046)
ForPressure 0.747*** -0.056 0.607*** -0.003 0.418*** -0.024 0.514***
(0.121) (0.098) (0.207) (0.097) (0.162) (0.097) (0.161)
Foreign 1.334*** 0.018 1.044*** -0.013 0.714*** 0.013 0.869***
(0.170) (0.162) (0.361) (0.159) (0.274) (0.161) (0.268)
PublicInfo 0.292*** 0.254***
(0.096) (0.094)
Specificity 0.154*** 0.163***
(0.046) (0.041)
AME 0.015 0.100 0.146 0.125
(SE) (0.006) (0.055) (0.027) (0.030)
Observations 1,070 1,059 1,059 1,070 1,070 1,059 1,059
ρˆ 0.140 0.002*** 0.004***
Log-Likelihood -276.1 -2,073 -2,090 -2,064
Sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. In column 1, 3, 5, and 7 we provide the average marginal
effect of LogCIArec on exporting. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
affects the first stage if the share of firms with an outcome of 1 is rather low, as it is
the case in our setting. This may also explain why the first stage F-Statistic is below
the recommended value of 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997) although both instruments enter
the first stage highly significantly and although the Hansen test statistic confirms that
the overidentifying restrictions are valid. Therefore, estimation via the recursive bivariate
probit model seems to be more appropriate to us.
When using the continuous measure of CIA received by firms as key regressor in Table
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B.4, the 2SLS results come closer to the estimates of the instrumental variable probit
model and also the first stage F-Statistic improves. The estimated effects vary widely,
though: a 1% increase in the share of CIA received leads to an increase in the export
probability between 13% and 22%. The Hansen test statistic again confirms that the
overidentifying restrictions are valid.
Taken together, our results strongly support our hypothesis that CIA financing fosters
the export participation at the firm level. If we do not control for potential endogeneity,
the effect of CIA on exporting is considerably smaller hinting at a downward bias due
to omitted variables that jointly influence firms’ decisions to export and to use CIA.
Applying instruments that account for non-random use of CIA by firms we establish a
statistically and economically meaningful effect of CIA financing on exporting.
2.4.3 Effect of Cash-in-Advance Financing on Export Participa-
tion for Financially Constrained Firms
So far, we have assumed that the effect of CIA financing on the export participation
decision of firms is constant across firms. According to our model, we expect the positive
effect of CIA financing to be driven mainly through the effect for financially constrained
firms since unconstrained firms can export even in the absence of CIA. In this subsection,
we explicitly test for heterogeneous effects of prepayment financing on exporting for con-
strained and unconstrained firms. We apply several different concepts that express firms’
difficulties in accessing bank credit and their financial needs. In doing so, we rely on the
specification with the continuous measure of CIA as key regressor (equations (2.16) and
(2.18)) because the recursive bivariate probit model becomes less computationally feasible
if the number of observations drops. Furthermore, we use the specification including both
instrumental variables since it provides us with the most precise and efficient estimates.
The results of this exercise can be found in Table 2.4.
We first split firms according to their number of employees with the median number of
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Table 2.4: Effect of LogCIArec on Export Participation for
Different Subgroups of Firms, IV Probit
IV probit: Dep. Var. Exp
Coeff.
LogCIArec
SE AME SE N
Heterogeneity According to Access to Finance
LogSize
(1) below median 0.778∗∗∗ (0.046) 0.156 (0.023) 503
(2) above median 0.258 (0.421) 0.048 (0.085) 549
Firms with demand
(3) and no access to loan 0.952*** (0.129) 0.266 (0.064) 71
(4) and access to loan 0.593*** (0.147) 0.115 (0.041) 723
Heterogeneity According to Financing Needs
Material input growth
(5) below median 0.540∗ (0.300) 0.081 (0.073) 738
(6) above median 0.609∗∗∗ (0.155) 0.141 (0.045) 313
(7) Manufacturing, Mining,
and Construction
0.800*** (0.050) 0.204 (0.024) 443
(8) Services 0.489** (0.198) 0.083 (0.048) 681
Instruments applied: PublicInfo, Specificity
Sector fixed effects are included in all regressions except for the last two sample splits ac-
cording to the firm’s main economic activity. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are in
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
employees as cutoff. Assuming that smaller firms experience stronger difficulties in secur-
ing bank finance, we expect a stronger fostering effect of CIA on the export probability
for firms below the median size level. The results in Table 2.4, rows 1 and 2, confirm our
conjecture and suggest that the effect of CIA on the export participation is mainly driven
by small firms: small firms that experience a 1% increase in CIA shares can increase their
export probability by about 16%. In constrast, larger firms do not significantly benefit
from additional CIA financing.
We then divide firms according to their access to bank financing in rows 3 and 4. The
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survey allows to identify firms that do not receive a bank loan although they have a positive
demand for it. In the survey, firms are asked whether they recently obtained a bank loan.
Firms that state that they do not currently possess a bank loan are asked to name the
reasons: potential answers are no need for a loan, downturn of the loan application,
or discouragement from applying for the loan for several reasons. We follow Hainz and
Nabokin (2012) and divide firms into two subgroups according to their demand and access
to credit. In doing so, we only consider firms that state a demand for credit, which is
true for 78% of all firms in our sample. We then split these firms according to whether
they currently possess a loan or not. Firms that do not possess a loan have either faced a
downturn of their application or did not apply for a loan because they were discouraged
from applying due to high interest rates, burdensome application procedures or because
they thought the loan application would be turned down anyways. We expect firms that
do not possess a loan but have demand for a loan to benefit more from additional CIA
financing than firms whose loan application was successful. Our results strongly confirm
this conjecture: firms that require external finance but do not obtain a bank loan can
raise their export probability by about 27% if CIA received increases by 1%. In contrast,
the partial effect for firms with access to a bank loan is only half of that for firms without
access. This strongly points to substitutional CIA financing by customers in order to
facilitate entry into exporting.
To gauge the extent of firms’ financial needs, we next split the sample according to the real
growth rate of material input costs. Firms with above median material input cost growth
very likely require additional financing to cover their higher input costs. We expect these
firms to benefit more strongly from additional CIA financing. Firms with above median
input cost growth experience a rise in their export probability by about 14% for every 1%
increase in CIA financing, row 6. In contrast, the average marginal effect for low growth
firms is smaller and only marginally statistically significant, row 5.
Finally, we analyze heterogeneous effects across different sectors. We lump together firms
from the manufacturing sector, mining, and construction and compare them to firms
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from the service sector. We expect the former to benefit more from CIA financing since
manufacturing and construction goods rather tend to be capital intensive goods that
have higher financing requirements than services. We find that the marginal effect of
1% increase in CIA financing on the export probability more than doubles when moving
from service to non-service firms (rows 7 and 8). Thus, the strong effect of CIA financing
on firms’ export decision is mainly driven by firms in presumably more capital intensive
sectors.
2.5 Conclusion
Our findings strongly suggest that prepayment financing between firms can be highly
beneficial. CIA can serve as a credible signal of quality and reduce part of the high
uncertainty in international trade. This in turn can help to alleviate financial constraints
experienced by firms in international trade despite higher implied costs. If external funds
are not sufficiently available, firms can still overcome financial frictions if other firms
redistribute their funds in form of CIA. We confirm our predictions for a sample of German
firms. Although the German credit market is rather well-developed, German firms greatly
benefit from access to CIA financing in terms of their export participation. We expect the
positive effects of CIA financing to be especially relevant in a situation of global monetary
contractions when firms experience severe difficulties in obtaining bank-intermediated
trade finance.
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Multinational Enterprises,
Exporters, and Unions: Bargaining
Advantage vs. Rent Sharing
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3.1 Introduction
The empirical evidence on whether multinational enterprises (MNEs) pay higher wages
than domestically owned firms is inconclusive. Heyman, Sjöholm, and Tingvall (2007)
estimate that the individual worker’s wage level is 2 to 6% higher in MNEs compared
to domestically owned firms (see Huttunen, 2007; Chen, Ge, and Lai, 2011, for similar
findings). Other studies, however, do not find an MNE wage premium (see Conyon,
Girma, Thompson, and Wright, 2002; Almeida, 2007; Andrews, Bellmann, Schank, and
Upward, 2009).1 One potential explanation for these opposing findings is the role unions
play in negotiations with domestically and foreign-owned firms.
Despite the fact that union membership steadily decreases, the share of workers covered by
union wage agreements still amounts to about 50% in Germany (see Ellguth and Kohaut,
2007). In France, approximately 80% of workers are covered by collective bargaining
(Delacroix, 2006). These numbers illustrate that unions still play an important role in the
determination of wages. MNEs may negotiate higher or lower wages with unions compared
to domestically owned firms. On the one hand, MNEs have a bargaining advantage as
they can relocate production, which may result in lower wage payments. On the other
hand, MNEs may pay higher wages as they are on average more profitable and unions
may want to partake in the profits.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that unions take into account firms’ profits when formulating
their wage claims. Take as examples the following statements of newspaper articles:
Referring to upcoming negotiations of the IG-Metall (the largest German union), its head
of county was cited in the newspaper Die ZEIT (25.12.2011): “It will be a hot debate.
A lot of workers have high expectations due to high profit margins and large profits in
2011.”. Similarly, The Guardian (18.01.2012) wrote that Unilever now wants to transfer
its entire workforce to a less costly career average earnings plan (Care). The Guardian
stated: “But the unions point to huge profits and generous treatment of executives, and
1For a more detailed review of the literature see section 3.2.
76
Multinational Enterprises, Exporters, and Unions
fear that the Care proposal will lead to much less dependable pensions arrangements.”
This chapter develops a general equilibrium model of firm-union wage bargaining behavior
for both exporters and MNEs which can explain the inconclusive empirical findings. In
line with the anecdotal evidence, the labor union in our model does not only consider
what can be earned outside the firm but also takes into account the firm’s economic
performance. We introduce the fair wage approach of Egger and Kreickemeier (2012a) into
the heterogeneous firms wage bargaining model of Eckel and Egger (2009). Firms choose
whether to serve a foreign market via exports or foreign direct investment (FDI). Besides
the traditional proximity-concentration trade-off, the firm has an additional incentive to
become an MNE due to a better bargaining position as it can relocate production to
foreign plants.
The contribution of the chapter is two-fold. First, by introducing fair-wage preferences
into wage bargaining we can derive firm-specific wages in a well tractable way. Homo-
geneous workers earn different wages depending on the firm they are employed at. This
pattern was first found by Slichter (1950) who termed this rent sharing behavior, i.e., more
profitable firms pay equally skilled workers more than less profitable firms. Summarizing
the empirical findings on rent sharing, Goos and Konings (2001) state that the overall
elasticity of wages with respect to rent, found for US, Canada, UK and some European
firms, lies between 0.1 and 0.3. Thus, among other factors, wages depend on the firm’s
economic performance. Furthermore, the model can explain the findings of the empirical
literature on residual wage inequality, i.e., wage inequality that cannot be explained by
observable worker characteristics. Residual wage inequality is found to account for about
two thirds of the increase in total wage inequality (see, e.g., Fuchs-Schuendeln, Krueger,
and Sommer, 2010, for Germany).
Second, the chapter can reconcile the inconclusive empirical evidence on MNE wage pre-
mia. On the one hand, MNEs may pay lower wages because they have a better bargaining
position vis-à-vis the unions as they can relocate production. On the other hand, MNEs
are on average more profitable than exporters and workers want their part of the profits.
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Combining these two effects, MNEs may pay higher or lower wages than exporters. MNEs
pay higher wages than exporters if unions’ bargaining power is relatively low or relatively
high as in these cases MNEs can benefit less from their bargaining advantage. For weak
unions wage claims are low anyway and for strong unions the firm’s contribution and
hence the disagreement profit matters less. For intermediate bargaining power, MNEs
pay lower wages than exporters as they can profit most from their bargaining advantage.
Furthermore, MNEs’ wage payments relative to exporters’ increase with trade costs and
with the competitive situation in an economy. In addition, we can show that the unem-
ployment rate in the open economy decreases with the share of MNEs if MNEs pay on
average lower wages than exporters. MNEs have the possibility to relocate production,
which has a direct negative effect on employment. Conversely, MNEs can negotiate lower
wages relative to their profits which has an indirect positive effect on employment. This
leads to an increase in employment.
This chapter builds on two strands of the literature. First, there is the literature on
MNEs and wage bargaining. We build on the model of Eckel and Egger (2009) who
first introduced the bargaining advantage of MNEs into a heterogeneous firm model,
where firms decide whether to serve a foreign market via exports or FDI. They show that
MNEs always pay lower wages than exporters. O’Farrell (2012) and Clougherty, Gugler,
and Sørgard (2011) add possible spill-over effects to the bargaining advantage of MNEs.
These may have a positive effect on MNEs’ wage payments. Ranjan (2010) constructs
a Pissarides-style search model of unemployment with collective bargaining to study the
impact of offshoring on domestic wages and unemployment. The paper finds that more
offshoring is always associated with a decrease in wages. These papers analyze MNEs’
wage payments in models in which either firms do not differ in their economic performance
or, if they differ, they still pay the same wage across all firms. As empirical studies have
shown that wages depend on firms’ profitability and since this can change the results of
the models described above, we analyze MNEs’ repercussions on the labor market in a
model with firm-specific wages.
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Second, this chapter is related to other papers in which firm-specific wages are derived.
Egger and Kreickemeier (2012a) use the fair wage approach to show that wages depend
on the firm’s economic performance and exporters pay higher wages than purely domestic
firms. Another paper that uses the fair wage approach is the one by Amiti and Davis
(2012) who also analyze exporters’ wage setting behavior. Davis and Harrigan (2011)
adopt an efficiency wage model to heterogeneous firms in international trade to include
firm-specific wages. Sethupathy (2010) uses the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) demand
function in a heterogeneous firm model with individual bargaining. Then, wages also
depend on firm profits. Furthermore, Kaas and Kircher (2011) use directed search with
convex vacancy costs to derive that more productive firms pay higher wages. Finally,
Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) also derive firm-specific wages in a heterogeneous
firm model with heterogeneous workers and firms which differ in their screening ability. All
of these models do not consider union wage bargaining, the bargaining advantage of MNEs
or MNEs as such, focusing on exporters instead. Therefore, we develop a heterogeneous
firm model that derives firm-specific wages and contains the bargaining advantage of
MNEs. The model is analytically well tractable and can explain the inconclusive evidence
on MNE wage premia.
The only other study analyzing MNEs in a framework with firm-specific wages is Egger and
Kreickemeier (2012b). In their model, MNEs pay higher wages than purely domestic firms
as they are more productive (composition effect) and exhibit cross-border profit sharing
(firm level wage effect). However, Egger and Kreickemeier (2012b) do not consider union
wage bargaining. In our model, MNEs also have a bargaining advantage in the collective
bargaining process in addition to the composition and the firm level wage effect. Hence,
there must not be an MNE wage premium. Furthermore, instead of comparing MNEs
to purely domestic firms, we compare MNEs and exporters because domestically owned
firms with a similar productivity as an MNE are most likely active as exporters.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 gives an overview of
the empirical evidence on MNEs’ repercussions on the labor market. Section 3.3 explains
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the model in the closed economy and gives first results. In section 3.4, we analyze the
open economy where the exporters’ wage, the MNEs’ wage and the unemployment rate
are derived. We evaluate and summarize the explanatory power of the fair wage approach
in section 3.5. Finally, section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Evidence on MNEs’ Repercussions on
the Labor Market
There exists a growing body of literature that empirically analyzes MNEs’ repercussions
on the labor market, especially on wages. The studies have found inconclusive evidence
as to whether an MNE wage premium exists. Several studies find that foreign ownership
leads to higher wages using industry-level or cross-section plant-level data (see Aitken,
Harrison, and Lipsey, 1996; Feliciano and Lipsey, 2006; Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004). These
datasets, however, do not allow to examine whether these findings are due to unobservable
differences between domestically and foreign-owned plants or whether ownership status
itself influences wages.
Therefore, several other studies use establishment-level panel data. Almeida (2007) and
Andrews, Bellmann, Schank, and Upward (2009) find that for Portugal and Germany
most of the MNE wage premium can be explained by foreigners cherry-picking domestic
firms. The firms that are most profitable and pay the highest wages are acquired by
foreign firms whereas the less productive firms remain domestically owned. For the United
Kingdom, Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright (2002) find that firms acquired by
foreign companies pay on average 3.4% higher wages than domestic firms. However,
controlling for productivity the foreign wage premium disappears. Also using UK data,
Girma and Görg (2007) find that the wage payments depend on the nationality of the
foreign acquirer. Skilled workers experience an increase in wages following an acquisition
by a US firm, while no such effect is found for other nationalities.
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Also controlling for firm and worker characteristics, Heyman, Sjöholm, and Tingvall (2007)
estimate that the individual worker’s wage level is 2 to 6% higher in MNEs using matched
employer-employee data on the entire Swedish private sector. Similarly, Huttunen (2007)
reports evidence for an MNE wage premium using panel data on Finnish establishments.
For China, Chen, Ge, and Lai (2011) find a significant foreign premium both in wage and
non-wage compensation.
Most of these studies do not explicitly compare MNE to exporter wages but rather wages
paid by foreign and domestically owned firms, where the latter may serve only the domestic
market or the domestic and the foreign market. To the best of our knowledge, there is
only one study which explicitly analyzes the difference between MNE and exporter wages
(Villarreal and Sakamoto, 2011). Using data on Mexican firms, the authors find that
foreign-owned and export-oriented firms pay considerably more than domestically owned
firms engaged in the production of goods for sale in the domestic market. This premium
is found to be larger for MNEs than for exporters.
Additionally, there are studies on the role of MNEs in wage bargaining. Using Danish
matched employer-employee data, Braun (2008) finds a foreign wage premium, but this
premium goes to zero in highly unionized firms. Similarly, Choi (2001) and Braun and
Scheffel (2007) find that the positive effect of plant level unionization on wages vanishes in
foreign-owned firms. Clougherty, Gugler, and Sørgard (2011) report for the US that higher
unionization rates make it more likely that cross-border mergers generate wage decreases.
Moreover, outward cross-border mergers are more likely to involve wage decreases than
inward cross-border mergers where positive spill-over effects may dominate.
To summarize, the empirical findings on the repercussions of MNEs on wages are diverse.
In unionized sectors, MNEs are found to pay lower wages. Overall, there is evidence that
MNEs pay higher wages than purely domestic firms or exporters. However, the evidence
on a residual MNE wage premium, i.e., firms with MNE status pay higher wages for the
same worker than firms with exporter status, is inconclusive.
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3.3 Closed Economy
3.3.1 Model Setup
The general setup of the model is based on Eckel and Egger (2009). Consider an economy
with two types of sectors, a homogeneous good sector Y and a horizontally differentiated
goods sector x. The representative consumer has the following Cobb-Douglas preferences
U = XαY 1−α, 0 < α < 1 (3.1)
where
X ≡
[∫
v∈V
x(v) −1 dv
] 
−1
. (3.2)
V is the set of available varieties v of good x.  is the elasticity of substitution between
the varieties of the differentiated good x, and  > 1.
Demand for variety v can be derived by utility maximization such that
x(v) = αE
P
p(v)−, (3.3)
where E are total consumption expenditures, which are equal to total income in the
economy as we consider a general equilibrium. The price index P is defined as
P ≡
∫
v∈V
p(v)1−dv.
Regarding the production side, the horizontally differentiated goods x are sold in a mo-
nopolistically competitive market. Firms in the differentiated goods sector need both
capital and labor as inputs. Capital is inelastically supplied at level K in a perfectly com-
petitive factor market. Labor is supplied at level L, where wages are negotiated between
firms and labor unions. Firms face fixed costs f , paid in units of capital, to set up a
production plant. In order to produce, firms have to employ labor. Output x is linear
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in labor input l with x = φl, where φ is the firm-specific productivity level (see Melitz,
2003). The homogeneous good Y is sold in a perfectly competitive market. Production
requires the input of capital, where the production function Y = KY is assumed (see
Eckel and Egger, 2009). Good Y is taken as the numeraire which implies that the price
of good Y and the factor price of capital are equal to one.
3.3.2 The Bargaining Game
Wages in the differentiated goods sector are negotiated at the firm level, where union
activities are restricted to a single producer.2 The bargaining game between the firm and
the union involves three stages:
1. Firms decide upon entry which involves the investment of f units of capital to set
up a production plant.
2. The firm and the union bargain about wages.
3. Firms choose employment, produce, and sell their goods in a monopolistically com-
petitive market.
Note that right-to-manage bargaining instead of efficient bargaining is assumed (see also
Eckel and Egger, 2009; Sethupathy, 2010). This means that firms and unions bargain
about wages but the firm chooses its optimal employment level given the negotiated
wage. In contrast, in efficient bargaining models firms and unions bargain about wages
and employment. As most unions primarily focus on wages and are often blamed to
consider employment insufficiently in their negotiations, the right-to-manage approach
can be considered as the more realistic one. Moreover, empirical support for the efficient
bargaining approach is weak at best (see Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). The game is
solved via backward induction.
2One could, for example, think of the union as a work council.
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Stage 3
In the differentiated goods sector, according to the monopolistic competition assumption
each firm produces its own variety and takes aggregate variables as given. First, take
the case that an agreement in the wage bargain of stage 2 is reached. Then, each firm
hires workers until the marginal revenue product of labor equals the wage rate. Profit
maximization yields that each firm charges a price including a constant markup over its
marginal production costs w(φ)
φ
with w(φ) as the wage per worker
p(φ) = w(φ)(− 1)φ, (3.4)
where 
−1 is the constant markup over marginal costs, which depends on the elasticity of
substitution . Hence, the lower is the degree of substitution, the higher is the markup
charged by each firm. Firm revenues and profits are
r(φ) = αE
P
p(φ)1−, pi(φ) = αE
P
p(φ)1− − f. (3.5)
Second, if no agreement in the wage bargain of stage 2 is reached, firms’ profits are
p¯i = −f , as the firms’ investment costs f are sunk and no production takes place.
Stage 2
Workers are assumed to have fair wage concerns which implies that they want to capture
a share of their employer’s economic success. The worker’s utility from working is
Uw = w(φ)− wˆ(φ), (3.6)
where wˆ is a fair wage function taken from Egger and Kreickemeier (2012a):
wˆ(φ) = (pi(φ) + f)θ [(1− u)w˜]1−θ . (3.7)
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Remember that pi(φ) are firm profits. Hence, pi(φ) + f are the firms operational profits.
u stands for the unemployment rate and w˜ is the average wage of employed workers.
θ ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as a rent sharing parameter. Thus, the fair wage is a weighted
average of two factors: a firm-internal component and a firm-external component. This
takes into account two empirical facts found in the literature on worker behavior (see
Howitt, 2002; Bewley, 2005). First, workers want to capture a share of the firm’s economic
performance - the firm-internal component, which is included in the first term of (3.7).
For the firm-internal component, we follow Egger and Kreickemeier (2012a) by using
the firm’s operational profits. The costs of building up a production plant f should be
considered as sunk from the workers’ perspective.3 Second, workers compare their wage
payments to those paid by other firms - the firm-external component, which is reflected in
the second term of (3.7). The firm-external component is captured by the average wage
income per worker which equals the average wage of employed workers multiplied by the
employment rate (1 − u). The higher the rent sharing parameter θ, the more the fair
wage depends on the firm’s operational profits. Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier (2011)
report estimates of the rent sharing parameter of about 0.1 for France, Croatia, Serbia,
and Slovenia. The worker’s utility function implies that a worker is willing to work only
if the wage paid exceeds the wage he just considers as fair, which is firm-specific.
In order to derive union preferences a utilitarian approach where the union aims at max-
imizing the sum of its members’ utilities is used (see Booth, 1995). Hence, union prefer-
ences are given by
W (φ) = l(φ) [w(φ)− wˆ(φ)] (3.8)
where l(φ) is the firm’s employment level. Aggregating union members’ utilities leads to
the inclusion of the employment level into the union’s utility function (see also Eckel and
Egger, 2009). This may seem to disregard the insider-outsider problem which implies that
unions often do not consider the employment level but only care about the wages and
3Amiti and Davis (2012) use total profits. Using total profits would not change the main results
qualitatively, but it complicates the analytical tractability.
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working conditions of their employed members (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). However,
using the same utility function without multiplying a single worker’s utility by the overall
employment leads to qualitatively similar results.4
In case of disagreement, the firm does not employ any workers. Hence, the union’s utility
is zero, W¯ = 0. This implies that the union is not able to start negotiations with another
firm in case of disagreement in the same time period. The firm’s profit is p¯i = −f in case
of disagreement. Similar to the union, the firm cannot negotiate with another union in
case of disagreement.
The Nash product is given by
Ω =
{
W (φ)− W¯
}γ {pi(φ)− p¯i}1−γ . (3.9)
γ can be interpreted as the union’s bargaining power and (1− γ) is the firm’s bargaining
power, where γ ∈ [0, 1]. Maximizing (3.9) subject to (3.4) and (3.5) as well as the usual
non-negativity constraints yields the solution to the firm-union bargaining problem. The
bargained wage is given by
w(φ) =
+ γ − 1 + γθ(− 1)(− 1)
αE
P
(
(− 1)φ

)−1θ [(1− u)w˜]1−θ

1
1+θ(−1)
. (3.10)
Note that the wage is firm-specific.5 The wage depends on the firm-specific productivity
level (φ) and the rent sharing parameter (θ) which can be seen as country- or union-
specific. Due to monopolistic competition, the individual firm takes the aggregate income
(E), the price index (P ), the unemployment rate (u) and the average wage (w˜) as given.
4The unemployment level does not necessarily increase leaving out the employment level. If the
elasticity of substitution is high and the bargaining power of unions is low, the unemployment rate can
even be lower compared to a situation in which employment is included into the union’s utility function.
5This is in contrast to most other studies using CES preferences (see Eckel and Egger, 2009; Helpman
and Itskhoki, 2010). Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) also have firm-specific wages. These,
however, differ due to the firm’s ability to screen workers and more productive firms are able to employ
more able workers. Hence, firms do not vary in the residual wage payments. Conversely, this model
assumes homogeneous workers and can thus provide an explanation for different residual wages. For
Mexican exporting firms, Frias, Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2012) find rent sharing rather than compositional
effects of the firm-specific workforce to be an important determinant of wage differences across firms.
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Proposition 1 The wage increases with
• the firm’s productivity, ∂w/∂φ > 0,
• the union’s bargaining power, ∂w/∂γ > 0,
• a higher average wage paid outside the firm, ∂w/∂w˜ > 0,
• total income, ∂w/∂E > 0,
• the constant share spent on the differentiated good sector, ∂w/∂α > 0.
The wage decreases with
• the unemployment rate, ∂w/∂u < 0.
The wage may increase or decrease with
• the rent sharing parameter, ∂w/∂θ ≶ 0. The higher the firm’s productivity level
compared to the average productivity, the more likely the wage is to increase with
the rent sharing parameter.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
The fact that the wage increases with the firm’s productivity level is due to the fair wage
assumption. Hence, the model is able to explain the empirical evidence on rent sharing (see
Goos and Konings, 2001). Furthermore, the wage increases with the union’s bargaining
power (γ) as the union’s utility gets a bigger weight in the Nash product and the union
can, thus, make higher wage claims. The wage increases with a lower unemployment rate
(u) and a higher average wage paid outside the firm (w˜). This also increases the union’s
bargaining power due to an improved outside option. Finally, the wage also increases if
the total income (E) or the constant share spent on the differentiated goods sector (α)
is higher. More income or a higher share of income spent on the differentiated goods
sector leads to higher revenues, which will induce higher wages as these are related to the
operational profits.
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An increase in the rent sharing parameter may lead to an increase or a decrease in the
wage. This is the case since within the fair wage more weight is put on the firm-internal
component. Therefore, the wage is more aligned with the firm’s operational profits.
Whether this raises or lowers the wage depends on the firm’s productivity. For firms with
a productivity level below the average, φ < φ˜, the wage may decrease as more weight is
put on the firm’s profits which are also below average. Hence, putting less weight on the
firm-internal component and more weight on the average wage of employed workers would
be more beneficial for workers in firms with low productivity levels. Whereas workers in
high productivity firms can increase their wages by demanding more rent sharing.
Stage 1
There is a mass N of potential entrants into the differentiated goods sector, whose pro-
ductivities are distributed according to the cumulative distribution function G(φ) with
density g(φ) (following Do and Levchenko, 2009). As in Eckel and Egger (2009), we
assume firms’ productivities to be drawn from a Pareto distribution:
G(φ) = 1− φ−k, g(φ) = kφ−(k+1).
This assumption has been shown to be plausible for different size and productivity mea-
sures of firms in reality (see Axtell, 2001).
In order to enter, firms must make an investment of f > 0 units of capital. Only those
firms with a sufficiently high productivity level will enter the market (see Melitz, 2003).
This cutoff productivity level will be termed φ∗. It can be derived from the zero profit
condition, pi(φ∗) = 0.
3.3.3 Aggregation
As in all heterogeneous firm models following Melitz (2003), aggregate product market
variables can be characterized by looking at the firm with the average productivity level
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φ˜. To calculate φ˜, recall that
P =
∫ ∞
0
p(φ)1−M g(φ)1−G(φ∗)dφ.
Including p(φ˜)
p(φ) =
(
φ˜
φ
) 1
θ(−1)−1 and using P = Mp(φ˜)1− yields
φ˜ =
 k
k − −11+θ(−1)

1+θ(−1)
−1
φ∗. (3.11)
Hence, the average productivity is a function of the cutoff productivity level (φ∗) and
depends on the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution (k), the preference parameter
(), and the rent sharing parameter (θ). For a positive and finite value of φ˜, it must hold
that k > −11+θ(−1) given that φ
∗ ≥ 1.
Using φ˜(φ∗), r(φ∗) = f , p(φ) = w(φ)(−1)φ , r(φ) =
αE
P
p(φ)1−, and pi(φ) = αE
P
p(φ)1− − f ,
average revenues can be calculated as
r(φ˜) = kf
k − −11+θ(−1)
. (3.12)
Furthermore, the mass of competitors can be derived using the capital market clearing
condition, K = Y + Mf , and the implication of the Cobb-Douglas preferences, Y =
(1 − α)E, i.e., consumers spend a constant share (1 − α) of their income (E) on the
consumption of the homogeneous good (Y ). The mass of competitors is given by
M = K
f
α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
(1− α)k+ α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
) . (3.13)
The cutoff productivity level can be determined by M = (1−G(φ∗))N and (3.13).6
The mass of competitors M , the average productivity level φ˜, and the cutoff productivity
level φ∗ are independent of the strength of unions in the Nash bargaining. However, they
depend on the rent sharing parameter θ. The higher the rent sharing parameter, the larger
6See Appendix C.1 for the exact expression of φ∗.
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the number of successful entrants. As more productive firms have to pay higher wages,
less productive firms can also enter the market compared to a situation without rent
sharing. This can also be seen from the fact that the cutoff productivity level decreases
with the rent sharing parameter θ, ∂φ∗
∂θ
< 0.
Proposition 2 The productivity cutoff for successful entry, φ∗, decreases with the rent
sharing preference of unions, θ. Consequently, the mass of successful entrants, M , in-
creases.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
The labor income per worker in terms of the numeraire good can be determined using
l(φ)w(φ) = −1

r(φ) and Lw¯ = Mr(φ˜) −1

. Thus,
w¯ = (1− u)w˜ = M
L
kf(− 1)
k − −11+θ(−1)
. (3.14)
From this one can derive the unemployment rate. We know that w¯ = (1− u)w˜, where w˜
is the average wage of employed workers. The average wage paid equals the wage paid by
the firm with the average productivity, w˜ = w(φ˜). Thus, the unemployment rate is given
by
u = 1−
ML kf(− 1)k − −11+θ(−1)

θ
1+θ(−1)
+ γ − 1 + θγ(− 1)− 1
(
αE
P
)θ ((− 1)φ˜

)θ(−1)
1
θ(1−)−1
.
(3.15)
Proposition 3 The unemployment rate increases with
• the union’s bargaining power, ∂u
∂γ
> 0.
• the average productivity, ∂u
∂φ˜
> 0.
• the union’s preference for rent sharing, ∂u
∂θ
> 0, if the operational profits of the
average firm are larger than the average wage of employed workers. Otherwise, the
unemployment rate decreases.
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The unemployment rate decreases with
• the number of successful entrants, ∂u
∂M
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
The unemployment rate increases with an increase in the union’s bargaining power (γ).
Thus, stronger unions lead to higher unemployment. This is the case despite the fact that
the employment level is included in the union’s utility function. A union always faces the
trade-off between higher wage claims for the employed members or more employment.
This is consistent with the observation that stronger unions make higher wage claims,
which leads to a reduction in employment. The unemployment rate increases with average
productivity (φ˜). The more productive firms are on average, the higher are the wages paid.
As the aggregate income (E) is constant, firms will decrease employment. The higher the
rent sharing parameter (θ), the higher the unemployment rate if the wage of the average
firm increases when the union puts more weight on the firm-internal component. In this
case, the average wage increases and employment decreases. Finally, the more firms are
able to enter the market successfully (M), the lower the unemployment rate.7
3.4 Open Economy
In the open economy, there are two symmetric countries. The two factors of production,
capital and labor, are internationally immobile. For the homogeneous good, there are
no barriers to trade. In the heterogeneous goods sector, firms have to incur iceberg-type
trade costs in order to serve the foreign market via exports. This means that τ > 1 units
of the differentiated goods have to be shipped for one unit to arrive. Alternatively, the
foreign market can be served via a foreign affiliate. Setting up a foreign production facility
involves the investment of fm > 0 units of capital in the host country. Thus, there exists
a proximity-concentration trade-off (Brainard, 1997): an exporter bears higher variable
7Note that for interpretation purposes the endogenous values M and φ˜ are not inserted. For the
unemployment rate u depending only on exogenous variables please refer to Appendix C.1.
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costs but lower fixed costs compared to an MNE.8 Hence, we analyze the export versus
horizontal FDI decision.
3.4.1 The Bargaining Game in the Open Economy
A multinational firm negotiates with two independent unions at the plant level.9 The
bargaining game involves the following stages:
1. Firms decide upon their investment at home (f) and abroad (fm), determining
whether they are an exporter or an MNE.
2. All plant-union bargaining pairs simultaneously negotiate on wages.
3. Firms decide upon employment, produce, and sell their goods in monopolistically
competitive markets at home and abroad.
Hence, firms decide on how they want to serve foreign markets before wages are negotiated.
Their investment decisions are not driven by differences in factor costs. Note that countries
are symmetric, hence, the average wage level does not differ. Therefore, the export versus
horizontal FDI decision is driven by the classical proximity-concentration trade-off and
its implications on wage bargaining (see Eckel and Egger, 2009, for the same timing of
the bargaining game). The game is solved via backward induction.
Stage 3
Let us first consider the case of exporters. Exporters charge higher prices in the foreign
market because of higher marginal costs of serving foreign consumers, pFn = τpn(φ). The
superscript F indicates foreign market variables in the following. Due to the assumption
8Note that there are no additional fixed costs of exporting assumed. This implies that there are no
purely domestic firms in the open economy.
9Unions are assumed not to cooperate internationally. Eckel and Egger (2012) analyze when it is
beneficial for unions to cooperate internationally. This is only the case if unions’ preferences are well
aligned.
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of symmetric markets, total employment and profits of an exporter with productivity level
(φ) are given by ltn(φ) = (1 + τ 1−)ln(φ) and pitn(φ) = (1 + τ 1−)
rn(φ)

− f , if an agreement
with the domestic union is reached. If no agreement is reached, profits equal p¯in = −f .
Consider then the case of MNEs. The MNE produces at home and abroad if an agreement
in both Nash bargains with the domestic and the foreign union is reached. Total employ-
ment is then given by ltm(φ) = lm(φ)+lFm(φ), with lm(φ) 6= lFm(φ), if wm(φ) 6= wFm(φ). Total
profits are given by pitm(φ) =
rm(φ)

+ rFm(φ)

− f − fm. If no agreement with the domestic
union is reached, total profits equal p¯iFm(φ) = (1 + τ 1−)
rFm(φ)

− f − fm. The MNE has a
better bargaining position due to a higher outside option compared to the exporter. It
can threaten the domestic union to move total production to the foreign plant in case of
disagreement at home and then export to the home country. Vice versa, if no agreement
with the foreign union is reached, total profits are p¯im(φ) = (1 + τ 1−) rm(φ) − f − fm. If
neither an agreement with the domestic union nor with the foreign union is reached, total
profits are p¯iNAm (φ) = −f − fm. We follow Eckel and Egger (2009) in the determination
of the disagreement profits. The assumption under which the disagreement profits of the
MNE are derived is that any firm-union or rather plant-union pair takes the negotiated
wage in the other country as given, just accounting for adjustments in the output level if
an agreement is not reached. This assumption is also key to solving the two plant-union
bargaining problem with interdependent payoff functions following Davidson (1988) and
Horn and Wolinsky (1988).
Stage 2
Exporter-union wage bargaining Compared to the wage in the autarky situation
the exporter wage in the open economy only differs with respect to the firm-internal
component as exporter profits are larger than profits of a purely domestic firm:
wn(φ) =
+ γ − 1 + γθ(− 1)(− 1)
[
αE
P
((− 1)φ

)−1
(1 + τ1−)
]θ
[(1− u)w˜]1−θ

1
1+θ(−1)
.
(3.16)
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Thus, the exporter wage is higher than the wage paid by purely domestic firms, wn(φ) >
w(φ) as τ 1− > 0.
MNE-domestic union wage bargaining The MNE negotiates with the domestic and
the foreign union symmetrically and simultaneously. Although the general bargaining
problem is quite complex, Davidson (1988) and Horn and Wolinsky (1988) have shown
for similar bargaining problems that the solution is a pair of wages wm and wFm such that
wm is the Nash solution to the bargaining problem between the MNE and the domestic
union, given that both anticipate correctly that the foreign wage will be wFm.10 Due to
symmetry, it is admissible to focus on the MNE bargaining with the domestic union. For
the MNE case, the Nash product differs from the autarky case with respect to the firms’
profits in case of agreement and in case of disagreement. Although the union negotiates
only with the domestic plant, total MNE’s profits are included. This acknowledges the
empirical evidence on profit sharing of workers within an MNE, e.g., a greater profitability
of parent companies raises wages in foreign affiliates (see Budd, Konings, and Slaughter,
2005; Villarreal and Sakamoto, 2011; Martins and Yang, 2010). The Nash product is
given by:
Ωm =
{
W (φ)− W¯
}γ {
pitm(φ)− p¯iFm(φ)
}1−γ
, (3.17)
where the plant-union bargaining pair under consideration takes the bargaining outcome
in the other country, i.e., wFm(φ), as given. The Nash product in (3.17) is maximized
such that lm(φ) = xm(φ)φ , x(v) =
αE
P
p(v)−, p(φ) = w(φ)(−1)φ , r(φ) =
αE
P
p(φ)1− and pi(φ) =
αE
P
p(φ)1−− f as well as the usual non-negativity constraints hold. Taking the symmetry
assumption regarding the two countries into account, i.e., using wm(φ) = wFm(φ) in the
first-order condition, the maximization yields
wm(φ) =
− 1 + γ(1− τ1−) + γθ(1− τ1−)(− 1)(− 1)(1− γτ1−)
[
2αE
P
((− 1)φ

)−1]θ
[(1− u)w˜]1−θ

1
1+θ(−1)
.
(3.18)
10Davidson (1988) develops a model of labor union bargaining in a homogeneous good industry in
which a union negotiates simultaneously with two firms. Horn and Wolinsky (1988) analyze simultaneous
bargaining of a supplier with two firms in an oligopolistic market.
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The MNE pays the same wage in its home and its foreign plant. In case of asymmetric
countries, an MNE would, for example, pay a lower wage in a country with a lower average
wage. The exporter’s and the MNE’s wage both depend on the same parameters.
Note that the wage in (3.18) has been derived assuming that an MNE does not export
if an agreement with the union is reached. A natural concern is that unions may foresee
that they can expand local production by also serving foreign consumers if they negotiate
a sufficiently low wage, wm(φ) < w
F
m(φ)
τ
. In order to rule out this incentive for “strategic
underbidding” one has to focus on a sufficiently high level of iceberg trade costs. If
wFm(φ) < τwˆ(φ), the union has no incentive to deviate from the wage determined in (3.18)
(see Eckel and Egger, 2009, for a similar line of reasoning).
Stage 1
In the open economy, the firm has to decide whether to enter and, once having entered,
how to serve the foreign market. In addition to the proximity-concentration trade-off,
firms also consider the difference between exporter and MNE wages (ω), when they decide
upon exporting or conducting FDI:
wn(φ)
wm(φ)
=
{
(+ γ − 1 + γθ(− 1))(1− γτ1−)(1 + τ1−)θ
(+ γ − 1− γτ1− + γθ(1− τ1−)(− 1))2θ
} 1
1+θ(−1)
≡ ω.
Thus, more firms may choose to become an MNE, if exporters pay higher wages than
MNEs, as due to the lower wage, firms with a lower productivity can also afford the fixed
costs of building up a foreign plant, fm. Yet, firms above a certain productivity threshold
generally yield higher profits by becoming MNEs than by exporting. Due to rent sharing,
MNEs may also pay higher wages than exporters. The exporter-MNE wage differential
will be discussed in the following section.
In order to derive the cutoff productivity level for successful entry in the open economy,
pitn(φ∗t ) = 0 is used. To enter the market, a firm has to have a productivity level φ ≥ φ∗t .11
11See Appendix C.2 for the derivation of the cutoff productivity level.
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For the decision between exporting and FDI, the difference between the profits as an MNE
and as an exporter, ∆pit(φ) = pitm(φ)− pitn(φ), matters:
∆pit(φ) =
(
2ω1− − (1 + τ 1−)
) rn(φ)

− fm.
To guarantee that not every firm has an incentive to invest abroad, ∆pit(φ∗t ) < 0 has
to be assumed, i.e., the marginal producer making just zero profits from exporting has
no incentive to invest abroad. This is equivalent to assuming a sufficiently high fm for
selection into exporting and FDI still to exist for any γ and θ:
fm >
[
2ω−1
1 + τ 1− − 1
]
f, (3.19)
which implies that MNEs are on average more productive than exporters (see Helpman,
Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004, for the same sorting pattern). Thus, we can also derive the
cutoff productivity level of an MNE, φ∗m.12
The fact that a firm may pay higher wages as an MNE than as an exporter influences
the decision how to serve the foreign market. The share of MNEs can be determined by
µ =
(
φ∗m
φ∗t
)−k
:
µ =
[
f
fm
(
2ω−1
1 + τ 1− − 1
)]k( 1+θ(−1)−1 )
. (3.20)
The share of MNEs not only depends on the bargaining power parameter (γ), which is
included in the wage differential (ω), but also on the rent sharing parameter (θ). The
share of MNEs reaches its maximum for a medium level of union bargaining power. This
follows from the changes in the exporter MNE wage differential due to changes in the
union’s bargaining power. This will be explained in detail below. Furthermore, the
share of MNEs increases the higher the exporter wages are relative to MNE wages. In
addition, the higher the freeness of trade, i.e., the lower iceberg trade costs, the lower
the share of MNEs due to the proximity-concentration trade-off for given relative wages
12See Appendix C.2 for the derivation.
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(ω). However, as τ also influences ω the effect is not clear (see Eckel and Egger, 2009, for
the same finding). A reduction in τ may also lead to an increase in the share of MNEs
as their fallback profits in case of disagreement with the union increase because of the
reduced transportation costs. Therefore, MNEs may be able to negotiate relatively lower
wages, which induces an increase in the relative wage (ω).
3.4.2 Is There an MNE Wage Premium?
The model shows that there is no unambiguous MNE wage premium, it rather depends on
a country’s institutional environment, e.g., the strength of unions and their willingness to
partake in firm profits. Comparing exporter and MNE wages, ω can be smaller or larger
than 1 (see Appendix C.2 for the proof):
ω ≡ wn(φ)
wm(φ)
=
{
(+ γ − 1 + γθ(− 1))(1− γτ 1−)(1 + τ 1−)θ
(+ γ − 1− γτ 1− + γθ(1− τ 1−)(− 1))2θ
} 1
1+θ(−1)
≶ 1.
If γ = 0 or γ = 1, ω < 1 for θ > 0. This implies that if the union has no bargaining power
or if there is a monopoly union, MNEs’ wages are always higher than exporters’ wages.
The intuition is clear: if either the firm or the union has full bargaining power, there is
no bargaining advantage of becoming an MNE.
In order to see further how ω changes with the union’s bargaining power, we use ∂ω
∂γ
= 0
to obtain an implicit solution for γ where ω is maximized. Exporters pay higher wages
than MNEs for medium levels of bargaining power of unions. On the one hand, a higher
γ leads to higher wage claims for both exporters and MNEs. But as MNEs have a
higher disagreement profit than exporters, they pay lower wages than exporters. Thus,
the exporter MNE wage differential ω tends to go up with an increase in γ. On the
other hand, an increase in the bargaining power of unions lowers the weight of a firm’s
contribution to the Nash product. Hence, the gap between the disagreement profits of
exporters and MNEs becomes less important with an increase in γ. Figure 1 shows how
the wage premium changes with the union’s bargaining power. Using the implicit function
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Figure 3.1: How the Wage Premium Changes with the Union’s Bargaining Power
theorem, we can show that the optimal γ is decreasing in θ. The more important rent
sharing becomes, the larger the union’s contribution to the Nash product for an MNE
compared to an exporter. Therefore, the bargaining power of the union has to be lower
such that an exporter pays higher wages than an MNE.13
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Figure 3.3: Wages as a Function of
Productivity if ω < 1
The wage differential is independent of the firm’s productivity level. Thus, there is no
cutting point. Either the wages are the same for all productivity levels or they are different
for all productivity levels as shown in Figure 2 and 3. Both wages are concave functions
of productivity, ∂wn
∂φ
> 0 and ∂2wn
∂φ2 < 0 as well as
∂wm
∂φ
> 0 and ∂2wm
∂φ2 < 0. Whether the
13For the detailed derivations see Appendix C.2.
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exporter or MNE wage increases more with productivity again depends on the parameter
values, γ, , τ , and θ. Focusing on γ, we can derive a unique γ = γ∗ for which ω = 1
holds. For γ 6= 1, MNEs can pay higher or lower wages than exporters.14
With regard to the rent sharing parameter (θ), both wn and wm may increase or decrease
in θ. The probability that the wage will increase with the rent sharing parameter rises
with the firm’s productivity. Whether ω increases or decreases with θ depends on the
bargaining power of the union (γ), the competitive situation (), and the iceberg transport
costs (τ). The relation between ω and θ is illustrated in Figure 4. The wage premium
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Figure 3.4: How the Wage Premium Changes with the Degree of Rent Sharing
increases with the union’s preference for rent sharing, i.e., the weight the union puts on
the firm-internal component, if transport costs and the degree of competition are low.
This implies that an increase in the rent sharing parameter increases the exporter wage
by more than the MNE wage. On the contrary, if the degree of competition is high (high
elasticity of substitution) or transport costs are high, the MNE’s wage increases by more
than the exporter’s wage. For example, if transport costs are high, exporters’ profits are
generally lower and, thus, the increase in rent sharing changes exporter wages less than
MNE wages. Similarly, if the degree of competition is high, the markup firms can charge
14For the explicit solution of γ∗ see Appendix C.2.
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is low. Hence, the least productive firms have to exit and market shares increase. As the
market shares increase with the productivity level, profits of MNEs increase by more than
exporters’ profits. Accordingly, the increase in rent sharing changes exporter wages less
than MNE wages.
Proposition 4 MNEs pay higher wages than exporters if unions either have a relatively
low or a relatively high bargaining power (γ), if trade costs are high (τ) and if the degree
of competition is high (). The influence of the union’s preference for rent sharing on the
exporter-MNE wage differential also depends on the union’s bargaining power, trade costs,
and the degree of competition.
As empirical studies yield results on average wage premia, we also compare the average
wages paid by exporters and by MNEs. The average wage paid by an exporter can be
derived by averaging over all the wages paid by firms with a productivity level between
φ∗t and φ∗m15:
w¯n = (G(φ∗m)−G(φ∗t ))
∫ φ∗m
φ∗t
wn(φ)g(φ)dφ. (3.21)
The average wage paid by an MNE is the average of all the wages paid by firms with a
productivity level larger than φ∗m:
w¯m = (1−G(φ∗m))
∫ ∞
φ∗m
wm(φ)g(φ)dφ. (3.22)
Comparing the average wages yields
w¯n
w¯m
= ω
[
µ
θ
k(1+θ(−1))−1 − 1
] (1− µ
µ
)
. (3.23)
The result for the comparison of the average wages paid by exporters and MNEs is am-
biguous. The higher is the share of MNEs, µ, the lower is w¯n
w¯m
. The higher is ω, the higher
is w¯n
w¯m
. For ω = 1, i.e., the wage paid by exporters and by MNEs is the same, MNEs pay
15See Appendix C.2 for the productivity cutoffs φ∗t and φ∗m depending on exogenous variables only.
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on average higher wages as they are more productive.16
3.4.3 Aggregation
Again, aggregate product market variables can be characterized by looking at the firm with
the average productivity level, φˆ. φˆ is determined in a way to ensure P = 2Mpn(φˆ)1−.
Looking at the aggregate product market variables one now has to account for 2M firms
with productivity φˆ, as they produce for the domestic and the foreign market, which
are assumed to be completely symmetric. The average productivity level φˆ is derived in
Appendix C.2.
With the zero profit condition rn(φ∗t ) = f and
rn(φˆ)
rn(φ∗t )
=
(
φˆ
φ∗t
) −1
1+θ(−1) the revenues of the
average firm can be obtained as
rn(φˆ) =
k(1 + τ 1−)
k − −11+θ(−1)
(f + µfm). (3.24)
The mass of competitors M has to be determined using the capital market clearing con-
dition K = Y +M(f +µfm) and the optimal expenditure allocation Y = (1−α)E which
yields
M = K(f + µfm)
α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
+ (1− α)2k(1 + τ 1−) . (3.25)
The number of successful entrants is higher in a situation with rent sharing compared to
a situation without rent sharing, θ = 0, if k < θ(−1)21+θ(−1) .
17 As k > −11+θ(−1) for φˆ > 0,
θ( − 1) > 1 has to hold for both conditions to be fulfilled. This is the more probable
the higher θ and  are. The reasoning is that firms with a lower productivity level pay
less for the same quality of labor than firms with a higher productivity level and thus
have a relative advantage. The number of active firms (M) also depends on the share of
multinationals (µ). If µ increases, M decreases. Compared to the closed economy, the
16The exact expressions of w¯n and w¯m are given in Appendix C.2.
17In a situation without rent sharing, θ = 0, the number of entrants would be
M = K(f+µfm)
α(k−(−1))
α(k−(−1))+k(1+τ1−)(1−α) .
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number of active firms is smaller in the open economy.18 This is the typical selection
process introduced in Melitz (2003).
Similar to the closed economy, per worker labor income is proportional to aggregate
revenues, i.e.,
w¯ = (1− u)w˜ = − 1

2M
L
rn(φˆ)
= 2(− 1)Mk(1 + τ
1−)
L
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
) (f + µfm)
= K
L
2α(− 1)k(1 + τ 1−)
α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
+ (1− α)2k(1 + τ 1−) .
The per worker labor income is higher in the open economy than in the closed econ-
omy.19 This is due to higher aggregate revenues. Hence, on average, workers profit from
globalization in this framework. As w˜ = (1− µ)w¯n + µw¯m, the unemployment rate is:
u = 1− 2(− 1)Mk(1 + τ
1−)
L
(
k − −11−θ+θ
)
((1− µ)w¯n + µw¯m)
(f + µfm). (3.26)
The unemployment rate of the domestic country in the open economy decreases with
the mass of competitors (M). In contrast, the unemployment rate increases with the
aggregate amount of labor (L), the average wages paid by exporters and by MNEs (w¯n
and w¯m). The more workers are paid, the less workers can be employed. Thus, there is the
traditional trade-off between wages and employment that unions face when negotiating
with firms.
Another interesting question is how the unemployment rate changes with an increase in
the share of MNEs (µ). Public opinion often claims that the unemployment rate will
increase with more MNE activity as part of the production can be shifted to foreign
countries. However, a higher share of MNEs may lead to lower unemployment at home
if MNEs pay on average lower wages than exporters. The possibility to shift production
18See Appendix C.2 for the derivation.
19See Appendix C.2 for the derivation.
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gives MNEs a bargaining advantage. Therefore, they may pay lower wages than exporters,
which enables them to employ more workers.
Proposition 5 An increase in the share of MNEs leads to a decrease in the unemploy-
ment rate, if the average wage paid by MNEs is lower than the average wage paid by
exporters.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
3.5 Explanatory Power of the Fair Wage Approach
In this chapter, we introduce the fair wage approach to a heterogeneous firm model
with firm-union bargaining. The model contains two important mechanisms which can
have contradictory effects on the MNE wage premium. First, MNEs have a bargaining
advantage over exporters. Second, MNEs are on average the more productive firms and
should, thus, pay higher wages if wages are bound to the firm’s economic performance.
Embedding fair wages in the labor union’s utility function is a tractable way of deriving
firm-specific wages. In Eckel and Egger (2009) wages do not vary with productivity. This
is due to CES demand which produces the result that firms do not differ in their elasticity
of revenues with respect to employment and thus pay wages which are independent of
productivity.
In order to derive firm-specific wages without assuming fair wages, one can either use a
different demand framework (such as the one by Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) combined
with wage bargaining or introduce search frictions into a Melitz-type model assuming
convex vacancy costs (see Koeniger and Prat, 2007; Holzner and Larch, 2011). However,
both alternatives hamper analytical solutions such that one has to rely on numerical
solutions.
Including the fair wage approach, the model explains several empirical findings. First,
one can derive firm-specific wages. Assuming homogeneous workers, the model therefore
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includes intra-group wage inequality which has been found in several empirical studies
(see, e.g., Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2007). Second, whether MNEs pay higher or
lower wages on average is ambiguous, which is in line with the inconclusive empirical
evidence (see section 3.2). The model shows that whether MNEs pay higher or lower
wages than exporters depends on the strength of the union, the competitive environment,
the degree of rent sharing, and on trade costs. Therefore, to test empirically whether there
exists an MNE wage premium besides controlling for firm and worker characteristics one
should also include country and sectoral characteristics. In order to obtain a measure of
rent sharing, one would have to estimate the wage equation and use the coefficient of the
operating profits. Thus, the model can give clear predictions and guidance for empirical
studies on what has to be included in the estimation of the wage equation. Estimating
the model of Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) structurally, Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier
(2011) show that the model including fair wages has a high predictive power. Using
firm level data for five European countries, the model can explain more than 70% of the
variation in wages across firms in their dataset. Hence, using the fair wage approach in
the present study also helps to explain a large part of the empirical findings and may
serve as guidance for future empirical analyses.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents an analytically tractable model of heterogeneous firms in interna-
tional trade with collective bargaining that incorporates both intra-group wage inequality
and an MNE bargaining advantage. For this purpose, we embed the fair wage approach
of Egger and Kreickemeier (2012a) into the heterogeneous firm model with collective
bargaining of Eckel and Egger (2009). With firm-specific wages depending on a firm’s
economic performance, MNEs may pay higher or lower wages than exporters as there are
two opposing effects. First, MNEs have a bargaining advantage and, therefore, should
pay lower wages. Second, on average, MNEs yield higher operating profits than exporters
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and should, thus, pay higher wages if these are dependent on the firm’s economic per-
formance. Which effect dominates depends on the bargaining power of unions, their rent
sharing preferences, the competitive situation, and on trade costs. The model can explain
the inconclusive empirical findings on the MNE wage premium and may serve as guidance
for further empirical research.
In the public opinion, MNEs are mainly associated with negative labor market effects due
to the fear of a relocation of production. However, we can show that even if MNEs have
the possibility to relocate production and, hence, a bargaining advantage, they may still
pay higher wages than exporters. Conversely, if they pay lower wages on average, a higher
share of MNEs in the economy decreases the unemployment rate.
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Testing the O-Ring Theory for FDI∗
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Henrike Lindemann.
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4.1 Introduction
Most of today’s production processes involve several stages which have to be performed
sequentially and firms may split them across several countries. Countries, in turn, spe-
cialize in particular stages of the production process, which Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001)
term vertical specialization. This type of specialization has constantly grown over the last
decades. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) find that it grew by almost 30% between 1970 and
1990.1 Notably, vertical specialization does not only affect trade flows between countries
but it is also of importance for foreign direct investment (FDI). A firm may decide to
relocate a production stage to a country that has specialized in this particular stage.
In this chapter, we therefore adopt the idea of Kremer (1993) and Costinot, Vogel, and
Wang (2012) to the case of FDI. They model a sequential production process involving
several stages, which are subject to mistakes. For the product to have full value all stages
have to be completed successfully. Hence, the highest value can be lost at stages at the
end of the value chain. Kremer (1993) termed this the O-ring theory referring to the
space shuttle Challenger which broke apart due to a problem of one of its thousands
of components, the O-ring. Kremer (1993) and Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012) find
that countries with lower probabilities of making mistakes specialize in later stages of
production.2 In line with these results, our hypothesis is that firms locate affiliates that
produce goods that are positioned at later stages in the production process in countries
with lower propensities to making mistakes.
To test this hypothesis, we use firm level panel data for the years 1999 to 2006 on the
universe of German multinationals and their activities abroad, which is provided by the
Deutsche Bundesbank (2012). To capture the affiliate sector’s position in a value chain
we employ the measure of upstreamness introduced by Antràs, Chor, Fally, and Hillberry
(2012). It considers the number of stages at which a sector enters production processes
1The countries analyzed are Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, United Kingdom, United States, Ireland, Korea, Taiwan, and Mexico.
2Another paper which needs to be mentioned in line with Kremer (1993) and Costinot, Vogel, and
Wang (2012) is Jones (2011), which also implements a production process that exhibits complementarities.
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before the final use of a product. We compute this measure using input-output tables for
Germany from the OECD STAN database for the periods of early 2000 and mid 2000.
Furthermore, Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012) argue that a country’s propensity to
making mistakes can be approximated by the inverse of a country’s total factor produc-
tivity (TFP). Therefore, we use a country’s TFP to test our hypothesis. Each parent firm
faces a 0/1-decision whether to invest in a certain country at a certain time. To capture
this in our data, we inflate the dataset over countries and over year for every affiliate the
parent firm has once invested in. Using a linear probability model (LPM), we estimate
the effect of TFP, the affiliate sector’s upstreamness, and an interaction term of the two
on the parent firm’s FDI location decision while also controlling for parent firm, country
and year fixed effects.
The results confirm the O-ring theory for FDI. We find that a destination country’s
productivity is more important for a firm’s investment decision if the affiliate sector is
positioned more toward the end of the value chain. We can show that this effect is not only
statistically but also economically significant and that it is of about the same size as the
effect of a country’s productivity as such. To make sure that we do not capture market-
seeking motives, i.e., more downstream sectors are located in more attractive markets, we
conduct the same estimations including absolute GDP as an additional control. Moreover,
we run our basic regression for vertical FDI only. The results remain robust and we
even observe an increase in the coefficients. Furthermore, we control for other sector
characteristics, we look at new entrants only and we use an alternative productivity
measure. The results remain robust throughout all of these additional tests.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to relate the idea of Kremer (1993) and
Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012) to the FDI location decision. Using a production func-
tion in which production consists of a number of sequential tasks, all of which have to
be successfully completed for the product to have full value, we can explain the attrac-
tiveness of certain countries for certain investment projects. More developed countries
attract FDI in those sectors which are located at later stages of the production process.
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As shown by Fally (2012), over the last 50 years there has been a large shift of value
added towards more downstream industries, i.e., those located more at the end of the
production process. Therefore, we can give a potential explanation for the widening gap
of economic development between high-income and low-income countries and how FDI
explicitly contributes to this.
Two other papers also combine the concept of complementary production processes and
FDI. First, Chang and Lu (2012) introduce risk into a model of whether to conduct FDI by
extending the idea of Kremer (1993). The risk of FDI increases with a firm’s production
technology. The latter is measured in terms of the number of stages, which constitute the
production process. Chang and Lu (2012) find that only firms of intermediate technology
levels find FDI profitable. Their study focuses on the firm level determinants of the FDI
decision whereas our study analyzes the country level determinants of the firm’s location
decision.
Second, Antràs and Chor (2012) develop a property-rights model of the firm including
a similar production function as Kremer (1993). They analyze the optimal allocation of
ownership rights along the value chain, i.e., whether the incentives to integrate increase
or decrease for earlier or later stages of the value chain. They also test their model
empirically. Although the authors apply the same production function of FDI their focus
is different. While Antràs and Chor (2012) analyze why only some stages are integrated,
we look at why certain affiliates are located in certain countries.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we present the data
used in the estimation and show summary statistics. Section 4.3 explains our empirical
strategy. In section 4.4, we then present our estimation results. Section 4.5 discusses our
robustness checks. Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 Data
4.2.1 FDI Data
We use firm level data on the universe of German multinationals and their activity abroad,
which is provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank (2012) in the Microdatabase Direct in-
vestment (MiDi). This is a panel dataset for the years 1996 to 2010 of which we consider
the years 1999 to 2006.3 We only consider German outward FDI. As the reporting thresh-
olds have changed over this period of time, we consider all firms which hold at least 50%
of the shares or voting rights of a foreign enterprise, which has a balance sheet total of
more than 3 million Euro.4 These firms are legally required to report to the Deutsche
Bundesbank information on the sector, legal form as well as the number of employees and
balance sheet information of the foreign affiliate (Lipponer, 2009). Furthermore, we only
consider countries in which at least five affiliates are located. Thereby, we can exclude
small countries in which only very few affiliates are located that play a dominant role and
therefore may influence country characteristics. Our sample comprises a total of 3919
parent firms holding foreign affiliates in at least one of the 33 host countries and in at
least one of the years from 1999 to 2006.5 The countries included in our estimation sam-
ple are listed in Table D.3 in Appendix D. With these, we cover 67.5% of total German
outward FDI activities.6
4.2.2 Upstreamness Measure
In order to capture at which stage of a production process an affiliate sector is located,
we employ the measure of upstreamness developed by Antràs, Chor, Fally, and Hillberry
(2012). The variable considers the number of stages at which the sector enters into
3We cannot use more years due to computational limitations.
4We also deflate the balance sheet total to make the data comparable over time.
5For a more detailed description of the estimation sample refer to Appendix D.
6Unfortunately, due to data limitations with respect to country characteristics, the regression sample
does not comprise, inter alia, the destination countries China and Switzerland as well as the Eastern
European countries.
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a production process before final use of the resulting product. Antràs, Chor, Fally, and
Hillberry (2012) present three approaches which they prove to yield equivalent measures of
industry upstreamness. We present one of the approaches to demonstrate the construction
of the measure of upstreamness. Considering an open economy, the value of gross output
for each industry (Yi, with i ∈ 1, 2, ..., N) equals the sum of its use as a final good (Fi),
its use as an intermediate input to other industries and exports (Xi) minus imports (Mi).
The use as an intermediate input is measured as the Euro amount of sector i’s output
(dij) needed to produce one Euro worth of industry j’s output (Yj):
Yi = Fi +
N∑
j=1
dijYj +Xi −Mi.
In the input-output tables we do not observe dij as the data does not distinguish between
domestic and international flows of goods. What can be observed is
δij =
dijYj +Xij −Mij
Yi
.
However, to disentangle dijYi, we lack information on international inter-industry trade
flows, Mij and Xij. Therefore, as in Antràs, Chor, Fally, and Hillberry (2012) we have to
assume that the share of industry i’s exports (imports) that are used in industry j (be it
at home or abroad) is the same as the share of industry i’s output used in industry j. dij
then has to be replaced by
dˆij = dij
Yi
Yi −Xi +Mi ,
where the denominator is the domestic absorption of industry i’s output.
Hence, we can compute the average position of a sector’s output in the value chain as
Ui = 1 · Fi
Yi
+ 2 ·
∑N
j=1 dˆijFj
Yi
+ 3 ·
∑N
j=1
∑N
k=1 dˆikdˆkjFj
Yi
+ ..., (4.1)
where the use of the industry’s output at different positions in the value chain, starting
with final use, is multiplied by their distance from final use plus one and divided by Yi.
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Note that Ui ≥ 1. The interpretation of this measure is straightforward: the larger Ui the
more upstream the industry.
We compute this measure using input-output tables for Germany from the OECD STAN
database (OECD, 2012) for the periods of early 2000 and mid 2000.7 Table 4.1 shows
the mean upstreamness over the two periods for several sectors. In order to gain a better
intuition for the measure, we present the five least upstream sectors and the five most
upstream sectors. Among the five least upstream sectors are two service sectors (hotels
and restaurants and the construction sector) as well as the manufacture of textiles, food
products, and furniture.8 The five most upstream sectors are water transport, renting
of machinery, other business activities, supporting and auxiliary transport activities, and
the manufacture of basic metals.9
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Upstreamness Measure
Sector Upstreamness
Least Upstream Sectors
Hotels and restaurants 1.3410
Construction sector 1.4041
Manufacture of textiles 1.4792
Manufacture of food products and beverages 1.4792
Manufacture of furniture 1.5596
Most Upstream Sectors
Water transport 2.9793
Renting of Machinery and Equipment 3.0677
Other business activities 3.0938
Supporting and auxiliary transport activities 3.0969
Manufacture of basic metals 3.6734
The table contains the five least and the five most upstream sectors according to the mean
upstreamness measure over the two time periods early 2000 and mid 2000.
7The data for early 2000 is used for the period 1999 to 2002, and mid 2000 is used for 2003 to 2006.
8We would have expected the retail sector to be under the five least upstream sectors. However, in
the OECD STAN input-output tables the wholesale and retail sector are aggregated. Therefore, the two
combined are ranked eighth of the least upstream sectors.
9Note that we have excluded activities related to the extraction of natural resources, such as mining.
These belong to the most upstream activities.
112
Testing the O-Ring Theory for FDI
Figure D.1 in Appendix D shows the average upstreamness measure over the two time
periods of early and mid 2000 for each sector. The measure of upstreamness ranges from
1.34 to 3.67. An upstreamness measure of 1 would imply that the sector’s output is used
only in final consumption. The maximum value of about 4 means that the sector’s ouput is
used in some industries (at least one) as an input in the first stage of a production process
involving four stages. Its mean value across the 47 industries in our regression sample is
2.14 with a standard deviation of 0.54. This result is similar to Fally (2012) who finds that
production chains involve on average less than two stages. Table D.1 in Appendix D shows
how the upstreamness variable varies over time. We compare the rankings of the ten least
upstream and the ten most upstream sectors over the two time periods early 2000 and mid
2000. As we can see from Table D.1, the upstreamness measure varies over time, but the
variation is not very strong. Out of the 20 sectors listed, six sectors do not vary in their
ranking over time. The rest varies between one to three places. Therefore, if we identify
an effect of a sector’s upstreamness on the investment probability, it is mainly driven by
the variation across sectors and not by the variation of the upstreamness measure over
time.
In order to get a first impression on whether our hypothesis, that more upstream affiliates
are more likely to be located in less productive countries, holds true, we look at the average
upstreamness of affiliates located in different country groups. We categorize countries
according to their GDP per capita using the World Bank classification of country incomes
(World Bank, 2011). In Figure 1, the country-income group 2 comprises lower-middle
income countries, group 3 upper-middle income countries, group 4 high-income OECD
countries, and group 5 high-income non-OECD countries.10 Figure 1 clearly shows that
the average upstreamness is lower in more developed countries. As the more developed
countries generally are also the more productive ones, this can be taken as first suggestive
evidence for our hypothesis.
10Note that our sample does not include low-income countries, i.e., country-income group 1.
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Figure 4.1: Average Upstreamness of Affiliate Sectors in Different Country-Income
Groups
4.2.3 Country Characteristics
We seek to analyze whether a country’s overall propensity to making mistakes plays a
more important role for more downstream industries. Therefore, we need a measure of a
country’s failure rate. Following the argument of Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012) that
a country’s propensity to making mistakes can be interpreted as the inverse of a country’s
TFP, we use TFP obtained from the World Productivity Database (UNIDO, 2012).11 In
our basic specification we use TFP, upstreamness, and an interaction term of the two, i.e.,
upstreamness∗TFP.12
We run the basic specification also controlling for various other country characteristics
11The database offers ten-year forecasts of TFP growth which are then used to forecast TFP levels,
which we use. Note that TFP level forecasts are calculated for different measures of capital stock.
Because of data availability issues (i.e., the number of year-country data points) we use the one based on
capital stock calculated in terms of physical efficiency. I.e., capital is assumed to underlie a time-varying
depreciation rate. The TFP measure is scaled relatively to the US. See Isaksson (2007) for a detailed
technical documentation.
12Our measure of TFP is country-specific but does not vary across sectors. We would like to use a
country- and sector-specific measure of productivity as we would presume to get even more clear-cut
results. However, this data is very limited. The EU Klems data contains a measure of productivity which
varies across sectors. Unfortunately, it is only available for six countries.
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in order to see whether the effect of the interaction term of upstreamness with TFP
persists. As a geography measure we use a country’s remoteness. This variable measures
the distance of the host country from all other countries in the world weighted by those
other countries’ share of world GDP (see Blonigen and Piger, 2011). It captures export-
platform motives, i.e., a firm invests in a country to export to other surrounding countries
(Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen, 2007).
To control for factor endowments, we use average years of schooling, average wages, and
capital intensity. Average years of schooling is obtained from the Barro and Lee (2010)
table of educational attainment. We use the measure for male and female persons aged 25
years and older. This data is available in five-year intervals from 1950 to 2010. In order to
be able to use the data for our panel analysis, starting with 2000 we replace the missing two
years before and after the year for which the data is available with the value of that year.
Further, we include monthly average wages as a factor-cost measure. The wage dataset
was prepared by Harsch and Kleinert (2011) making use of the October Inquiry database
of the International Labor Organization (ILO). Average wages may capture conventional
cost-saving motives associated with vertical FDI. In order to capture the countries’ capital
endowment, we calculate capital intensity as log physical capital per worker using Penn
World Table data following Antràs, Chor, Fally, and Hillberry (2012).
To control for a country’s institutional environment, we include the variable rule of law
from the World Bank, which measures contract enforceability and protection of property
rights.13 As a measure of a country’s financial development we include the ratio of private
credit to GDP from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2010). In order to control for the
fixed cost of setting up a foreign affiliate, we include the variable market entry. It is
an index computed in five-year intervals since 1970 and annually since 2000. The latest
update is published in the 2011 Economic Freedom of the World annual report (Gwartney,
Lawson, and Hall, 2011). It measures the performance of countries in terms of the cost
13The actual values range from -2.5 (worst governance) to 2.5 (best governance). As the variable is
skewed and in order to take the logarithm, we add 2.5 to each value such that it goes from 0 to 5, a
higher value implying better governance.
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of starting a new business. As such, it captures the time (measured in days) necessary
to comply with regulations when starting a limited liability company, money costs of the
fees paid to regulatory authorities (measured as a share of per-capita income), and funds
that must be deposited into a company bank account (measured as a share of per capita
income).
In several robustness checks, we include different sector or country level controls and an
alternative productivity measure. First, we add absolute GDP obtained from the World
Bank to control for market size. Second, we include a dummy variable indicating whether
a country has a comparative advantage in a specific sector using data from the WTO trade
statistics (WTO, 2012b) and following Mayda and Rodrik (2005) who have proposed this
measure of comparative advantage. Third, we replace TFP by an alternative measure of
productivity. Kremer (1993) focuses in his theoretical model on the skill level of workers.
The line of reasoning is that more highly skilled workers are less likely to make mistakes.
Therefore, we include a measure of labor productivity, i.e., output per worker, measured
as an annual average at the country level, which we obtain from the Total Economy
Database (The Conference Board, 2012).
Table D.2 in Appendix D summarizes all variables (dependent and explanatory) used in
our regressions. Means and standard deviations are also reported. We have sufficient
variation in the country characteristics in our estimation sample, which is mostly cross-
sectional and not so much over time.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
The analysis of the effect of a sector’s upstreamness on the firm’s investment location
decision and how this is related to a country’s propensity to making mistakes entails an
intriguing question: where will the affiliate be located, i.e., are affiliates at later stages of
the value chain more likely to be located in countries with higher productivity? In order
to find an answer to this question, we estimate a binary choice model. We inflate the
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dataset such that each firm may invest in each country, in each year, and in each sector
it has been observed to invest in at least once before. Due to the inflation of our dataset
we have 96% zeros in our data.
Let yijst be the outcome of firm i in host country j in sector s in year t (i = 1, ..., N ,
j = 1, ..., J , s = 1, ..., S, and t = 1, ..., T ). The binary choice model for yijst is then given
by
P (yijst|.) =β0 + β1productivityjt−1 + β2upstreamnessst
+ β3productivityjt−1 ∗ upstreamnessst + αi + ηj + δt + ijst. (4.2)
yijst is a binary variable taking on the value of 1 if firm i holds an affiliate in sector s
in host country j in year t and 0 otherwise. αi is a time-invariant parent firm-specific
effect, ηj is a country fixed effect and δt are time dummies. We control for a country’s
productivity, the sector’s upstreamness and an interaction term of the productivity and
the sector’s upstreamness.
We estimate the investment location decision by specifying Pr(yijst|.) as a linear proba-
bility model (LPM). Hence, we can directly interpret the regression coefficients, even of
interaction effects. Using the LPM compared to nonlinear methods such as a random
effects probit model has a distinct advantage: it neither requires a distributional assump-
tion regarding the unobserved effect conditional on the covariates nor does it necessitate
the assumption of independence of the responses conditional on the explanatory variables
and the unobserved effect (Wooldridge, 2010). However, the linear functional form is
almost certainly false. Therefore, in order to test the fit of the linear functional form we
calculate the share of predicted probabilities below 0 or above 1. In almost all of our
regressions this share amounts to about 5%. Accordingly, estimating an LPM seems to
be a reasonable choice as it frees us from making other untestable assumptions.
We include all country characteristics lagged once. First, this acknowledges the duration
of an investment decision. We assume that it will probably take about one year from the
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point when the firm considers investing up to the actual effectuation of the investment.
Therefore, the country characteristics at the time when the firm decides upon the invest-
ment should matter, and not at the time of the realization of the investment. Second,
using lags ensures that there are no unobserved year-specific shocks influencing both, the
country’s characteristics as well as the firm’s investment in the country. Additionally, by
including firm-, country-, and year-specific effects we can control for various time-invariant
unobserved effects.
We exclude those affiliate sectors that are related to agricultural and mining activities.
This way, we make sure that our results are not driven by the availability of natural
resources, where firms do not exactly face a choice where to locate an affiliate in order to
extract or refine these resources.14
We use standard errors clustered at the country level. Hence, we account for the fact that
the error terms will probably be correlated within a country but not across countries.15
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Basic Specification
In our basic specification we regress the binary indicator whether a firm has invested in a
particular country on the destination country’s total factor productivity, on the affiliate
sector’s position in the value chain, and on an interaction term of the two. This specifi-
cation follows closely the model of Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012) where a country’s
productivity determines the allocation of sectors with respect to their position in the
value chain. In addition, we control for year and country fixed effects. As most country
characteristics do not vary a lot over time we, thus, control for observed and unobserved
14We provide a list of the excluded sectors in the description of the estimation sample in the Appendix
D.
15Cameron and Miller (2010) have pointed out that cluster-robust inference asymptotics are based
on the assumption that the number of clusters goes to infinity. In our sample we have 33 clusters.
Therefore, we also use bootstrap standard errors proposed by Cameron and Miller (2010) as a finite-
sample adjustment. The results do not differ significantly.
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time-constant country effects. The results are reported in Table 4.2. Columns 1 and 2
show the results for our estimation sample of 33 countries with and without including firm
fixed effects. Including firm fixed effects, we control for time-constant firm characteristics
that presumably have a high explanatory power for the firm’s investment location deci-
sion. Only about one third of the parent firms in our estimation sample have affiliates in
varying sectors. As firm fixed effects, thus, absorb some of the variation across sectors of
the upstreamness variable, we also run the regressions without firm fixed effects. Columns
3 and 4 show the results of the same regression for all countries for which we have data
on TFP (52 countries). We run the regressions on these different samples because the
estimation sample does not include, for example, China and Switzerland for which not all
of our country controls are available.
For both samples and with or without including firm fixed effects, we find that firms are
more likely to invest in countries with higher TFP. Controlling for firm fixed effects the
coefficient becomes slightly smaller but remains positively significant. We also calculate
the overall effect of TFP which can be derived from (4.2) as
∂P (yijst|.)
∂log(TFP)jt−1
= β1 + β3upstreamnessst,
at the mean of the upstreamness variable. The overall effect of TFP remains positive but
is smaller with a value of 0.0026 for the regression without firm fixed effects in column 1
and remains about the same with a value of 0.0262 for the regression with firm fixed effects
in column 2. The overall effect of TFP remains almost unchanged for the regression with
firm fixed effects, because we eliminate a lot of variation of the upstreamness variable
by including parent fixed effects. In contrast, in the regression without firm fixed effects
we keep the full variation of the upstreamness variable across sectors. This explains the
difference in the overall coefficients between the regressions with and without firm fixed
effects. Keeping the full variation of the upstreamness variable, the overall effect of TFP
is smaller. For a sector in an average position in the value chain, TFP only plays a minor
role for the firm’s investment decision.
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Table 4.2: The Influence of a Sector’s Position in the Value Chain
on the FDI Location Decision I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. yijst yijst yijst yijst
Estimation Sample Larger Sample
log (TFP) 0.0309** 0.0262 0.0152** 0.0148**
(0.0144) (0.0161) (0.0072) (0.0071)
Upstreamness -0.0126*** -0.0235*** -0.0070** -0.0151***
(0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0033) (0.0037)
Upstreamness*log(TFP) -0.0133** -0.0130** -0.0069** -0.0068**
(0.0052) (0.0061) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No No
Observations 674,833 674,833 1,322,007 1,322,007
Countries 33 33 52 52
Parent firms 3,919 3,919 3,920 3,920
R2 0.0481 0.0500 0.0510 0.0527
The dependent variable is the binary variable yijst, taking on the value of 1 if a firm has invested
in country j in sector s at time t, and 0 otherwise. Columns 1 and 2 include the basic regression
for the estimation sample. Columns 3 and 4 include the basic specification for the larger sample
of 52 countries. In all of the regressions we control for country and year fixed effects. We
estimate the regressions with and without firm fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
country level are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Furthermore, affiliate sectors that are located more at the beginning of the value chain are
less likely to be invested in (see columns 1 to 4). This result seems to be surprising. As we
analyze German outward FDI and Germany is a country with high TFP, more upstream
sectors should be more likely located in less productive countries while more downstream
sectors should remain in Germany. In addition, it could also be argued that sectors where
less value can be lost, i.e., the ones at the beginning of the value chain, are more likely
to be relocated as monitoring them is less crucial. However, in line with Antràs and
Chor (2012) one could then argue that these stages may rather be outsourced than being
kept within the firm, which is something we cannot observe in our data. Furthermore,
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an intuition for the negative coefficient may be that more upstream sectors such as the
manufacture of basic metals entail large initial fixed investment costs, which could reduce
the likelihood of investing at all. The overall effect of upstreamness, evaluated at the
mean of TFP, is also negative.
For the interaction of upstreamness and TFP the theoretical intuition is clear. Follow-
ing Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012), more upstream sectors should be located in less
productive countries. In our estimation, we can confirm this hypothesis. The interac-
tion term of upstreamness and TFP is negatively significant for both samples with or
without firm fixed effects. This implies that the more upstream an affiliate sector, the
less a destination country’s productivity matters for the investment decision. Putting
it differently, a destination country’s productivity becomes more important for a firm’s
investment decision if the affiliate sector is positioned more toward the end of the value
chain. Hence, we find the O-ring idea to be confirmed for FDI: the more upstream an
affiliate sector, the less the productivity of a destination country appears to matter for the
decision whether to invest. One might argue that there could be skill spillovers between
a parent and its affiliate. Consequently, the host country’s productivity should be less
important. Nevertheless, we find a country’s productivity to be important and even more
so for more downstream affiliates. Hence, the effect of a country’s productivity on its
sectoral specialization may be even stronger for domestically owned firms.
Including firm fixed effects does not alter our results. The signs and significance levels
remain unchanged. Only the size of the coefficients varies, but not significantly. Interest-
ingly, controlling for firm fixed effects increases the R-squared by less than 1 percentage
point. Hence, time-constant firm characteristics seem to matter less for the decision where
to locate an affiliate than we would have expected.
The results are the same for the two samples, except for the size of the coefficients which is
smaller in the larger sample including 52 countries. However, the signs of the coefficients
remain unchanged and the explanatory variables are still significant.
121
Testing the O-Ring Theory for FDI
Table 4.3: Economic Significance
(1) (2)
Dep. Var. yijst yijst
log(TFP) 0.0651** 0.0606*
Upstreamness -0.0339*** -0.0633***
Upstreamness*log(TFP) -0.0628** -0.0614**
The table contains the beta coefficients of columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
These effects are not only statistically but also economically significant. In order to discuss
economic significance and to be able to compare the coefficients we calculate standard-
ized coefficients, also called beta coefficients. Table 4.3 gives the beta coefficients of our
basic specification in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.2. An increase in TFP by one stan-
dard deviation significantly increases the investment probability by about 0.06 standard
deviations. If the affiliate sector moves one standard deviation up the value chain, the
firm’s investment probability decreases by about 0.03 to 0.06 standard deviations. Finally,
an increase in the interaction term of TFP and upstreamness by one standard deviation
decreases the investment probability by about 0.06 standard deviations. Hence, for the
firm’s investment location decision the effect of TFP interacted with the affiliate sector’s
position in the value chain is as important as the effect of TFP itself.
4.4.2 Controlling for the Number of Affiliates
Following the theory of Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012), an increase in country j’s
productivity should make country j more attractive for investments in more downstream
sectors. Take the example of three countries: country 1, country 2, and country 3.
Country 1 is the most productive, country 2 is less productive, and country 3 is least
productive.
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Table 4.4: The Influence of a Sector’s Position in the Value Chain
on the FDI Location Decision II
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. yijst yijst yijst yijst
Estimation Sample Estimation Sample
log (TFP) 0.0276** 0.0257* 0.0561 0.0569
(0.0121) (0.0141) (0.0405) (0.0417)
Upstreamness -0.0126*** -0.0236*** -0.0128*** -0.0238***
(0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0044) (0.0050)
Upstreamness*log(TFP) -0.0134** -0.0130** -0.0139** -0.0133**
(0.0053) (0.0062) (0.0052) (0.0061)
Affiliate Number 0.0184*** 0.0193***
(0.0043) (0.0044)
Average Schooling -0.0039 -0.0037
(0.0060) (0.0060)
log (wage) 0.0219 0.0206
(0.0222) (0.0216)
Market entry -0.0018 -0.0024
(0.0038) (0.0030)
log (remoteness) -0.0416 -0.0411
(0.0248) (0.0245)
Rule of Law -0.0179 -0.0170
(0.0156) (0.0147)
log (Fin. Dev.) 0.0257* 0.0259*
(0.0141) (0.0141)
log (Capital Intensity) -0.0130 -0.0134
(0.0171) (0.0173)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Country FE Yes Yes No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No No
Observations 674,833 674,833 674,833 674,833
Countries 33 33 33 33
Parent firms 3,919 3,919 3,919 3,919
R2 0.0478 0.0497 0.0165 0.0174
The dependent variable is the binary variable yijst, taking on the value of 1 if a firm has invested
in country j in sector s at time t, and 0 otherwise. Columns 1 and 2 contain the basic specification
including the number of affiliates. Columns 3 and 4 include the basic specification controlling
for other country characteristics. In all of the regressions we control for country and year fixed
effects (except for columns 3 and 4, where we do not control for country fixed effects). We
estimate the regressions with and without firm fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
country level are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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If country 3’s productivity increases, the most upstream affiliate sectors in country 2 may
be relocated to country 3. This leads to a decrease in the average upstreamness measure of
both, country 2 and country 3. Hence, in country 3 the productivity increase has induced
a decrease in the average upstreamness of the sectors located in country 3. However, the
average upstreamness has also decreased in country 2 while country 2’s productivity has
remained the same. Therefore, we also control for the number of affiliates per country.16
This should increase the coefficient of the interaction term as those changes in the average
upstreamness caused by an exit of the most upstream sectors are accounted for separately.
Indeed, we find our results to remain stable and our coefficients to increase slightly (see
columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.4). Affiliates in more downstream sectors are more likely to
be located in more productive countries. The number of affiliates as such has a positive
significant effect on the investment probability. Affiliates seem to be located in countries
where already other affiliates are located. This may hint at agglomeration effects.
4.4.3 Additional Country Controls
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.4, we insert additional country characteristics as covariates
in our baseline regression: in addition to TFP, upstreamness and the interaction term
between the two, we now also control for a country’s endowment with human capital
(average years of schooling) and with physical capital (capital intensity), the labor cost
in a country (average wages), the cost of market entry, the GDP-weighted distance of
the destination country from all other countries in the sample (remoteness) as well as
a set of factors capturing a country’s institutional development (rule of law, financial
development).17
Except for TFP which becomes insignificant, we find that in our set of original covariates
neither the significance levels, nor the sign of the coefficients is altered by adding the
16Note that we only control for the number of German affiliates per country. This is the relevant
category as the average upstreamness is also based on German affiliates.
17Note that when including these additional country characteristics, we have to leave out the country
fixed effects due to the new covariates’ insufficient variation over time.
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additional variables. Only the coefficients’ magnitude decreases slightly compared to our
regression results in columns 1 to 4 in Table 4.2 and columns 1 and 2 in Table 4.4. Looking
at the new regressors, we see that only financial development significantly influences the
investment decision. Firms are more likely to invest in countries that are more financially
developed. A potential reason for the insignificance of most of the country characteristics
may be that most of the variables are highly correlated. Nonetheless, controlling for
other country characteristics the affiliate sector and the country’s TFP still seem to be
the drivers of the FDI location choice.
4.5 Robustness Checks
4.5.1 Closing the Market-Seeking Channel
In a first robustness check, we test whether our results are driven by market-seeking
arguments. The idea is that more downstream sectors are located in more attractive
markets which are generally also the more productive ones. Therefore, we rerun our basic
regression including a country’s absolute gross domestic product (GDP) as a covariate
in a first test and analyze only vertical FDI in a second test. First, affiliates are more
likely to be located in richer countries if the location decision is driven by market-seeking
arguments. Hence, absolute GDP should control for this channel. Second, vertical FDI
is by definition not driven by market-seeking motivations but can be explained by cost-
saving arguments, i.e., the search for the most cost-efficient production location. Thus, if
our results still hold for vertical FDI only, it can be argued that they are not driven by
the market-seeking channel.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.5 report the results when including absolute GDP as an
additional control. Our results remain robust. TFP has a positive effect on the investment
probability. The more upstream a sector is, the lower the investment probability is. Most
importantly, the more downstream the affiliate the more likely the firm is to invest in
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Table 4.5: Robustness Check: Excluding Market-Seeking
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. yijst yijst yijst yijst
Estimation Sample Ver. FDI
log (TFP) 0.0327** 0.0258 0.0553** 0.0660**
(0.0160) (0.0168) (0.0248) (0.0305)
Upstreamness -0.0126*** -0.0234*** -0.0296*** -0.0398***
(0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0081) (0.0079)
Upstreamness*log(TFP) -0.0133** -0.0129** -0.0227** -0.0269**
(0.0052) (0.0061) (0.0087) (0.0112)
log(Absolute GDP) 0.0029 -0.0070
(0.0036) (0.0061)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No No
Observations 674,833 674,833 338,342 338,342
Countries 33 33 33 33
Parent firms 3,919 3,919 2,348 2,348
R2 0.0481 0.0501 0.0520 0.0529
The dependent variable is the binary variable yijst, taking on the value of 1 if a firm has invested
in country j in sector s at time t, and 0 otherwise. In columns 1 and 2 we run the basic regression
including log(Absolute GDP). In columns 3 and 4 the basic regression is run for vertical FDI
only. In all of the regressions we control for country and year fixed effects. We estimate the
regressions with and without firm fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the country level
are given in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
more productive countries. The size of the coefficients also remains about the same.
Absolute GDP is not significant. We would have expected it to be positively significant.
Presumably, the variation over time is not sufficient to identify a significant effect as we
control for country fixed effects in our regressions. This stresses the validity of our results,
as controlling for country fixed effects seems to rule out omitted variable bias, such as
absolute GDP influencing TFP and the firm’s probability to invest in a country.
The regression results for vertical FDI only are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.5.
We define vertical FDI as those investments where the parent firm’s sector differs from
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the affiliate’s.18 We find our results to remain robust. Moreover, the coefficients actually
increase. Hence, for vertical investments a country’s TFP is more important if the sector
of the investment project is more downstream.
4.5.2 Controlling for Other Sectoral Characteristics
One objection to including upstreamness as the only sectoral characteristic may be that
this way our results capture various sectoral factors and may, thus, be explained by
different theories. Hence, we do two things to alleviate this concern. First, we include
a variable that indicates whether country j has a comparative advantage in sector s.
We construct this measure following Mayda and Rodrik (2005) who term it revealed
comparative advantage. The comparative advantage variable is an indicator variable and
defined as follows
CAsj =

1, if Msj −Xsj − λMsj < 0,
0, if Msj −Xsj − λMsj > 0 or non-tradable sector.
λ is an adjustment factor which should take into account the existence of overall trade
imbalances. Mayda and Rodrik (2005) define it as:
λ =
∑
s(Ms −Xs)∑
sMs
.
The adjustment factor illustrates by which fraction imports would have to be reduced or
increased in order to balance the trade account. λ is negative for countries with a trade
surplus and positive for those with a trade deficit. Therefore, a sector is defined as a
comparative advantage sector if its adjusted net imports are less than zero. The sector
is no comparative advantage sector if the adjusted net imports are larger than zero or
the sector is non-tradable. We calculate the measure using sectoral trade data from the
18Due to a lack of data we cannot use the standard identification of vertical FDI where, in addition
to the different parent and affiliate sectors, we would also control for trade flows from the affiliate to the
parent.
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WTO trade statistics (WTO, 2012b).
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.6 report the results when including the comparative advan-
tage measure. Again, our results remain robust. Whether a country has a comparative
advantage in a sector does not seem to influence a firm’s FDI location decision. Control-
ling for whether a sector is a comparative advantage sector even increases the coefficients
of TFP, upstreamness, and the interaction term of the two.
Table 4.6: Robustness Check: Controlling for Other Sectoral Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. yijst yijst yijst yijst
Estimation Sample Estimation Sample New Entrants
log (TFP) 0.0429** 0.0361** 0.0306** 0.0433***
(0.0163) (0.0158) (0.0144) (0.0031)
Upstreamness -0.0164*** -0.0290*** -0.0045***
(0.0046) (0.0064) (0.0012)
Upstreamness*log(TFP) -0.0178*** -0.0176*** -0.0131** -0.0063***
(0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0014)
Comp. adv. -0.0009 -0.0009
(0.0009) (0.0009)
Firm FE No Yes No No
Country FE Yes Yes Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No
Sector FE No No Yes No
Observations 272,625 272,625 674,833 157,149
Countries 29 29 33 33
Parent firms 3,919 3,919 3,919 3,294
R2 0.0481 0.0502 0.0545 0.0051
The dependent variable is the binary variable yijst, taking on the value of 1 if a firm has
invested in country j in sector s at time t, and 0 otherwise. In columns 1 and 2 we run the
basic regression including Comp. adv.. In column 3 the results of the basic regression including
sector fixed effects are reported. In column 4 we run the basic regression for new entrants only.
In all of the regressions (except for column 4) we control for country and year fixed effects. We
estimate the regressions in columns 1 and 2 with and without firm fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the country level are given in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Second, we include sector dummies in order to control for time-constant sector characteris-
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tics, such as its skill-intensity, and specificity, which can be assumed to be rather constant
over time. As upstreamness also hardly varies over time, we exclude the upstreamness
variable in this regression. Column 3 of Table 4.6 shows that the interaction term of up-
streamness and TFP remains significantly negative. Therefore, even controlling for other
sector characteristics, the link between a country’s productivity and a sector’s position in
the value chain is a significant explanatory determinant of a firm’s FDI location decision.
4.5.3 New Entrants
Once an affiliate has been set up in a country, it is quite likely that it will remain in that
country for a few years. Although we have entry and exit of affiliates in countries over the
years, the variation over time is not very large. Therefore, we run our basic specification
for new entrants only. This means that we look at the influence of a country’s productivity
on the initial entry decision for different affiliate sectors. Earlier, we have assumed that
the firm decides each year whether to invest in a country if it has not invested in the
country before and whether to stay or exit if it already has invested in the country before.
Looking only at new entrants implies that we have a cross section. Therefore, we run a
LPM without fixed effects.
Column 4 of Table 4.6 reports the results for the sample with new entrants only. In line
with our previous findings, TFP has a significantly positive effect on the initial investment
decision. Affiliates in more upstream sectors are less likely to be established in a foreign
country. Furthermore, firms are more likely to conduct the initial investment in more
upstream affiliates in less productive countries and more downstream affiliates in more
productive countries.
4.5.4 Alternative Measure of a Country’s Productivity
In addition to TFP as a measure of a country’s productivity, we also use labor productivity
(labprod), measured as GDP per person employed. Hence, we test the robustness of our
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results with respect to the productivity measure used.
Table 4.7: Robustness Check: Alternative Productivity Measure
(1) (2)
Dep. Var. yijst yijst
Estimation Sample
log (labprod) 0.0263** 0.0167
(0.0107) (0.0107)
Upstreamness 0.1075*** 0.0837**
(0.0265) (0.0308)
Upstreamness*log(labprod) -0.0111*** -0.0099***
(0.0027) (0.0031)
Firm FE No Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Sector FE No No
Observations 674,833 674,833
Countries 33 33
Parent firms 3,919 3,919
R2 0.0482 0.0501
The dependent variable is the binary variable yijst, taking on the value of 1 if a firm has invested in
country j in sector s at time t, and 0 otherwise. In all of the regressions we control for country and year
fixed effects. In column 2 firm fixed effects are included. Standard errors clustered at the country level
are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In Table 4.7, the results using labor productivity are reported. As TFP, labor productivity
has a significantly positive effect on the investment probability. Thus, countries with a
higher labor productivity are more likely to attract FDI. Furthermore, the interaction
between an affiliate sector’s position in the value chain and a country’s labor productivity
remains significantly negative. Hence, affiliates located at later stages in the value chain
are more likely to be placed in countries with a higher labor productivity. One important
difference with respect to the results of our baseline specification is that the coefficient of
the upstreamness measure is now significantly positive. This implies that investments are
more likely to take place in more upstream sectors. As we have argued above, from the
German parents’ point of view this makes sense as downstream sectors may also remain
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in Germany. To conclude, the main hypothesis that those sectors that are located at
later stages in the production process are more likely to be located in more productive
countries can be confirmed irrespective of the productivity measure used.
In summary, our results allow us to make a strong case for the relevance of a sector’s
position in the value chain for a firm’s decision of whether and where to invest. Further,
our robustness checks have shown that the results are robust to using various measures
of a country’s productivity, they are not driven by market-seeking motives, and remain
robust when we include other country characteristics.
4.6 Conclusion
The position in the value chain of a production stage matters for the decision of where
to set up a foreign affiliate. In our empirical analysis we have shown that a country’s
productivity, which can also be thought of as a lower propensity to making mistakes, is
more important if the affiliate’s sector is at a later stage in the production process.
With respect to Kremer (1993) and Jones (2011), our results underline the role of com-
plementary production processes as a potential explanation for pronounced inequalities
between countries in terms of development also for FDI. It is not only domestic firms pro-
ducing more upstream goods in less developed countries but also foreign firms establishing
affiliates in upstream sectors in less developed countries and more downstream affiliates
in more developed countries. Hence, later stages of production processes are located in
more developed countries which again leads to stronger economic growth, as these stages
contribute most value added (see Fally, 2012).
Global supply chains are increasingly subject to public debate. Especially policy makers
of developing and emerging countries aim at participating in global supply chains and then
moving down towards those stages, which yield higher value added (see discussion at the
WTO Public Forum 2012, Session 22).19 Therefore, it is of high relevance for policy makers
19http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum12_e/programme_e.htm#session22
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which country characteristics matter for attracting FDI in more downstream sectors. This
study stresses the importance of becoming more productive in order to attract investment
in those sectors which yield a higher value added.
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A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Theoretical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
Given the belief of the bank, Pr(G|α ≥ αsep) = 1 and Pr(G|0 ≤ α < αsep) = 0, both
suppliers have no incentive to deviate. The exporter sets α, p1 and q1. Given p1 and
q1, the good supplier could choose a higher α, but she has no incentive to do so, since
∂piSU (G)
∂α
< 0:
∂piSU
∂α
= [c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC)] q1 − [c+ (c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC)] q1(1 + r¯SC) < 0.
Likewise, the good type has no incentive to lower α, as the exporter would not obtain a
bank credit then and the export transaction does not take place which means that the
supplier would make losses.
The bad type does not have an incentive to choose 0 < α(B) ≤ αsep, because the trans-
action does not take place as the bank does not give a bank credit and hence she makes
losses. For α(B) = αsep, the supplier still makes zero profits and thus has no incentive to
deviate to αsep.
The bank updates its belief according to Bayes’ rule and sets σ = 1 when α = αsep. If
α = 0, the bank updates its belief according to Bayes’ rule and sets σ = 0 and hence
denies a credit. Thus, [(α(G) = αsep, α(B) = 0) , (gives bank credit at interest rate 1+r¯B
λ
,
gives no bank credit), Pr(G|α ≥ αsep) = 1 and Pr(G|0 ≤ α < αsep) = 0] is a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
Illustration of Proposition 3:
Note that condition (1.18) requires the suppliers’ refinancing costs not to be too high
r¯SC <
(1− σ2)c¯+ r¯B(c¯− σ2c)
σ2(c¯− c)
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and the adverse selection problem to be severe
σ2 <
(1 + r¯B)c¯
c(r¯B − r¯SC) + c¯(1 + r¯SC) .
In Figure A.1, the shaded area gives all the parameter combinations satisfying (1.18).
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Figure A.1: Graphical Illustration of Proposition 3
This shows by example that the parameter set for which (1 + β)SC/BC < (1 + β)BC is
non-empty. In fact, for reasonable parameter constellations the productivity threshold
for supplier credit and bank credit financing is almost always below the one for pure bank
credit financing.
Proof of Proposition 4
Given the belief of the bank Pr(G|α ≥ αsep) = 1, Pr(G|0 ≤ α < αsep) = 0 and
Pr(G|α(G) = α(B)) = σ both suppliers have no incentive to deviate. They will not
deviate to a higher α as their profits decrease in α (see above). Furthermore, they will
not unilaterally decrease α as they will not get any bank credit then. Thus, in this case
the bank does not learn anything.
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Proof of Proposition 5
Comparing (1.17) with (1.21), we can derive that the minimum productivity level in the
separating equilibrium lies below the one in the pooling equilibrium:
4(1 + r¯B)(F + FEX) [c(r¯B − r¯SC) + c¯(1 + r¯SC)]
p2q¯2
<
4(1 + r¯B)F [σ(c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC) + c(1 + r¯B)]
(σp)2q¯2
σ2(c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC) + σ2c(1 + r¯B) < σ(c¯− c)(1 + r¯SC) + c(1 + r¯B)
Firms with a productivity level (1 + β) ∈
[
(1 + β)pool, (1 + β)BC
]
with (1 + β)pool < (1 +
β)BC , can play both the separating or the pooling equilibrium. To say which equilibrium
they prefer, we have to compare the expected profits of both equilibria. In the separating
equilibrium, only the good suppliers participate. Therefore, we have to multiply the
profits of the separating equilibrium with the probability that the supplier is good (σ).
Only if the supplier is good, the costs are incurred and the revenues are realized. In the
pooling equilibrium, both types of suppliers participate. The pooling equilibrium is never
played by the exporter if:
σpisepEX > pi
pool
EX
(1− σ)(1 + r¯B)(F + FEX) > 12pσ
[
xpool − xsep
]
.
This is always fulfilled, as the quantity produced by the exporter is always smaller in the
pooling equilibrium than in the separating equilibrium. Thus, the separating equilibrium
Pareto-dominates the pooling equilibrium. Playing the pooling equilibrium only has dis-
advantages. The exporter incurs the fixed costs and pays part of the variable costs to the
supplier but does not get any revenues from selling its products if the supplier is of bad
quality. It can still be better than using only bank credit financing as the exporter only
pays a part of the variable costs and not the whole variable costs to the supplier.
Every pooling equilibrium where 0 ≤ α(T ) < αsep is Pareto-dominated by the separating
equilibrium independent of beliefs. Furthermore, there does not exist any other pooling
equilibrium with α > αsep as the bad supplier will always make negative profits.
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A.2 Empirical Appendix
Table A.1: Description of Variables
Variable Definition
SC Logarithm of trade accounts payable divided by total assets
BC Logarithm of bank debt divided by total assets
Tangibles Logarithm of tangible assets divided by total assets
Salesgrowth Sales of period t divided by sales of period t − 1 minus 1,
((salest/salest−1)− 1)
Constrain 0/1 dummy indicating whether firms feel financially constrained or
not
This is the case if either the question whether the firm is constrained
in its production due to financial constraints is answered with “yes”
or if the question on how the firm judges the willingness of banks
to give credits to firms is answered with “restrictive”.
EXP 0/1 dummy indicating whether a firm exports or not
A firm is classified as an exporter if it exports its product at least
2 months in a year.
Labprod Productivity of a firm measured as ln(sales/employees)
Sales Logarithm of sales
SCliab Logarithm of trade accounts payable divided by total liabilities
BCliab Logarithm of bank debt divided by total liabilities
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Table A.2: Robustness Check: Using Sales as a Size Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. BC BC BC BC
SC -3.431* -4.145** -3.572** -3.896**
(1.889) (2.024) (1.417) (1.871)
tangibles 0.946 1.184* 1.003** 1.101*
(0.615) (0.698) (0.491) (0.641)
salesgrowth -0.027 -0.0307* -0.0277* -0.0293*
(0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0147) (0.016)
constrain 7.212* 6.651* 6.336** 5.724
(4.218) (3.953) (3.131) (3.567)
constrain*SC 1.876 1.611
(1.332) (1.307)
constrain*SC*EXP 1.6548** 1.424
(0.8354) (1.0100)
EXP -0.495 -0.548 -0.3792 -0.4058
(0.738) (0.734) (0.6883) (0.708)
sales 1.321 1.635* 1.383** 1.538*
(0.815) (0.908) (0.609) (0.817)
year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,720
No. of companies 410 410 410 410
No. of instruments 23 20 25 21
Lags used 2+3 2 2+3 2
AR(1) 0.003 0.007 0.001 0.004
AR(2) 0.327 0.327 0.233 0.263
AR(3) 0.812 0.912 0.706 0.829
Hansen (p-value) 0.832 . 0.970 .
BC stands for bank credit, which is our dependent variable. The variable bank credit is divided
by total assets and the logarithm is taken. SC stands for supplier credit. Supplier credit is
measured by trade accounts payable divided by total assets and the logarithm is taken. sales
stands for the logarithm of sales. tangibles stands for the share of tangible assets a firm has
relative to total assets. Again the logarithm is taken. salesgrowth is calculated as sales of period
t divided by sales of period t− 1 minus 1 ((salest/salest−1)− 1). SC*constrain is an interaction
term of the fraction of supplier credit used and a dummy variable indicating whether a firm feels
financially constrained. SC*constrain*EXP is a triple interaction term of supplier credit used,
the financial constraints dummy and a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is an exporter.
In columns 1 and 3, we use the two-step GMM estimator with Windmeijer finite sample corrected
standard errors using the second and the third lag as instruments for the endogenous variables.
In columns 2 and 4, we only use the second lag as instrument.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A.3: Robustness Check: Scaling Supplier Credit and Bank Credit
by Total Liabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. BCliab BCliab BCliab BCliab
SCliab -3.549** -3.657** -3.102** -3.881**
(1.720) (1.633) (1.291) (1.532)
tangibles 1.153* 1.195* 1.008** 1.270**
(0.634) (0.856) (0.498) (0.609)
salesgrowth -0.020 -0.020 -0.017 -0.019
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
constrain 3.395 4.093 4.458* 3.479
(4.009) (3.214) (2.663) (2.764)
constrain*SCliab 1.121 1.186
(1.350) (1.091)
constrain*SCliab*exp 1.356* 0.993
(0.813) (0.905)
exp 0.309 0.332 0.271 0.352
(0.335) (0.338) (0.321) (0.344)
labprod 1.037* 1.063* 0.839 1.124**
(0.609) (0.589) (0.442) (0.552)
year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,720
No. of companies 410 410 410 410
No. of instruments 23 20 25 21
Lags used 2+3 2 2+3 2
AR(1) 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.003
AR(2) 0.330 0.340 0.305 0.292
AR(3) 0.998 0.869 0.754 0.785
Hansen (p-value) 0.666 . 0.656 .
BCliab stands for bank credit, which is our dependent variable. The variable bank credit is
divided by total liabilities and the logarithm is taken. SCliab stands for supplier credit. Sup-
plier credit is measured by trade accounts payable divided by total liabilities and the logarithm
is taken. labprod is measured by the logarithm of sales over the number of employees. tan-
gibles stands for the share of tangible assets a firm has relative to total assets. Again the
logarithm is taken. salesgrowth is calculated as sales of period t divided by sales of period
t − 1 minus 1 ((salest/salest−1) − 1). SCliab*constrain is an interaction term of the fraction
of supplier credit used and a dummy variable indicating whether a firm feels financially con-
strained. SCliab*constrain*EXP is a triple interaction term of supplier credit used, the financial
constraints dummy and a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is an exporter. In columns
1 and 3, we use the two-step GMM estimator with Windmeijer finite sample corrected stan-
dard errors using the second and the third lag as instruments for the endogenous variables. In
columns 2 and 4, we only use the second lag as instrument.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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B Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Theoretical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the strategies and beliefs specified in Proposition 1. For these strategies and
beliefs to form a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the following conditions have
to hold. Recall that pˇ denotes the price the exporter demands for the good.
(1) λpˆx− αH pˇx(1 + r¯Im)− λ(1− αH)pˇx ≥ 0,
(2) − αLpˇx(1 + r¯Im) ≥ 0,
(3) λpˆx− αH pˇx(1 + r¯Im)− λ(1− αH)pˇx ≥ −αLpˇx(1 + r¯Im),
(4) − αLpˇx(1 + r¯Im) ≥ −αH pˇx(1 + r¯Im) + φx,
(5) λpˆx− αH pˇx(1 + r¯Im)− λ(1− αH)pˇx ≥ −αH pˇx(1 + r¯Im) + φx.
Conditions (1) and (2) describe the participation constraints of the high- and the low-
quality importer when extending the share α of the purchasing price pˇx in advance.
Conditions (3) and (4) are the incentive compatibility constraints of both importer types.
Condition (5) rules out moral hazard by the high-quality importer guaranteeing that the
high-quality importer breaks even when paying an informative amount of CIA. It is easily
verified that by choosing
αH = αSep = φ/(1 + r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ(1+r¯Im) −
φ
λ
, αL = 0, and pˇ = pˆ− φ
λ
+ φ(1 + r¯Im)
,
all five conditions are fulfilled in such a way that the exporter’s pay-off is maximized.
If the bank observes the share α = αSep given in advance it updates its belief according
to Bayes’ Rule such that Prob(H|αSep) = 1 and extends additional bank credit at the
cheaper interest rate (1+r¯B)
λ
. If α ≤ αSep the bank’s best response is to deny bank credit,
as otherwise piB < 0 because its updated belief is that it faces the low-quality importer.
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The high-quality importer’s best response is to choose αH = αSep and the low-quality
importer’s best response is to set αL = 0. The high-quality importer does not de-
viate to 0 ≤ α < αSep since the bank does not extend any bank credit in this case,
Prob
(
H|0 ≤ α < αSep
)
= 0. Thus, the export transaction does not take place and the
high-quality importer pays the amount of CIA in vain, i.e., piHIm ≤ 0. The high-quality
type does not have an incentive to set α > αSep, because given pˇ and xSepEx , the importer
makes negative profits when extending a higher amount of CIA. Hence, the high-quality
importer does not have an incentive to deviate from αSep.
The low-quality importer does not have an incentive to choose 0 < αL < αSep, since the
bank does not extend an additional bank credit in this case and piLIm ≤ 0. Neither does
it choose αL ≥ αSep since piLIm ≤ 0, as well.
Derivation of xSepEx and (1 + β)
Sep
Ex
In the separating equilibrium, the exporter’s profit function with partial CIA and bank
credit financing is
piSepEx = αSeppˇx+λ(1−αSep)pˇx−λ
(1 + r¯B)
λ
(
x2
2(1 + β) + FEx − α
Seppˇx
)
−αSeppˇx. (B.1)
Part of the total invoice amount is received with certainty up front, the rest is received
with probability λ in t = 1. The amount paid in advance is used to pay a part of the
total costs of production, the rest is financed via bank credit. Bank credit is available
at a lower interest rate since uncertainty with regard to the importer’s quality type has
vanished.
Combining αSep = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ(1+r¯Im)−
φ
λ
and pˇ = pˆ− φ
λ
+ φ(1+r¯Im) to maximize the exporter’s profit
given in (B.1), we can derive the optimal quantity exported and the minimum productivity
level necessary for exporting:
xSepEx =
(1 + β)
1 + r¯B
[
λpˆ− φ+ φ(1 + r¯B)(1 + r¯Im)
]
,
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(1 + β)SepEx ≡
2(1 + r¯B)2FEx[
λpˆ− φ+ φ(1+r¯B)(1+r¯Im)
]2 .
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the strategies and beliefs specified in Proposition 2. For these strategies and
beliefs to form a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the following conditions have to
hold:
(1) λpˆx− αPoolpˇx(1 + r¯Im)− λ(1− αPool)pˇx ≥ 0,
(2) − αPoolpˇx(1 + r¯Im) + φx ≥ 0,
(3) λpˆx− αPoolpˇx(1 + r¯Im)− λ(1− αPool)pˇx ≥ −αpˇx(1 + r¯Im),
(4) − αPoolpˇx(1 + r¯Im) + φx ≥ −αpˇx(1 + r¯Im),
(5) λpˆx− αPoolpˇx(1 + r¯Im)− λ(1− αPool)pˇx ≥ −αPoolpˇx(1 + r¯Im) + φx,
where α denotes any share of CIA extended by the importer except αPool. It is easily
verified that with the share αPool = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ(1+r¯Im)−
φ
λ
and pˇ = pˆ− φ
λ
+ φ(1+r¯Im) the participation
constraints and the incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied for both types of
importers and the pay-off of the exporter is maximized. Note that only for αPool =
φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ(1+r¯Im)−
φ
λ
and pˇ = pˆ − φ
λ
+ φ(1+r¯Im) the exporter can set the profits of both importer
types equal to 0.
Neither type of importer has an incentive to deviate from αPool = φ/(1+r¯Im)
pˆ+ φ(1+r¯Im)−
φ
λ
. They will
not deviate to α > αPool since, given the price pˇ for the exporter’s good, importer profits
decrease in α. Furthermore, they will not unilaterally decrease α as the transaction will
not take place then. This holds independently for any equilibrium belief of the bank,
Prob
(
H|α > αPool
)
∈ [0, 1] since pˇ is given. For Prob
(
H|α > αPool
)
= 1, the bank offers
the cheaper bank credit to the exporter. However, the exporter will charge the same price
and thus the high-quality type does not have an incentive to deviate to αH > αPool. For
Prob
(
H|α > αPool
)
= 0, the bank does not extend any bank credit and the transaction
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does not take place. For every belief Prob
(
H|α > αPool
)
∈ [0, 1], the exporter will charge
the same price. Hence, neither the high-quality importer nor the low-quality importer
has an incentive to deviate to αH > αPool.
Derivation of xPoolEx and (1 + β)PoolEx
In the pooling equilibrium with αPool = αSep, the bank has the belief Prob(H|αPool) = µ
and (1 + rB) = (1+r¯B)λµ . The price for the export good is given by pˇ. The exporter’s profit
function with partial CIA and bank credit financing is
piPoolEx = αPoolpˇx+ λµ(1− αPool)pˇx− λµ
(1 + r¯B)
λµ
(
x2
2(1 + β) + FEx − α
Poolpˇx
)
− αPoolpˇx.
(B.2)
The optimal quantity exported and the minimum productivity level required for exporting
are
xPoolEx =
(1 + β)
1 + r¯B
[
µ(λpˆ− φ) + φ(1 + r¯B)(1 + r¯Im)
]
,
(1 + β)PoolEx ≡
2(1 + r¯B)2FEx[
µ(λpˆ− φ) + φ(1+r¯B)(1+r¯Im)
]2 .
Proof of Proposition 3
A comparison of (2.11) with (2.13), reveals that (1 + β)SepEx < (1 + β)
Pool
Ex since µ < 1.
Similarly, from comparing (2.13) with (2.5) we find that (1 + β)PoolEx < (1 + β)
BC
Ex since
0 < φ(1+r¯B)(1+r¯Im) . Therefore,
(1 + β)SepEx < (1 + β)
Pool
Ex < (1 + β)
BC
Ex .
Proof of Proposition 4
Firms in the first category can export with pure bank credit financing or partial CIA
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financing. Partial CIA financing allows the exporter to charge a higher price than in the
case of pure bank financing. It is straightforward to see that
p < pˇ.
A higher price leads to higher expected revenues and higher expected profits since the
total costs of production remain constant.
Consider, e.g., the case of partial CIA financing in the pooling equilibrium. The exporter
faces the same type uncertainty as with pure bank financing and pays the same bank
interest rate. However, the exporter receives a higher price from partial CIA financing
and therefore makes higher profits than with pure bank financing.
Proof of Proposition 5
Whether exporters with (1 + β) ≥ (1 + β)PoolEx prefer to play the pooling or the separat-
ing equilibrium depends on the expected profits in both equilibria. A transaction with
an informative signal in the separating equilibrium occurs with probability µ since with
probability (1 − µ) the importer is of low quality and is not willing to extend an infor-
mative signal. Thus, expected profits in the separating equilibrium amount to µpiSepEx . A
transaction with an uninformative signal in the pooling equilibrium always takes place
since every importer type is able to provide the uninformative fraction of CIA. Exporting
firms in the first and second group receive a higher payoff in a separating equilibrium if
µpiSepEx > pi
Pool
Ex .
This is fulfilled if
2 (1− µ) (1 + r¯B)2FEx > (1 + β)
[[
µ (λpˆ− φ) + φ 1 + r¯B1 + r¯Im
]2
− µ
[
λpˆ− φ+ φ 1 + r¯B1 + r¯Im
]2]
. (B.3)
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For given values of (1 + β) and µ, (B.3) holds if
1 + r¯Im > ±
√√√√ φ2(1 + r¯B)2
2(1+r¯B)2FEx
(1+β) + µ (λpˆ− φ)
.
We can rule out the negative value since (1 + r¯Im) ∈ [1,∞). Thus, there exists a unique
threshold of (1 + r¯Im).
For given values of (1 + β) and (1 + r¯Im), (B.3) holds if
µ >
(1 + r¯B)2(1 + β)φ2 − 2FEx(1 + r¯B)2(1 + r¯Im)2
(1 + r¯Im)2(1 + β)(−pˆλ+ φ)2 .
Consequently, these exporters prefer playing the separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium
if quality uncertainty is low (high µ) and the importer’s refinancing costs are high. They
prefer playing the pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium if quality uncertainty is high (low
µ) and the importer’s refinancing costs are low.
Note further that for given values of µ and (1 + r¯Im), (B.3) holds if
(1 + β) < 2 (1− µ) (1 + r¯B)
2FEx[[
µ (λpˆ− φ) + φ 1+r¯B1+r¯Im
]2 − µ [λpˆ− φ+ φ 1+r¯B1+r¯Im ]2
] .
Thus, the pooling equilibrium becomes more preferable, the higher the productivity of
the firm.
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B.2 Empirical Appendix
Table B.1: Decomposition of Firms According to Sectors
Sector Number of firms Share of firms (%)
Mining and quarrying 10 0.84
Construction 239 19.98
Manufacturing 221 18.48
Transportation, storage, and communi-
cation
73 6.10
Wholesale, retail, and repairs 267 22.32
Real estate, renting and business ser-
vices
244 20.40
Hotels and restaurants 66 5.52
Other services 76 6.35
Total number of firms 1,196 100
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Table B.2: Description of Variables
Outcome variable
Exp 0/1 dummy for firms that sell a positive share of their sales
abroad
Independent endogenous regressors
DCIArec 0/1 dummy for firms that receive a positive share of their sales
before delivery of the products or services
LogCIArec Log percentage share of total sales received before delivery of
the products or services
Independent exogenous regressors
LogAge Log firm age in years
LogSize Log number of full-time employees
LogLabprod Log(total sales/number of employees)
CompNum Number of competitors in the national market with regard to
the main product line or main line of services (range 0, 1, 2,
3, or 4 and more, coded as 4)
ForPressure 0/1 dummy for firms for which pressure from international
competitors is fairly or very important when making key de-
cisions about their business with regard to developing new
products or services and markets
Univeduc Percentage of workforce that has a university education or
higher
Foreign 0/1 dummy for firms of which 10% or more is foreign owned
Instruments
PublicInfo 0/1 dummy for firms for which trade fairs and other public
sources of information are extremely important as potential
source about new customers
Specificity Ordinal variable that is equal to:
1 for firms whose customers buy from competitors instead
if the firm raises the price of the main product line or main
service line by 10%
2 for firms whose customers continue to buy from the firm
but at much lower quantities if the firm raises the price of the
main product line or main service line by 10%
3 for firms whose customers continue to buy from the firm
but at slightly lower quantities if the firm raises the price of
the main product line or main service line by 10%
4 for firms whose customers continue to buy from the firm
in the same quantities if the firm raises the price of the main
product line or main service line by 10%
All variables are measures or projected estimates of firm characteristics for the year 2004.
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Table B.3: Effect of DCIArec on Export Participation - 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. DCIArec Exp DCIArec Exp DCIArec Exp
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
DCIArec 0.236 0.774** 0.438**
(0.233) (0.392) (0.206)
LogAge -0.0422** 0.0129 -0.0448** 0.0388 -0.0415** 0.0214
(0.0203) (0.0164) (0.0201) (0.0267) (0.0203) (0.0174)
LogSize 0.0475*** 0.0299** 0.0501*** 0.00234 0.0469*** 0.0198
(0.0103) (0.0145) (0.0103) (0.0229) (0.0103) (0.0137)
LogLabprod 0.0310 0.0391** 0.0391** 0.0175 0.0318* 0.0317**
(0.0189) (0.0152) (0.0191) (0.0232) (0.0190) (0.0159)
Univeduc 0.00290*** 0.000305 0.00286*** -0.00104 0.00282*** -0.000305
(0.000801) (0.000845) (0.000777) (0.00138) (0.000790) (0.000832)
CompNum -0.00463 0.00400 -0.000142 0.00923 0.00234 0.00488
(0.0140) (0.00855) (0.0142) (0.0132) (0.0143) (0.00977)
ForPressure -0.0140 0.144*** 0.00308 0.147*** -0.00712 0.145***
(0.0333) (0.0260) (0.0333) (0.0350) (0.0333) (0.0284)
Foreign -0.0320 0.342*** -0.0455 0.371*** -0.0325 0.348***
(0.0516) (0.0452) (0.0508) (0.0591) (0.0515) (0.0484)
PublicInfo 0.0966*** 0.0941***
(0.0326) (0.0328)
Specificity 0.0376** 0.0372**
(0.0152) (0.0153)
Constant 0.0929 -0.0904 0.169 -0.142 0.170 -0.108
(0.114) (0.0783) (0.120) (0.116) (0.120) (0.0874)
Observations 1,124 1,124 1,135 1,135 1,124 1,124
R2 0.060 0.322 0.059 -0.484 0.065 0.123
F-Stat 36.05 19.27 28.99
First Stage F-
Stat
8.76 6.09 7.57
Hansen J-Stat - - 1.84
χ2 p-value - - (0.1753)
Sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are
in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table B.4: Effect of LogCIArec on Export Participation - 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LogCIArec Exp LogCIArec Exp LogCIArec Exp
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
LogCIArec 0.0702 0.216** 0.130**
(0.0691) (0.0987) (0.0585)
LogAge -0.117** 0.0112 -0.124** 0.0310 -0.114* 0.0181
(0.0585) (0.0154) (0.0582) (0.0220) (0.0585) (0.0162)
LogSize 0.123*** 0.0325*** 0.130*** 0.0131 0.121*** 0.0247**
(0.0283) (0.0124) (0.0284) (0.0166) (0.0282) (0.0117)
LogLabprod 0.0825 0.0406*** 0.107* 0.0246 0.0852 0.0347**
(0.0547) (0.0145) (0.0552) (0.0192) (0.0549) (0.0151)
Univeduc 0.00871*** 0.000379 0.00850*** -0.000660 0.00841*** -0.000160
(0.00237) (0.000784) (0.00229) (0.00110) (0.00233) (0.000750)
CompNum -0.0349 0.00536 -0.0208 0.0136 -0.0103 0.00737
(0.0420) (0.00902) (0.0424) (0.0130) (0.0422) (0.0101)
ForPressure -0.0853 0.147*** -0.0309 0.156*** -0.0611 0.150***
(0.0955) (0.0259) (0.0952) (0.0323) (0.0956) (0.0277)
Foreign 0.000447 0.334*** -0.0289 0.342*** -0.00142 0.334***
(0.153) (0.0451) (0.151) (0.0540) (0.153) (0.0481)
PublicInfo 0.325*** 0.316***
(0.0947) (0.0948)
Specificity 0.135*** 0.131***
(0.0444) (0.0447)
Constant 0.237 -0.0851 0.532 -0.125 0.508 -0.0976
(0.327) (0.0768) (0.347) (0.102) (0.342) (0.0836)
Observations 1,124 1,124 1,135 1,135 1,124 1,124
R2 0.063 0.333 0.061 -0.177 0.071 0.188
F-Stat 36.30 24.49 31.03
First Stage F-
Stat
11.76 9.20 10.33
Hansen J-Stat - - 1.78
χ2 p-value - - ( 0.1818)
Sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are
in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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C Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Theoretical Appendix Closed Economy
Proof of Proposition 1
Comparative statics of the wage rate in the closed economy:
• The higher the bargaining power parameter of unions, the higher the wage:
∂w(φ)
∂γ
= 11− θ + θ
1− γ − + γθ(1− )1− 
(
αE
P
)θ ( 
(− 1)φ
)θ−θ
[(1− u)w˜]1−θ

θ−θ
1−θ+θ
θ(1− )− 1
1− 
(
αE
P
)θ ( 
(− 1)φ
)θ−θ
[(1− u)w˜]1−θ > 0.
• The higher the productivity of the firm, the higher the wage:
∂w(φ)
∂φ
= 11− θ + θ
1− γ − + γθ(1− )1− 
(
αE
P
)θ ( 
(− 1)φ
)θ−θ
[(1− u)w˜]1−θ

θ−θ
1−θ+θ
(θ − θ)φθ−θ−1 1− γ − + γθ(1− )1− 
(
αE
P
)θ ( 
− 1
)θ−θ
[(1− u)w˜]1−θ > 0.
• The lower the unemployment rate, the higher the wage:
∂w(φ)
∂u
= 11− θ + θ
1− γ − + γθ(1− )1− 
(
αE
P
)θ ( 
(− 1)φ
)θ−θ
[(1− u)w˜]1−θ

θ−θ
1−θ+θ
(1− θ) [(1− u)w˜]−θ (−w˜) < 0.
• The higher the average wage paid outside the firm, the higher the wage:
∂w(φ)
∂w˜
= 11− θ + θ
1− γ − + γθ(1− )1− 
(
αE
P
)θ ( 
(− 1)φ
)θ−θ
[(1− u)w˜]1−θ

θ−θ
1−θ+θ
(1− θ) [(1− u)w˜]−θ (1− u) > 0.
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• The higher the aggregate income or the share of income used for the differentiated
good sector, the higher the wage:
∂w
∂(αE) =
1
1− θ + θ
1− γ − + γθ(1− )1− 
(
αE
P
)θ ( 
(− 1)φ
)θ−θ
[(1− u)w˜]1−θ

θ−θ
1−θ+θ
θ(αE)θ−1(P )−θ 1− γ − + γθ(1− )1− 
(

(− 1)φ
)θ−θ
[(1− u)w˜]1−θ > 0.
• The higher the rent sharing parameter, the higher or the lower the wage.
In order to simplify the derivation, we first take the logarithm of (3.10):
ln(w(φ)) =ln
[
− 1 + γ + γθ(− 1)
− 1
]
1
1 + θ(− 1) + ln
αE
P
(
(− 1)φ

)−1 θ
1 + θ(− 1)
+ ln [(1− u)w˜] 1− θ1 + θ(− 1). (C.1)
Hence, differentiating (C.1) with respect to θ yields
∂ln(w(φ))
∂θ
=γ(− 1) + γθ(− 1)
2
+ γ − 1 + γθ(− 1) − ln
[
+ γ − 1 + γθ(− 1)
− 1
]
(− 1)
ln
[
αE
P
(
(− 1)φ

)−1]
− ln [(1− u)w˜]  ≶ 0.
We cannot say whether ∂ln(w(φ))
∂θ
is smaller or larger than zero. However, it can be
shown that ∂ln(w(φ))
∂θ
increases with the productivity
∂ln(w(φ))
∂θ∂φ
= − 1
φ
> 0.
Hence, the higher the productivity level, the more likely the wage increases with a
higher rent sharing parameter.
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Derivation of φ∗ in the closed economy
Using M = (1−G(φ∗))N and (3.13), φ∗ is given by
φ∗ =
 K
Nf
α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
(1− α)k+ α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
−
1
k
. (C.2)
Proof of Proposition 2
The cutoff productivity level decreases with the rent sharing parameter:
∂φ∗
∂θ
=− 1
k
 K
Nf
α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
(1− α)k+ α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
−
1
k
−1
K
Nf
(−1)2
(1+θ(−1))2
[
(1− α)k+ α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)]
− α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
α (−1)
2
(1+θ(−1))2[
(1− α)k+ α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)]2 < 0.
The number of successful entrants in the economy increases with the rent sharing param-
eter:
∂M
∂θ
=K
f
α (−1)
2
[1+θ(−1)]2 (1− α)k[
(1− α)k+ α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)]2 > 0.
The unemployment rate depending only on exogenous variables
Inserting (3.11) and (3.13) into (3.15) yields
u =1−
KL αk(− 1)(1− α)k+ α (k − −11+θ(−1))

θ
1+θ(−1) {
+ γ − 1 + γθ(− 1)
− 1
(
αE
P
)θ
(
− 1

)θ(−1) k
k − −11+θ(−1)
θ(1+θ(−1))  K
Nf
α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
(1− α)k+ α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)

θ(1−)
k

1
θ(1−)−1
.
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Proof of Proposition 3
• The unemployment rate increases with an increase in the union’s bargaining power.
Thus, stronger unions lead to higher unemployment:
∂u
∂γ
=
ML kf(− 1)k − −11+θ(−1)

θ
1+θ(−1) 1
1 + θ(− 1)− 1 + γ + θγ(− 1)− 1
(
αE
P
)θ ((− 1)φ˜

)θ(−1)
2+θ(−1)
θ(1−)−1 (
αE
P
)θ
(
(− 1)φ˜

)θ(−1) 1 + θ(− 1)
− 1 > 0.
• The unemployment rate increases with the average productivity (wage effect domi-
nates):
∂u
∂φ˜
=
ML kf(− 1)k − −11+θ(−1)

θ
1+θ(−1) 1
1 + θ(− 1)− 1 + γ + θγ(− 1)− 1
(
αE
P
)θ ((− 1)φ˜

)θ(−1)
2+θ(−1)
θ(1−)−1 (
αE
P
)θ
(
(− 1)

)θ(−1)
− 1 + γ + γθ(− 1)
− 1 φ˜
θ(−1)−1θ(− 1) > 0.
• The higher the number of successful entrants, the lower the unemployment rate:
∂u
∂M
=− θ1 + θ(− 1)
 1L kf(− 1)k − −11+θ(−1)

θ
1+θ(−1)
M
θ
1+θ(−1)−1
− 1 + γ + θγ(− 1)− 1
(
αE
P
)θ ((− 1)φ˜

)θ(−1)
1
θ(1−)−1
< 0.
• The higher the rent sharing parameter, the higher the unemployment rate, if the
operational profits of the average firm are larger than the average wage of employed
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workers:
∂u
∂θ
=− 1
M
∂M
∂θ
+ (− 1)
2[
k − −11+θ(−1)
]
[1 + θ(− 1)]2 − ln
M
L
kf(− 1)
k − −11+θ(−1)
 1
1 + θ(− 1)
+ γ(− 1)
+ γ − 1 + γθ(− 1) + (− 1)
1
φ˜
∂φ˜
∂θ
θ + ln
αE
P
(
(− 1)φ˜

)−1 1
1 + θ(− 1)
− ln
[
1 + γ(1 + θ(− 1))
− 1
]
− 1
1 + θ(− 1) > 0.
As w¯ = M
L
kf(−1)
k− −11+θ(−1)
and pi(φ˜)+f
w(φ˜) , this is fulfilled if
pi(φ˜) + f > (1− u)w˜2,
as ∂M
∂θ
> 0 and ∂φ˜
∂θ
< 0 as well as the other terms being in a negligible order
of magnitude (smaller or close to 1) compared to the operational profits and the
average wage.
C.2 Theoretical Appendix Open Economy
Determination of φ∗t
To determine φ∗t we use:
pitn(φ∗t ) = 0
(1 + τ 1−)rn(φ
∗
t )

− f = 0
rn(φ∗t )

= f1 + τ 1−
rn(φ∗t )

= f1 + τ 1−
αE
P
(
wn(φ∗t )
(− 1)φ∗t
)1−
= f1 + τ 1−
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Plugging in wn(φ∗t ) yields:
φ∗t =
{
(− 1)1−f
− (1 + τ1−)
P
αE
} 1−θ+θ
−1
1− γ − + γθ(1− )1− 
[
αE
P
(

− 1
)1− (
1 + τ1−
)]θ
((1− u)w˜)1−θ
 . (C.3)
Determination of φ∗m
To determine φ∗m we use:
∆pit(φ∗m) = 0
rn(φ∗m)

= fm2ω−1 − (1 + τ1−)(
wn(φ∗m)
φ∗m
)1−
= Pfm(− 1)
1−
αE(2ω−1 − (1 + τ1−))−
Plugging in wn(φ∗m) yields:
φ∗m =
{
(− 1)1−fmP
− [2ω−1 − (1 + τ1−)]αE
} 1−θ+θ
−1
1− γ − + γθ(1− )1− 
[
αE
P
(

− 1
)1− (
1 + τ1−
)]θ
((1− u)w˜)1−θ
 . (C.4)
Is There an MNE Wage Premium?
ω ≡ wn(φ)
wm(φ)
=
{
(+ γ − 1 + γθ(− 1))(1− γτ1−)(1 + τ1−)θ
(+ γ − 1− γτ1− + γθ(1− τ1−)(− 1))2θ
} 1
1+θ(−1)
≶ 1
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Reformulating it, we obtain
[(
1 + τ1−
)θ − 2θ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
[
+ γ − 1− γθ − γτ1− + (γ + 1)
[
γθτ1− − γθτ1−
]]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
[
γθ− γ2τ1− + γτ1−
] (
1 + τ1−
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
≶ 0 cannot be clearly shown
How does ω change with γ?
If γ = 0: ω =
{
(1−)(1+τ1−)θ
(1−)2θ
} 1
1−θ+θ
< 1, as 2θ > (1 + τ 1−)θ for τ > 1 and  > 1.
If γ = 1: ω =
{
(−+θ(1−))(1−τ1−)(1+τ1−)θ
(−+θ(1−))(1−τ1−)2θ
} 1
1−θ+θ
< 1.
From ∂ω
∂γ
= 0, one can obtain an implicit solution for γ
A = γ2 [τ(+ θ − θ)− τ (1 + θ − θ)] + 2γτ (1− ) + τ (− 1) = 0.
The second derivative is negative:
∂A
∂γ
= 2γ [τ(+ θ(− 1))− τ (1 + θ(− 1))]− 2τ (− 1) < 0,
as
2τγ(+ θ(− 1)) < 2τ (γ + γθ(− 1) + − 1)
(τ −1 − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(γθ − γθ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ (1− γ)(− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0.
Thus, ∂A
∂γ
< 0.
Using the implicit function theorem we can show that the optimal γ is decreasing in θ:
∂γ
∂θ
= −
∂A
∂θ
∂A
∂γ
< 0,
as ∂A
∂θ
= (τ(− 1)− τ (− 1))γ2 < 0. Thus, the optimal γ decreases with θ.
156
Appendix to Chapter 3
Derivation of γ∗
We can derive a solution for γ where ω = 1 holds:
γ1/2 =−
(−1 + θ − θ− τ1− + τ1−)
[
(1 + τ1−)θ − 2θ
]
(1 + τ1−)θ2(τ1− − θτ1− + θτ1−)
±
√√√√((−1 + θ − θ− τ1− + τ1−) [(1 + τ1−)θ − 2θ]
(1 + τ1−)θ2(τ1− − θτ1− + θτ1−)
)2
− (1− ) [(1 + τ
1−)θ − 2θ] + 1
(1 + τ1−)θ2(τ1− − θτ1− + θτ1−) .
As (−1+θ−θ−τ
1−+τ1−)[(1+τ1−)θ−2θ]
(1+τ1−)θ2(τ1−−θτ1−+θτ1−) > 0, there is only one solution for γ where ω = 1:
γ∗ =−
(−1 + θ − θ− τ1− + τ1−)
[
(1 + τ1−)θ − 2θ
]
(1 + τ1−)θ2(τ1− − θτ1− + θτ1−)
+
√√√√((−1 + θ − θ− τ1− + τ1−) [(1 + τ1−)θ − 2θ]
(1 + τ1−)θ2(τ1− − θτ1− + θτ1−)
)2
− (1− ) [(1 + τ
1−)θ − 2θ] + 1
(1 + τ1−)θ2(τ1− − θτ1− + θτ1−) .
If γ∗ > 0, then wn and wm have the same slope.
Determination of φ∗t
Using M = (1−G(φ∗t ))N and (3.25) the cutoff productivity level is given by:
φ∗t =
 K
N(µf + fm)
α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
+ (1− α)2k(1 + τ 1−)
−
1
k
.
Determination of φ∗m
Using (3.20) and µ =
(
φ∗m
φ∗t
)−k
the cutoff productivity level for an MNE is given by:
φ∗m =
[
f
fm
(
2ω−1
1 + τ 1− − 1
)] 1+θ(−1)
1−
 K
N(µf + fm)
α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
+ (1− α)2k(1 + τ 1−)
−
1
k
.
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Exact expressions of w¯n and w¯m
(3.21) yields
w¯n =k
1− γ − + γθ(1− )1− 
[
αE
P
(
− 1

)−1
(1 + τ 1−)
]θ
[(1− u)w˜]1−θ

1
1+θ(−1)
1 + θ(− 1)
θ(− 1)− k(1− θ(− 1)
[
φ
∗ θ1+θ(−1)−k
m − φ∗ θ1+θ(−1)−k
] (
φ∗−k − φ∗−km
)
.
(3.22) yields
w¯m =k
− 1 + γ(1− τ 1−)− γθ(1− τ 1−)(− 1)(1− γτ 1−)
[
2αE
P
(
− 1

)−1]θ
[(1− u)w˜]1−θ

1
1+θ(−1)
θ(1− )− 1
θ(− 1)− k(1− θ(− 1)φ
∗ θ1+θ(−1)−k
m φ∗−km .
Derivation of φˆ
The price index in the open economy is given by:
P = M(1 + τ 1−)
∫ φ∗m
φ∗t
pn(φ)1−
g(φ)
1−G(φ∗t )
dφ+M2ω−1
∫ ∞
φ∗m
pn(φ)1−
g(φ)
1−G(φ∗t )
dφ.
Using pn(φ)
pn(φˆ)
= φˆ
φ
yields:
P = Mp(φˆ)
1−
φˆ
1−
θ−θ−1
[
1 + τ 1−
∫ φ∗m
φ∗t
φ
1−
θ−θ−1
g(φ)
1−G(φ∗t )
dφ+ ω−1
∫ ∞
φ∗m
φ
1−
θ−θ−1
g(φ)
1−G(φ∗t )
dφ
]
.
Substituting 1−G(φ∗t ) = φ∗−k and g(φ) = kφ−k−1 gives:
φˆ
1−
θ−θ−1 = k
k − 1−
θ−θ−1
φ∗
1−
θ−θ−1
(
fm
f
µ+ 1
)
,
which yields
φˆ =
[
k(1 + τ 1−)
k − 1−
θ−θ−1
(
1 + µfm
f
)] 1−θ+θ
−1
φ∗t .
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Comparison of the number of active firms in the closed and the open economy
M c < Mo
f
[
(1− α)k+ α
(
k − − 11 + θ(− 1)
)]
< (f + µfm)
[
(1− α)2k(1 + τ1−) + α
(
k − − 11 + θ(− 1)
)]
Comparison of the per worker labor income in the closed and the open econ-
omy
w¯o > w¯c
2(1 + τ1−)(f + µfm)
K
f + µfm
α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
(1− α)2k(1 + τ11− ) + α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
) > f K
f
α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
(1− α)k+ α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
2(1 + τ1−) > 1
Proof of Proposition 6
Plugging (3.25) into (3.26) and substituting (1− µ)w¯n + µw¯m = w˜, the derivative of the
unemployment rate with respect to µ yields
∂u
∂µ
= K
L
2(− 1)k(1 + τ 1−)α
α
(
k − −11+θ(−1)
)
+ (1− α)2k(1 + τ 1−)w˜
−2∂w˜
∂µ
.
∂u
∂µ
< 0 if ∂w˜
∂µ
< 0, therefore, w¯m + µ∂w¯m∂µ < w¯n + µ
∂w¯m
∂µ
− ∂w¯m
∂µ
has to hold.
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D Appendix to Chapter 4
Description of the Estimation Sample
Our estimation sample comprises all firms that have at least one affiliate, in at least one
of the years between 1999 and 2006, and in at least one of the 33 countries listed in Table
D.3. Hence, we consider only German outward FDI. Furthermore, we exclude indirect FDI
from our estimation sample. We only consider countries in which at least 5 affiliates are
located. We do not consider holding companies. Furthermore, we exclude all non-firms
from the estimation sample, meaning the public sector. As the reporting thresholds have
changed over this period of time, we consider all firms which hold 50 percent or more of
the shares or voting rights of a foreign enterprise with a balance sheet total of more than
3 million Euro. We also deflate the balance sheet total to make the data comparable over
time. Moreover, we exclude those affiliate sectors that are related to natural resources
in order to rule out resource driven location decisions. Therefore, we drop affiliates that
are in the following sectors: agriculture, hunting and related service activities; forestry,
logging and related service activities; fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms,
service activities incidental to fishing; Mining of coal and lignite, extraction of peat;
extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas, service activities incidental to oil and gas
extraction; mining of uranium and thorium ores; mining; mining and quarrying, other
mining.
We inflate the dataset such that each parent firm for every existing affiliate can invest in
every country in every year. Our regression sample contains 47 affiliate sectors. The list
of affiliate sectors can be found in Table D.4. The number of countries in our sample is
limited to 33 due to limited data availability of our country characteristics.
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Figure D.1: Average Upstreamness over Early and Mid 2000 for Each Affiliate Sector
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Table D.2: List of Dependent and Explanatory Variables
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
FDI Dummy Dummy variable indicating whether a parent firm has invested
in a specific sector in a country in a year
0.0414 0.1991
Average Schooling Variable measuring country’s endowment with human capital 9.1501 2.2769
Total Factor Productivity Variable measuring a country’s TFP level relative to the
United States
0.6996 0.2463
log Total Factor Productivity Logarithm of TFP as variable is skewed -0.4332 0.4190
Wage Variable measuring factor costs 1,954.881 1,278.548
log Wage Logarithm of wage as variable is skewed 7.2317 0.9833
Market Entry Variable measuring the performance of countries in terms of
the cost of starting a new business
7.9044 1.8317
Remoteness Variable measuring the distance of the host country from all
other countries in the world weighted by their share of world
GDP
842,949.9 265,602.4
log Remoteness Logarithm of remoteness as variable is skewed 13.6008 0.2878
Upstreamness Variable capturing at which stage of a production process an
affiliate sector is located
2.1354 0.5373
Rule of Law Variable measuring contract enforceability and protection of
property rights in a country
3.4664 0.9090
Financial Development Variable measuring a country’s financial development as the
ratio of private credit to GDP
0.8832 0.4814
log Financial Development Logarithm of financial development as variable is skewed -0.3455 0.7542
Capital Intensity Variable measuring capital intensity as the log physical capital
per worker
1,219,008 650,990.4
log Capital Intensity Logarithm of capital intensity as variable is skewed 13.7353 0.9062
absolute GDP Variable measuring a country’s absolute GDP 1.01e+12 2.22e+12
Log absolute GDP Logarithm of absolute GDP as variable is skewed 26.58 1.29
Affiliate Number Number of German Affiliates in a country in a year 150.79 159.23
Log Affiliate Number Logarithm of Affiliate Number as variable is skewed 4.43 1.21
Comparative Advantage Dummy indicating whether a country has a comparative ad-
vantage in a sector
0.39 0.49
Labor productivity Labor productivity measured as output per person employed 36,733 15,909
Log Labor productivity Logarithm of Labor productivity as variable is skewed 10.35 0.66
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Table D.3: List of Countries in the Estimation Sample
Argentina Sweden
Australia Thailand
Austria Turkey
Belgium United Kingdom
Brazil United States
Cyprus Venezuela
Denmark
Egypt Additional countries (52 sample):
Finland Switzerland
France Morocco
Greece Tunisia
Hong Kong Nigeria
India Kenya
Ireland South Africa
Israel Canada
Italy Guatemala
Japan Panama
Luxembourg Columbia
Mexico Ecuador
Netherlands Chile
Norway Uruguay
Pakistan Iran
Peru Sri Lanka
Philippines Indonesia
Portugal Malaysia
Singapore China
Spain Republic of Korea
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Table D.4: List of Affiliate Sectors in the Estimation Sample with Nace Rev. 1 categories
1500 Manufacture of food products and beverages
1600 Manufacture of tobacco products
1700 Manufacture of textiles
1800 Manufacture of textile products
1900 Manufacture of leather and leather products
2000 Manufacture of wood and wood products
2100 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products
2200 Publishing, printing and reproduction or recorded media
2300 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
2400 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
2500 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
2600 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
2700 Manufacture of basic metals
2800 Manufacture of metal products
2900 Manufacture of machinery and equipment
3000 Manufacture of office machinery and computers
3100 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus
3200 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
3300 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
3400 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
3500 Manufacture of other transport equipment
3600 Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c.
3700 Recycling
4000 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
4100 Collection, purification and distribution of water
4500 Construction
5000 Sale, repair of motor vehicles, retail sale of automotive fuel
5100 Wholesale trade and commission trade
5200 Retail trade
5500 Hotels and restaurants
6000 Land transport, transport via pipelines
6100 Water transport
6200 Air transport
6300 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies
6400 Post and telecommunications
6560 Other credit institutions
6570 Financial leasing
6580 Other financial intermediaries
6590 Investmentfunds
6600 Insurance and pension funding
6700 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation
7050 Housing enterprises
7060 Other real estate activities
7100 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods
7200 Computer and related activities
7300 Research and development
7400 Other business activities
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